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vAbstract
This dissertation is composed of three separate and self-contained chapters on two different
areas: (i) reputation building and competition in on-line markets, and (ii) the heterogeneous
transmission of monetary policy to household consumption expenditures and income.
The first paper investigates how sellers’ strategic competition for high valuation buyers shapes
reputation building incentives in a setting resembling an on-line market, and how it determines
the dynamics of prices and reputation itself. Sellers repeatedly auction off a good to a pool of
short-lived buyers; efforts and valuations are private information. Ceteris paribus, as the repu-
tation of competitors increase (intensity of competition), a seller’s incentive to exert effort that
helps to successfully complete a transaction decrease. This "intensity" of competition effect,
however, quickly disappears as the number of buyers in the market increases, providing a mo-
tivation for the use of equilibrium concepts such as “oblivious equilibrium”, in which the only
payoff relevant reputation is the average one.
The second chapter shifts focus to household expenditure, debt and monetary policy. It is
shown that, in response to an interest rate change, mortgagors in the U.K. and U.S. adjust their
spending significantly (especially on durable goods) but outright home-owners do not. While
the dollar change in mortgage payments is nearly three times larger in the U.K. than in the
U.S., these magnitudes are much smaller than the overall change in expenditure. In contrast,
the income change is sizable and similar across both household groups and countries. Con-
sistent with the predictions of a simple heterogeneous agents model with credit-constrained
households and multi-period fixed-rate debt contracts, our evidence suggests that the general
equilibrium effect of monetary policy on income is quantitatively more important than the di-
rect effect on cash-flows.
The third chapter exploits individual mortgage data in the UK to try to further understand
the role of mortgagor’s balance sheets in the transmission of monetary policy. Estimation re-
sults point in the direction of significant heterogeneity in two dimensions: (i) in the response
of observed leverage (loan-to-value) and affordability (loan-to-income) ratios at the time of
origination for the median mortgagor, and (ii) the response of LTVs for households that are
first-time-buyers and those that are non-first-time-buyers.
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1Chapter 1
Reputation and Strategic Competition:
The Case of an Online Market
joint with Emanuela Iancu (National Institute of Economic Research, Sweden)1
Keywords: reputation, strategic competition, on-line market, private information
1.1 Introduction
Many markets, especially on-line markets such as eBay, Amazon or on-line house rent-
ing platforms, are characterized by (at least) two key informational features. First,
there is a potential role for reputation building: buyers have little knowledge about
the sellers or the quality of a product they are interested in purchasing. Feedbacks
and comments by previous buyers, as well as the information content in sellers’ mar-
keting campaign, can then be aggregated into public reputation measures. In the spirit
of Akerlof, 1970, such measures might help welfare improving trades to occur, and in
the process allow "good" sellers to increase their revenues. Second, precisely this pub-
lic and non-anonymous nature of reputation can give rise to strategic behavior that
affects observed market outcomes.
This paper tackles two relevant questions related to the incentives characteristic for
on-line markets. We first investigate the role of strategic competition between sellers in
altering the incentives to build a reputation, and how this affects observed market out-
comes. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to characterize the interaction between
strategic competition and reputation building. Second, we analyze quantitatively two
identification problems in the reduced-form estimation of the impact of reputation on
a seller’s revenues. These problems can arise when strategic or reputation building
behavior is not incorporated into the estimated model, even when panel data or field
experiment data on revenues and reputation measures is used.
1This chapter has benefited greatly from comments and discussions with Arpad Abraham, Jean-Pierre Benoît,
Wouter Den Haan, Daniel García, David Levine, David Pothier, Tomás Rodriguez Barraquer, David Strauss, Fer-
nando Vega-Redondo, Felipe Zurita, as well as seminar participants at the World Congress of Game Theory 2012,
the EEA-ESEM Meetings in Malaga 2012, the EUI Netwroks and Microeconomics Working Groups, EUI Cooper
Meetings.
2 Chapter 1. Reputation and Strategic Competition: The Case of an Online Market
In our benchmark environment, two long lived sellers repeatedly auction homo-
geneous items to a finite number of different bidders each period. Over time, sellers
compete in attracting a higher number of high valuation bidders. Sellers have different
abilities, a feature that is only privately observed. In addition, once the good is sold,
sellers put effort in delivering the item (i.e. send the promised good on time, with-
out quality deficiencies, etc.), a decision unobserved by other buyers and sellers. The
game therefore presents both adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Buyers
have private valuations for the good on auction, and do not have any incentive to pur-
chase more than one object over time. Once the transaction is completed, the winner
of the auction truthfully reports the outcome in a binary form, an information which
is added to the public history of the seller. Buyers form beliefs in a Bayesian fashion
about sellers’ unobserved abilities and anticipate the optimal effort decision for each
type of seller. Based on these measures, they optimally select an auction and place a
bid as described in Bapna, Dellarocas, and Rice, 2010.
Our first finding points out the fact that when sellers compete strategically, compe-
tition erodes marginal future profits and hampers sellers incentive to exert high effort
in the first place: the higher the current reputation of the competitor, the less effort is
a seller willing to put in order to build a reputation for the future. Nevertheless, we
find that, as the number of bidders in the market increases, the effect of competition on
effort exertion is reduced. In addition, a high number of potential buyers every period
incentivizes sellers to work more in the present as they expect higher future profits (i.e.
a higher highest expected bid in their auction). Our results on reputation building per
se fall in line with Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson, 2004 and Holmstrom, 1999 pre-
dictions. Independent on whether a retailer acts as a single seller or faces competition
from another fellow, a seller will always choose a relative higher effort to improve on
his reputation when the latter is low. Once his type has been learned by the market, he
opts for a relatively lower effort. This has been coined as the "spending of reputation".
Our second contribution consists in analyzing two identification problems that are
linked to the reduced form estimation of the impact of reputation on revenues when
strategic interactions and reputation building behavior are not taken into account in
the estimation process. In addition, we analyze the dependence of such bias on market
characteristics, such as the number of bidders at any given point.
Recent empirical studies have estimated different reduced form effects of reputa-
tion and feedback changes on sellers’ revenues / sales in on-line markets, using both
randomized "field" experiment data and observational panel data on revenues and
reputation. Resnick et al., 2006 presents the first field experiment study in which a
seller with an established reputation is asked to create a second identity and to oper-
ate (i.e. sell) under both identities employing the same "effort". The researchers then
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compare different revenue measures generated under the two identities.2 This strat-
egy allows them to control for many potential factors omitted in observational studies,
related specially to the effort in presenting the good, in answering inquiries, in packag-
ing, etc. They show that, indeed, the identity with better reputation generates higher
revenues: willingness to pay increases by 8%, although they also find that one or two
negative feedback does ot have a significant effect on revenues for the "new" seller. In
observational data study, Cabral and Hortaçsu, 2010 analyze a sample of 819 sellers of
three different goods3 and follow them at monthly intervals between October 24, 2002
and March 16, 2003. They first estimate a reduced form impact of reputation on prices
using cross sectional data; in a second exercise, they use longitudinal data of seller’s
sales and reputation histories to estimate the impact of the first negative feedback on the
dynamics of sales. They find that conditional mean (age-detrended) sales growth rates
decrease from +5% to −8% immediately after the first negative.4
We claim, however, that such reduced form (linear) estimations of the impact of
reputation miss two crucial aspects related to reputation building and strategic com-
petition: both sellers’ reputations and unobserved effort decisions might affect current
revenues of a given seller, being at the same time correlated with the seller reputation.
This feature is central to our model, as we consider it to have a significant impact on
a seller’s behavior. In order to understand the importance of such omission, we study
the infinite horizon version of the game described above. This allows us to focus on
the dynamics of revenues, efforts and reputations. We modify the computational algo-
rithm presented in Doraszelski and Pakes, 2007, and solve numerically for a Markov
Perfect Equilibrium. We then use simulated histories of revenues, reputation and effort
to characterize the problems in identifying the reputation-elasticity of revenues from
not incorporating reputational information and unobserved effort decisions into a re-
duced form model. In our dynamic game, the relevant elasticity is non-monotone on a
seller’s reputation, and it varies with the competitor’s reputation. Due to the strategic
behavior, reputations are correlated in equilibrium, which implies that the omission of
the competitors reputation in the estimated model will bias the results. The mechanism
that leads to this bias arises if the decisions made by a seller’s competitors depend on
the seller’s reputation, and if buyers somehow understand this.
The paper proceeds in the following way: in section 1.2 we briefly review our
contribution from the point of view of recent papers on the topic. In section 1.3 we
lay out the two-period environment and we define the equilibrium concept employed
throughout the paper. section 1.4 then develops the main analysis, characterizing the
2They also document 15 previous observational studies of the impact of reputation on different measures of
revenues.
3 IBM ThinkPad T23, collectible coins and 1998 Holidays Teddy Beanie Babies.
4In order to estimate these effects, Cabral and Hortaçsu, 2010 averaged weekly sales growth rates over a four
week window before and after the week in which the seller got his first and respectively second, third, fourth and
fifth negative feedback. Then they conduct t-tests for equality of means before and after the feedback. They use
both a cross-section regression and a panel data approach to estimate the effect of reputation. The results, in line
with previous research, show a steady positive trend of profits until the first negative feedback is received.
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mechanisms relevant for our results in a two period version of the game.5 Finally,
section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
The present paper makes a significant contribution to a recently emerged strand from
the reputation literature, that analyzes competition among long-lived firms in a dy-
namic environment dominated by adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Al-
though the role of reputation building has been studied extensively since the semi-
nal paper of Kreps and Wilson, 1982, there is only a small number of studies analyz-
ing games with asymmetric information in which many long lived players compete
against each other. This literature, fostered by Horner, 2002, Tadelis, 2002, Vial, 2010
and Vial and Zurita, 2012, builds on the one-seller case studied in the papers of Holm-
strom, 1999 and Mailath and Samuelson, 2001. The purpose of these models is under-
standing whether competition can induce a reputational equilibrium in which oppor-
tunistic players choose high effort. The way in which these studies model competition,
however, is through Walrasian markets. In consequence, the strategic behavior of the
long-run players becomes rather limited, which implies that sellers do not incorporate
in their decisions the market’s beliefs about their competitors. We contribute to this
literature by assuming a dynamic auction environment with a finite number of sell-
ers and buyers; this allows us to explicitly analyze the role of strategic competition in
shaping sellers’ reputation building decisions.
Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson, 2004 and Holmstrom, 1999 show that within a
monopolistic environment a reputational mechanism cannot survive indefinitely as a
mean to sustain an equilibrium with a high level of effort if the uncertainty about types
disappears over time. Reputation - in the sense of Kreps and Wilson, 1982- is a commit-
ment device that allows sellers to overcome the moral hazard problem, characterized
by the short-term incentive to exert low effort, even though higher profits could be
earned when committing to high effort in the long run. The dynamics of reputation in
our benchmark game between a monopolist and a sequence of N -bidders sets is sub-
ject to the same pattern: as long as there is uncertainty about one’s type, sellers exert
costly effort in equilibrium. Over time, the market learns the seller’s type and so the
incentives to employ costly effort gradually decrease. As in Holmstrom, 1999, the type
of a seller has an intrinsic value, in addition to the information that it provides about
the effort decision of a seller in equilibrium.
Our benchmark game stems from Mailath and Samuelson, 2001, with some impor-
tant distinctions. They consider an environment with imperfect public monitoring, in
which consumers observe only a noisy signal of firms’ decision. "Inept" sellers can
5 In the appendix to this chapter, section A.5 which is preliminary work, I describe and briefly characterize an
infinite horizon version of the game in order to assess quantitatively the the problems to empirically identify the
reputation elasticity of revenues.
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only exert low effort while the "competent" have the choice between high or low effort.
Reputation building then becomes an exercise where competent firms try to separate
themselves from inept ones, rather than mimicking a "Stackelberg" type. The key in-
gredient for maintaining high effort on the equilibrium path is the replenishment of
uncertainty by adding an unobservable type change process. With permanent types,
they find that there are no pure strategy Markov equilibrium with high effort is ex-
erted in equilibrium. The key idea behind these results lies in the convergence of high
and low effort value functions when uncertainty is not replenished or when firms are
replaced always by competent ones. Our benchmark game does not present such un-
certainty in types, and we can still generate temporarily high effort. The reason lies
in that, unlike Holmstrom, 1999 or our paper, in Mailath and Samuelson, 2001 a high
reputation is valuable only to the extent that it signals high effort.
Horner, 2002, Vial, 2010 and Vial and Zurita, 2012 analyze reputational equilib-
rium in competitive environments. In a setup in which both firms and consumers are
atomistic and infinitely lived as described in Horner, 2002, competition supports the
existence of equilibria in which opportunistic firms always exert high effort. In Horner,
2002 reputation is built gradually and vanishes instantly upon the deliverance of bad
quality, for which a firm is punished by losing its customers to other firms with impec-
cable records. Prices are initially low but rise with a firm’s reputation. Vial, 2010 and
Vial and Zurita, 2012 consider a competitive environment as in Mailath and Samuel-
son, 2001 and show that a reputational equilibrium with high effort can be attained. In
contrast with Horner, 2002, in Vial, 2010 and Vial and Zurita, 2012 reputation builds
and dissipates gradually. Nevertheless, while Vial, 2010 focuses on the population dis-
tribution of reputations and its impact on equilibrium prices, Vial and Zurita, 2012
investigates the entry/exit decision of a firm and the resulting industry dynamics. As
in Horner, 2002, sellers in our model profit more not only from having a good reputa-
tion, but from having the better reputation. Under the assumption that the number of
buyers is sufficiently higher relative to the number of sellers, we ensure that sellers will
always expect a certain number of bidders with positive probability. The allocation of
bidders to auctions in equilibrium is done in an assortative fashion: bidders with high
valuation bid exclusively in the auction of the seller with the relatively higher chances
to successfully deliver the good, while bidders with valuations from the lower part of
the distribution bid with positive probability in both auctions. The threshold that sep-
arates the "high valuation" bidders from the "low valuation" bidders is endogenously
determined by the likelihood ratio of successful deliveries of the two sellers. This re-
sult ensures a gradual increase and respectively a gradual dissipation of reputation as
in Vial, 2010. This very aspect will allow us to investigate the strategic role competition
plays in our model in contrast with the above mentioned papers.
As in Vial, 2010 and in our model, the equilibrium price function is key to under-
standing the incentives of sellers to exert effort, both in the monopolistic and in the
competitive setting. The equilibrium price is a function of both equilibrium beliefs
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about a seller’s type and the distribution of buyers’ valuations and it incorporates the
equilibrium behavior of both parties. In this setting, the updating of beliefs after a
success or failure determines both the effect of current actions on future reputations
and implicitly on future revenues. The main difference with respect to Vial, 2010 and
Horner, 2002 is our focus on the finite number of bidders and sellers, that induces long-
run players to strategically compete for high valuation buyers.
1.3 The Set-Up
The general game builds on Mailath and Samuelson, 2001 and introduces some modi-
fications. In the baseline game, time is discrete, and indexed by t = 1, 2. In each period,
there are either 1 or 2 long-lived seller(s) that open an auction each, and N new risk-
neutral buyers that select (if more than 1 seller) and bid once in the auctions available
at the time they arrive to the market. A good is allocated to a buyer through a second-
price auction. All auctions start and end simultaneously. Further, the set of buyers will
be denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, while the set of sellers by J = {1, 2}.
1.3.1 Sellers
There are 2 risk-neutral long-run sellers that each period put up for sale a homoge-
neous good. Sellers are long-lived, with a common discount factor δ. A seller can be of
either of"good" or of "bad" type. The type is indexed by θ ∈ {g, b}, where 0 ≤ b ≤ g ≤ 1
and stands for the privately observed innate ability or trustworthiness of the seller to
execute a successful transaction. The prior probability that a seller is of good type is
µj,0 ≡ P (θj = g).
Assumption 1 The type θj is fixed throughout the life of the seller j, for j = 1, 2.
Assumption 1 implies that there is no "replenishment" of uncertainty. This is different
from Mailath and Samuelson, 2001, where types are allowed to change randomly or
endogneously.
In our setting, we think about the type of a seller as an "aggregate" measure of
competence and morality characteristics.6
6When interpreting a seller’s type, we don’t distinguish among two dimensions of her privately observed char-
acteristics: her trustworthiness in revealing information before trade takes place and her ability to deliver the good
in a successful way. Jullien and Park, 2011 analyzes the emergence of reputational equilibrium when these two di-
mensions are distinguished. They propose an equilibrium where there is an endogenous complementarity, in terms
of market perception of information, between honesty in pre-trade communication (honesty) and ability to deliver
good quality (reputation). In such setting, pre-trade communication is cheap-talk; however, in the benchmark equi-
librium they consider, high type sellers truthfully reveal the quality of their good, while low types tend to lie more
often; once the quality of the good is revealed (through a feedback system) a truthfull pre-trade communication is
mapped into a higher probability of the seller being of high ability. Therefore, learning occurs at a faster rate than
when the distinction in the dimensions of reputation is not consider (our paper).
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Actions, Information and Payoffs
For successfully delivering the product after the auction has been carried out, a seller
has to exert some effort e. We think about the effort as the amount of work put in
delivering the product properly, securely and professionally packaged, in sending in
the specified time the exact advertised object. Effort has a cost for the seller, c(·), and is
unobserved by buyers and by the other seller (i.e. the competitor).
Assumption 2 The cost function is increasing and convex and has the following properties:
c(eθ) = 0, c′(eθ) = 0 ∀eθ ∈ [0, e] and c(eθ) > 0, c′(eθ) > 0 and c′′(eθ) > 0 ∀eθ ∈ (e, 1). The
cost function is the same for all sellers.
In other words, for a sequence of low efforts, the seller incurs no costs; effort be-
comes costly above the threshold e, which we call the "maximum costless effort". By
devising a cost function of this form, we are implicitly assuming that it is a weakly
dominant strategy for each seller to exert a positive amount of effort, to which a strictly
positive probability of success is associated 7.
Each transaction carried out by seller j and buyer i at time t has an outcome, which
we define as a random variable yt,j that can take two values: S (success) or F (failure).
Assumption 3 The technology is such that the probability of success depends both on sellers’
effort and on his type, i.e. the probability of success of each transaction takes the form
P
(
yj,t = S|eθjt,j, θj
)
= e
θj
t,j · θj (1.1)
For a given effort level, the "good" seller has almost always a higher probability
of success in delivering the product. Conditional on effort and types, outcomes are
independent across sellers:
P
(
Yj = yj , Y−j = y−j
∣∣∣θj , θ−j ; eθjj , eθ−j−j ) = P (Yj = yj∣∣∣θj , eθjj )P (Y−j = y−j∣∣∣θ−j , eθ−j−j ) ∀ j 6= −j
(1.2)
At the beginning of each period t, sellers have two sets of information: public infor-
mation, given by the publicly observable sequence of outcomes {yt−1}t≥1 with yt−1 =
{y1,t−1, y2,t−1} assuming that yj,0 = ∅ ∀j ∈ 1, 2, and private information, given by his
type (which is time-invariant) and the sequence of own effort decisions
{
e
θj
j,t, θj
}
j,t≥1
.8
The public reputation of seller j at the beginning of auction t ≥ 1 is defined as
µj,t−1 ≡ P
(
θj = g|yt−1
)
7Note that this is a similar assumption to a standard one in the literature, which allows for 0-effort but assumes
that the probability of success (or more generally, the density of outcomes) is always greater than 0. In particular,
many papers assume two possible effort levels, say eL and eH , and then assume that the density of outcomes given
eH first-order stochastically dominates the one given eL.
8Here we assume that prices paid by previous buyers in seller’s j past auctions are not observed by upcoming
buyers. This rules out complicated behavior and equilibria in which buyers condition their bidding on past realized
prices.
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where µj,0 is the belief about the seller’s j type at the beginning of the game. Given
our assumption regarding the public information yt−1 about seller j at the beginning
of period t, µj,t−1 is the common belief that all other players (buyers and other sellers)
hold about seller j being of good type.
LetHtj be the set of all possible public histories seller j can have at the beginning of
period t + 1: Htj = {htj ∈ {S, F}t, t ≥ 1}, where h0j = ∅. The set of all possible histories
of the game is defined by the product of all sellers’ historiesHt = ×
j
Htj .
Seller’s j expected revenue from an auction, Rj , is the expected second highest bid
of the respective auction paid by the winning bidder. In a second price auction, the
expected revenue of the seller is given by
Rj = E
(
b
(2)
j
∣∣∣ # of buyers, strategies of buyers)
Henceforth, the expected revenue of seller j at time t denoted by Rj,t is a function of
all sellers’ equilibrium actions in period t. Under the assumption that each seller sells
only one good each period, seller’s j ex-ante stage payoffs are given by
pi
θj
j,t = Rj,t − c
(
e
θj
j,t
)
(1.3)
The inter-temporal problem for seller j of type θj is then
max{
e
θj
j,t
}
t=1,2
Π
θj
j,0 = Rj,1 − c
(
e
θj
j,1
)
+ δE1
(
Rj,2 − c
(
e
θj
j,2
))
(1.4)
1.3.2 Buyers
The benchmark setting follows closely Bapna, Dellarocas, and Rice, 2010. Different
from them, however, in our setup buyers anticipate seller’s equilibrium actions and
incorporate this information in their optimal bidding strategies.
Buyers have unit demand and only live for one period, i.e. they are interested in
buying one unit of the good offered by sellers today (in later sections we will discuss
deviations from this assumption). Each buyer has private information about his valu-
ation vi, and valuations are independently drawn from the distribution vi ∼ U [0, 1].
Assumption 4 The total number of biddersN is constant in every period. In addition, bothN
as well as the distribution from which valuations are drawn every period are common knowl-
edge to all market participants.
Actions and Payoffs
Buyers’ strategies consist in deciding in which auction to bid, and the bid bij ∈ [0,∞)
they place in the respective auction. Therefore, a buyer’s i strategy consists of two
elements: a bid vector bi(vi) and an auction selection strategy si(vi). The bid vector bi =
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(bi1, . . . , b
i
J) consists of elements b
i
j representing the amount of money buyer i is willing
to place in seller’s j auction if she were to bid in that auction. An auction selection
strategy is a vector si(vi) = (sij(vi))Jj=1 where sij(vi) is the probability that buyer i with
valuation vi bids in seller’s j auction.
Assumption 5 In our benchmark game, buyers are allowed to select only one auction and to
bid once.
Since buyers’ valuations are freshly drawn every period, their strategic behavior is
independent of time and hence we omit the time index in the buyers’ problem.
Prior to selecting a seller, each buyer forms beliefs about sellers delivering success-
fully the good. We make a final assumption about the information available to buyers:
Assumption 6 Current bidders cannot observe past prices.
Assumption 6 implies that buyers only observe past outcomes before deciding.
Given sellers’ reputations µ = (µj)j∈J , buyers anticipate the effort a seller j of type
θj will exert. The belief regarding the successful delivery of seller j is defined as
rj,t ≡ P (yj,t = S|µj,t−1) = µj,t−1 · ge˜gj,t + (1− µj,t−1) · be˜bj,t (1.5)
where e˜θjj,t is the anticipated effort of seller j in auction t if she were of type θj . In
other words, rj,t stands for the anticipated probability of a successful transaction when
facing a seller of unknown type whose public beliefs are by µj,t−1.
It is a well established result that in a second price auction truthful bidding is a
weakly dominant strategy. In our setup buyers’ optimal strategy is to bid their ex-
pected valuation of the item in each auction:
b∗ij (v
i, rj,t) = rj,tv
i (1.6)
Conditional on winning auction j, buyer’s i expected surplus is:
U˜i
(
vi, rj,t, b
−i
j
)
= rj,tv
i − E
(
b
(2)
j |bij > max−i
{
b−ij
})
(1.7)
where b(2)j is the second highest bid in j’s auction and {b−ij } is the set of all bids in
seller’s j auction j, excluding bidder i.
Equation (1.7) takes into account only the subset of buyers that have decided to bid
in seller’s j auction. The ex-ante expected surplus from bidding in seller’s j auction is
given by
Ui
(
vi, rj,t
)
=
N−1∑
n=0
P (n+ 1 bidders in auction j)P
(
vi = max
k
vk
)
×
(
rj,tv
i − E
(
b(2)|b(1) = bi, n+ 1 bidders
))
(1.8)
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The first term in expression 1.8 is the probability that given that there are n + 1
bidders in seller’s j auction, bidder i has the highest valuation among all the bidders
k in that auction. The second term stands for the expected instantaneous expected
surplus of bidder i given that he wins the auction of seller j in which there are in total
n+ 1 bidders.
Buyer’s i expected surplus from bidding in seller’s j auction increases both in
seller’s j reputation and in the expected distance between the highest and the second
highest valuations in seller’s j auction. Hence, buyers face a tradeoff: on the one hand,
a buyer has a higher expected revenue from bidding in the auction of a seller with a
relatively high reputation, since this implies a higher probability of receiving the good,
conditional on winning the auction. On the other hand, given his valuation vi, bidding
in the auction of lower reputation sellers might bring a higher surplus and a higher
probability of winning if buyers of relative low valuation bid in these auctions.
Beliefs Updating
Buyers are forming and updating their beliefs about the type of seller they are facing in
a Bayesian fashion. Having observed the history of seller j consisting in the sequence
of outcomes of past transactions up to time t, buyers hold common beliefs, µj,t−1, at the
beginning of the t-th period about seller j being of "good" type. After the realization of
the outcome of period t, sellers and buyers of period t+1 revise their beliefs about other
sellers’ types using the Bayes rule. In case of a success, the beliefs at the beginning of
period t+ 1 are update to µj,t = µSj,t−1, while in the case of a failure the public believes
that seller j is good with probability µj,t = µFj,t−1. Concretely,
Pt
(
θj = g
∣∣∣yj,t = S, µj,t−1;{e˜θjj,t}) ≡ µSj,t−1 = µj,t−1ge˜gt,jµj,t−1ge˜gj,t + (1− µj,t−1) be˜bj,t (1.9)
and
Pt
(
θj = g
∣∣∣yj,t = F, µj,t−1;{e˜θjj,t}) ≡ µFj,t−1 = µj,t−1 (1− ge˜gj,t)µj,t−1 (1− ge˜gj,t)+ (1− µj,t−1) (1− be˜bj,t)
(1.10)
1.3.3 Markov Strategies
As specified above, the public history of a seller records only the outcomes of past
transactions. Such information restriction when describing strategies still entails many
equilibrium in which reputation has different roles. In order to rule out non intuitive
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equilibria, we will focus on Markov strategies, i.e. we want strategies to make behav-
ior by each seller at any t only dependent on a relatively small subset of the public
information available, or on a sufficient statistic of it.9
Assumption 6 implies that, although sellers can observe past prices, they will turn
out not to be payoff relevant variables at the time of deciding about effort.
In the case of on-line auction platforms such as eBay, the information available to
sellers and potential buyers about each other is significantly limited. Usually, such
information amounts to feedback scores (current and historical, up to a certain past date)
which represent a summary statistic of past evaluations by buyers or sellers. This
information is public, and is the same information observed by a researcher / economist
/ econometrician.
Given assumptions 1-6 and the above considerations, the reputation of seller j at
the beginning of period (auction) t, µj,t−1, is a sufficient statistic about that seller’s type:
it summarizes all the payoff-relevant information about seller’s j type available in the
only publicly observed variables ytj . Such information is payoff-relevant due to the
fact that it helps predict the behavior of sellers in the current auction (recall that buyers
are short lived in our benchmark game). Note that, given the finite-time nature of the
game, then the state space will also include the time period t.
Given the above, a Markov strategy for seller j is :
ej,t : [0, 1]
2 ×Θ× T −→ [0, 1]
where ej,t (µ1, µ2; θj) ≡ eθjj,t (µ1, µ2) is the effort choice of a seller with type θj at period
t, when buyer’s beliefs about all sellers’ types are described by the vector {µj}2j=1 ∈
[0, 1]2.
When facing sellers with different reputations, buyers’ strategies consist in an auc-
tion selection vector and in a set of bids. Given that we restrict buyers to bid in only one
auction, an auction selection strategy for buyer i is a mapping
si : [0, 1]2 × [0, 1] −→ [0, 1]2
where si(vi;µ1, µ2) ≡
{
sij (v
i;µ1, µ2)
}2
j=1
is a 2-dimensional vector of selection proba-
bilities.
1.3.4 Timing
The timing is presented in figure 1.1. The game proceeds in the following way: at
time t = 0, the game is in state (µj,0)j∈J , where µj,0 j ∈ J are the publicly held time-
0-beliefs (prior beliefs) about sellers being competent. We allow these beliefs to be
9Given the functional form for the conditional probability of success, P (y = S|θ, e) = θe, then for any equilib-
rium, every possible history of delivery outcomes ht−1 ∈ Ht−1 will have positive probability in such equilibrium.
This will simplify considerably the equilibrium characterization, since there will be no "off-equilibrium path" infor-
mation set.
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different across sellers. Sellers open simultaneous auctions in which all sell the same
homogeneous good. Buyers simultaneously select an auction and place a bid. The
winners of each auction are announced and the second highest bid in each auction is
paid out to the respective seller, as described in the previous section. Sellers decide
then on the effort they want to put in delivering the object, bearing in mind that the
probability of a success is proportional to their effort and that the success cannot be
guaranteed. Any of the two possible outcomes - success yj,0 = S or failure yj,0 = F -
will be then truthfully reported by buyers and enter the public record. Based on the
outcome, other sellers and buyers update their beliefs about seller’s j type. The infinite
game consists of infinitely many repetitions of the stage-game described above.
FIGURE 1.1: Timing
1.3.5 Equilibrium
Buyers’ equilibrium behavior derived in Bapna, Dellarocas, and Rice, 2010 is based on
their perceived success probability rj,t. In our setup, buyers observe sellers’ reputation
µj,t−1 and, anticipating sellers’ equilibrium behavior e˜
θj
j,t, buyers form a measure of the
success probability rj,tfor each seller, as described in equation 1.5. Note that the buyer’s
problem and equilibrium behavior can be characterized for a given set of beliefs. In other
words, buyers play a one shot game and their behavior is static by assumption.10
Definition 7 A tuple
({
egj (µ) , e
b
j (µ)
}
j
, {si (vi;µ) , bi (vi;µ)}i ,µ
)
, with µ ≡ {µ1, ...µJ},
is a Markov Perfect (Bayesian) Equilibrium (MPE) of the reputation game with asymmetric
information if, for a buyer’s valuation distribution F (·):
1. Buyers selection strategies si (vi;µ) and bidding behavior bi (vi;µ) are optimal given µ,
their valuation vi and distribution F.
2. Sellers choose effort
{
egj (µ) , e
b
j (µ)
}
j
to maximize continuation payoffs (1.4) , given µ.
10We analyze the role of assuming short lived buyers in the robustness section.
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3. Sellers’ behavior is consistent with the Markov-belief function (1.5):
rj,t = µj,t−1 · gegj,t + (1− µj,t−1) · bebj,t
4. Beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ rule:
µj,t (θj = g|, yt, µj,t−1) = P (yj,t|θj = g) · µt−1∑
θj
P (yj,t|θj) · P (θj) ∀yj,t if
∑
θj
P (yj,t|θ) · P (θj) > 0.
1.4 Characterization and Analysis
In order to disentangle the effects that competition and reputation incentives have on
effort an welfare, we study separately two versions of the game: (i) the case when there
only one seller (and everyone knows so) , and (ii) the case with 2 sellers.
1.4.1 Reputation Effects with One Seller
We first analyze the two period game with a single seller. This will allow us to isolate
how the two main information asymmetries shape the equilibrium effort strategies
and reputation building. We do this by characterizing the market equilibrium in such
scenario and then comparing with three alternative informational assumptions: (i) a
situation in which the seller can commit ex-ante (i.e. before buyers bid) to exert some
effort, and where the type (ability) of the seller is observed; (ii) a second scenario where
the seller can commit, but her type is now unobserved; and (iii) our case of interest, in
which the seller cannot commit ex-ante, and her type is unobserved, i.e., where both
adverse selection and moral hazard problems are present.
Our results are consistent with a (finite horizon version) of Holmstrom, 1999 and
Mailath and Samuelson, 2001: there is an equilibrium (which in our case is unique in
Markov strategies) in which the monopolist temporally exerts costly effort, and where
such effort strategy is non-monotone in initial beliefs (the state variable).
Building a Reputation in The First Period
A seller auctions off a homogeneous good over two periods. Given the timing in the
game, the seller will employ the maximal costless effort e in period 2 as there are no
future payoffs from which he can gain when employing a costly effort, independently
of her type and on the outcome of the first period.
Since there are no alternative auctions, buyer’s selection strategy is trivial. Equilib-
rium bidding implies that the expected revenue of the seller in a second price auction
in which valuations are drawn from an uniform distribution and the total number of
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buyers is N equals:
E
(
b
(2)
t
)
= rt ×H2 (N) (1.11)
where E
(
b
(2)
t
)
is the expected second highest bid, and H2 (N) ≡ E
(
v(2)|N bidders)
is the expected valuation of the second highest bidder (a second order statistic; see
appendix A.2 for the derivation of the functional form for H2 (N)).
There are two important features of H2 (N) : (i) it is a function of N , the number of
buyers each period; and (ii) it does not depend on the seller’s reputation, a feature that
will not be necessarily true once we add competition between sellers, and which will
drive seller’s strategic behavior. From now on, we omit the explicit dependence on N .
Equation (1.11) therefore implies that the expected second highest bid will be a linear
function in monopolist’s reputation.
Upon receiving the money, seller 1 decides how much effort to put in delivering the
item. The instantaneous expected payoff of the monopolist at the beginning of period
t, conditional on her type θ is given by:
pit(θ, e
θ
t , e˜
θ
t , µt) = E
(
b
(2)
t | µt
)
− c(eθt ) (1.12)
The present value (PV) of a seller’s profits conditioning on her type θ is then
Πmonop0
(
θ, eθ1, e˜
θ
1, µ0
)
= pi1(θ, e
θ
1, e˜
θ
1, µ0) + δE
[
pi2 (θ, e, µ1)
∣∣∣θ, eθ1] (1.13)
where
E
[
pi2 (·)
∣∣∣θ, eθ1] = eθ1θ · pi2(θ, eθ2, e˜θ2, µ1|y0 = S) + (1− eθ1θ) · pi2(θ, eθ2, e˜θ2, µ1|y0 = F ) (1.14)
Equilibrium effort levels for each type of seller have to solve
max
eθ1
Πmonop0
(
θ, eθ1, e˜
θ
1, µ0
)
(1.15)
s.t. eθt ∈ [e, 1]
Best responses for each type of seller are characterized by the system of first order
conditions for θ = {g, b}:
c′(e∗θ1 ) = δθ
(
piS2 − piF2
)
= δθH2 (N) (µ
S
1 − µF1 )(g − b)e (1.16)
where, as before, H2 (N) is the expected second highest value in the seller’s auction
and e∗θt is the best reply of seller-type θ to the effort of seller-type −θ. These are, in
other words, optimal effort levels employed in period t = 1).
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Lemma 1 The single crossing condition yielded by the complementarity of effort and types,
implies that higher types always choose higher efforts: e∗g1 > e∗b1 .
Proof. Note that
c′(e∗g1 ) = δgH2(µ
S
1 − µF1 )(g − b)e > δbH2(µS1 − µF1 )(g − b)e = c′(e∗b1 )
The cost function being monotonically increasing and convex results in c′(e∗g1 ) > c′(e∗b1 ),
from which follows that e∗g1 > e∗b2
With unobservable types, the reputation attributed to the seller at time t = 2 crucially
depends on the outcome of the first period: r2 = (µ1g + (1 − µ1)b)e, where µ1 are
updated beliefs given the outcome of the first period (µ1 = µS1 or µ1 = µF1 ). The buyers
active at this stage will bid their expected valuation for the good: b∗i(vi) = r2vi. Given
that reputation r2 is increasing in beliefs ∂r2∂µ1 = (g − b)e > 0, a monopolist has high
incentives to conclude period 1 with a success as µS1 > µF1 . Therefore, employing a
higher but costly effort level in period 1 will raise the probability of a success and the
implied future payoffs. In determining the optimal effort level, the monopolist will
trade off the future benefits of a higher reputation with the present cost of effort.
Proposition 1 below establishes the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in
the 2 periods game, in which the monopolist seller temporally exerts positive effort.
In addition, proposition 2 characterizes the role of a reputation mechanism in such
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium of the two-periods game where a monopolist of unobservable
type chooses (temporally) costly effort exists and is unique.
Proof. See appendix A.4
Proposition 2 below characterizes the equilibrium with moral hazard and adverse
selection
Proposition 2 For any type θ, θ ∈ {b, g}, in the Markov equilibrium with hidden effort and
unobserved type:
1. For any µ ∈ [0, 1] the equilibrium effort level in period 1 increases with the discount factor
δ; i.e.,
∂eθj,1(µ)
∂δ
> 0, ∀j, θ.
2. For any µ ∈ [0, 1] the effort level of the good type in period 1 is increasing in g and
decreasing in b; i.e.,
∂eθj,1(µ)
∂g
> 0 and
∂eθj,1(µ)
∂b
< 0. The opposite is true for the effort level of
the bad type.
3. The equilibrium effort level in period 1 is non-monotone and concave in initial beliefs µ0:
∂eθj,1(µ)
∂µ0
> 0 for µ0 < µ∗ and
∂eθj,1(µ)
∂µ0
< 0 for µ0 > µ∗. The threshold µ∗ is a function of the
different parameters of the game, and in particular, of g and b.
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FIGURE 1.2: Equilibrium updating of beliefs after S and F. Left: g = 0.9 b = 0.1
Right: g = 0.7 b = 0.5
Proof. See appendix A.4.
Result 1 in proposition 2 is straightforward. The higher the discount factor for
a seller, the more relevant future revenues become for her, and therefore reputation
building has a higher value. Result 2. captures an important aspect of on-line markets
(and markets in general with imperfect information in a dynamic setting). Figure 1.2
presents the argument graphically: the plot shows the updating of type-beliefs, for an
initial prior, after a successful transaction and after a failed one (equations (1.9) and
(1.9)) . The left-hand side plot presents the case where g = .9 and b = .1, while the
right-hand side plot presents the case of g = .7 and b = .6.: if the difference g − b is
close to 1, we are in a situation in which a seller can be either very able / willing, or
almost not able at all, to deliver successfully. For any initial belief, a seller of good
type has then a strong incentive to separate herself from a seller of bad type through
relatively high levels of effort, the reason being that a successful outcome will reveal a
lot of information about the sellers ability; clearly, this is true as long as this marginal
benefit is higher than the marginal cost of effort. For a bad type seller (i.e. the incom-
petent seller) things are different. Although higher g creates incentives for her to try
to mimic a good seller, the same happens if the value of b increases. The reason is that
when g − b is small and effort is not observable, it is harder for buyers to distinguish
among sellers of different abilities. This implies that effort will pay relatively more to
bad type sellers. The convexity of the cost function then drives the low level of efforts
in equilibrium. This is the standard likelihood ratio property coming into play.11
Result 3. requires a careful explanation. The upper row in figure 1.5 depicts how
the optimal effort for both types varies with different initial beliefs. As long as the
seller cannot commit ex-ante to an effort level, the uncertainty about the seller’s type is
11See appendix A.3 for a more detailed description of this.
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FIGURE 1.3: Equilibrium effort (top) and PV profits (bottom). Left: g = 0.9 b =
0.1 Right: g = 0.7 b = 0.6
what drives her incentives of employing costly effort. As the buyers believe with more
certainty that they are facing a particular type the game starts resembling the one with
observable types described above. It follows that the incentives for any seller type to
exert costly effort vanishes. This is similar to the findings in Holmstrom, 1999. In our
game, this mechanism is clear from the optimality condition (1.16) for each type. As
µ0 → 1 also µS0 → 1 and µF0 → 1 so µS0 − µF0 → 0. The equilibrium effort level for each
type will converge then to the maximal costless effort level e∗θ → e. The same principle
applies for the case where µ0 → 0. The non-monotonicity in µ is close to the concept of
"spending" a reputation described in Mailath and Samuelson, 2001.
Alternative Information Assumptions
If the seller’s type is observable, the game is trivial. The only possible equilibrium is
one in which the monopolist exerts the maximum costless effort in both periods, i.e.
eθobsNCt = e, t = 1, 2, θ ∈ {b, g}. Expected profits for the seller are then given by
ΠθobsNC = (1 + δ) (eθH2) (1.17)
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This result is straightforward: if the ability of the seller is publicly observable, the
seller has no "reputation" to defend and maintain. The perceived probability of success
of a transaction at time t is given by rt = θe ,t = 1, 2, θ ∈ {b, g}. The corresponding
bid in the first period by buyer i will be b(vi) = θevi. Furthermore, the outcome of the
first period is irrelevant for the second period since beliefs are degenerate. Employing
costly effort has then no effect on future payoffs, and although they do affect the equi-
librium bids in the first period (since buyers predict the seller’s behavior), the seller
is not able to commit to a given effort ex-ante. This implies an equilibrium effort that
satisfies c(eθobsNCt ) = 0. Independently of what had happened in period 1, the seller
will always employ the maximal costless effort in period 2. Given the monopolist’s
type and anticipating her defective behavior, a buyer with valuation vi will submit the
following bid in the second period b(vi) = θevi.
Efficient Effort
The efficient effort can be defined, given the buyer that has won the auction (the buyer
with highest valuation v(1)) , as a solution to the maximization of the total (ex-ante)
surplusWt of the transaction12:
max
{eθ1}θ
W1 = −c
(
eθ1
)
+ θ1e
θ
1E
(
v(1)
)
(1.18)
s.t.
eθ1 ∈ [0, 1]
where E
(
v(1)
)
is the expected highest valuation. The first order conditions of such
problem for θ = b, g are
c′
(
eθeff1
)
= θE
(
v(1)
)
(1.19)
In other words, for a given buyer’s valuation v(1), the efficient allocation is such that
a seller of good type should exert higher effort than a seller of bad type. In addition,
(1.19) implies that, given the properties of c (·) and that vi ∼ [0, 1], eθ1 > e. In other
words, the efficient effort is greater than the maximal costless effort. The idea is simple:
in our model, the seller does not value the good, while the buyer’s value of the good
is v. Given that the price payed is just a transfer between the buyer and the seller,
efficiency stipulates that effort needs to compensate the marginal cost with a positive
impact on the delivery technology.
Commitment and Observable Type
Consider first the case where a seller can credibly commit to a certain level of effort
before the buyers bidding decision, and where her type is publicly observed / known.
12Recall that when there is just one seller all buyers bid in her auction; therefore, selection plays no role, which
implies that we donot care about efficient allocation of buyers to sellers.
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In such scenario, beliefs would play no role, and the probability of a success becomes
rt = θet. This implies that the problem for a seller is now a static one. Concretely, she
would solve
max
e∈[0,1]
θeH2 − c (e)
The FOC for such problem is
c′
(
eθobsC
)
= θH2 (1.20)
The ability to commit allows the seller to shift her focus towards the current period:
she now cares about the effect of her effort on the strategies of current buyers, and
therefore drives the effort away from the maximal costless effort. However, note that
H2 < E
(
v(1)
)
: since the allocation mechanism is a 2nd price auction, the expected
revenue for the seller incorporates the expected 2nd highest bid, which implies that
eθobsC < eθeff , i.e. the effort decision under commitment and observable type would be
lower than the efficient one.
What about seller’s profits? For a seller of type θ, these are given by
ΠθobsC = (1 + δ)
(
eθobsCθH2 − c
(
eθobsC
))
(1.21)
Lemma 2 For any θ ∈ (0, 1), ΠθobsNC < ΠθobsC . In addition, Π (eθobsC) > Π (eθeff): the
seller makes higher profits than if she would employ the efficient effort computed in (1.19).
Total surplus in the efficient effort case, however, will be higher than under the commitment &
observable type case.
Commitment and Unobservable Type
Now we assume that the seller can still credibly commit to a certain level of effort before
the buyers bidding decision, but the type is unobserved. This is plainly a signaling
game between the seller and current and future buyers.
Lemma 3 In this signaling game where a seller can commit to some effort level before the auc-
tion starts, a separating equilibrium doesn’t exist. A pooling equilibrium in which both types
of seller announce the same effort decision in both periods always exists. The maximal effort
levels to which a seller of type θ can commit in both periods depend on the initial reputation µ0
and on the number of buyers N .
Proof. See appendix A.4.
The reasoning is the following: assume a separating equilibrium where a seller of
type g announces eg and a seller of type b announces eb, and where eg < eb w.l.o.g.
Types would then be revealed right after the announcement, which would imply µ1 =
µ2 = 1 if e = eg, or µ1 = µ2 = 0 if e = eb.
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1.4.2 Strategic Competition for Heterogeneous Buyers
Understanding the fierceness of competition in the future is relevant in order to decide
what kind of reputation building is the seller willing to embark herself in. In this
section, we investigate the role of such mechanism in understanding the equilibrium
behavior of buyers and sellers, as well as its potential to explain observed outcomes.
A buyer interested in the good can observe the reputation generated from past data
for all the available sellers of that particular product. As it was mentioned before,
a seller observes this very same information about other sellers who are competing
against her. If she believes that buyers select a seller taking into account the reputa-
tional information, then other sellers reputations become payoff relevant when decid-
ing about effort. Current beliefs will help to predict the competitor’s behavior and
therefore the strength of competition faced next period, given the updating of reputa-
tion. Sellers then start to compete strategically, understanding the effect of their actions
not only in their absolute reputation value, but also in their "attractiveness" relative to
other sellers.
Conditional on her type, and given the information that buyers consider when se-
lecting an auction and bidding, seller j instantaneous profits in period t = 1, 2 are:
pij,t
(
e
θj
j,t, e˜
θj
j,t, e˜
θ−j
−j,t, µj,t−1, µ−j,t−1
)
= Rj,t (rj,t, r−j,t)− c
(
eθj,t
)
where rj,t was defined in equation (1.5), as a function of e
θj
j and µj . Rj,t (rj,t, r−j,t) is the
expected revenue of seller j at time t. The expected revenue for seller j given his and
his competitor’s reputation is simply the expected second highest bid, given by
Rj,t (rj,t, r−j,t) ≡ E
(
b
(2)
j,t
)
= rj,tH2j (rj,t, r−j,t) (1.22)
where, as before, H2j (rj,t, r−j,t) ≡ E
(
v(2)
)
is the expected second highest valuation
in seller j’s auction, given the perceived probability of a successful delivery by each
seller in the current period. Expression (1.22) makes clear that now seller j’s reputation
affects her current revenues through an additional channel relative to the one seller
case: the expected valuation of the buyers, as well as the number of buyers, that will
decide to bid in seller j’s auction, summarized by H2j (rj,t, r−j,t).
Expected 2nd Highest Valuation in Seller j’s Auction
In our setting, when there is just one seller in the market, such seller receives the same
expected type of buyers irrespective of her reputation (although, as we argued, the
amount that each buyer will bid does depend on the reputation). When two sellers
compete, buyers need to select and bid taking into account the relative reputations.
H2j (·, ·), both in the first and in the second period, will now emerge endogenously from
the auction selection and bidding equilibrium. Here we present the main features of
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the selection equilibrium; a more detailed description of H2j is presented in appendix
A.2.
A buyer with private valuation vi who has the chance to bid in only one period
and one auction faces the following trade-off: on the one hand bidding in the auction
of the seller with the highest reputation results in a higher expected revenue upon
winning but it also entails a lower probability of winning the auction. On the other
hand, winning the auction of a seller with a relative lower reputation is more likely but
also the expected revenue upon winning that auction is lower. This trade-off is clear
from the expression (1.8) for the expected surplus that a buyer receives from bidding
on seller j’s auction. Following Bapna, Dellarocas, and Rice, 2010, if we restrict the
analysis to symmetric selection strategies which are piecewise continuous on a buyer’s
type, this trade-off generates a selection equilibrium with three main features that we
describe in proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3 One-bid selection equilibria. Assume, without loss of generality, that rj ≤
r−j . When we restrict selection strategies to be piecewise continuous in buyer’s type, then:
1. There is no pure strategy selection equilibria.
2. Buyers are divided into 2 type zones, with a zone threshold t∗v:
t∗v (rj, r−j) = N−1
√
rj
r−j
(1.23)
3. Buyers with type vi < t∗ choose a selection strategy
si (rj, r−j) =
(
sij, s
i
−j
)
=
(
N−1√r−j
N−1√rj + N−1√r−j ,
N−1√rj
N−1√rj + N−1√r−j
)
(1.24)
while buyers with type vi ≥ t∗ choose a selection strategy
si (rj, r−j) =
(
sij, s
i
−j
)
= (0, 1) (1.25)
where sij is the probability that buyer i assgns to bidding in auction (seller) j.
Proof. See appendix A.4.
Proposition 3 is a straightforward extrapolation of lemma 2 and proposition 2 in
Bapna, Dellarocas, and Rice, 2010 to our setting. The assumptions that allows us to do
this in our case are two: (i) the fact that we are focusing on short lived buyers, (ii) that
use Markov strategies, mappings from the space of reputations to the space of actions.
Buyers auction selection strategy depends on the perceived probability of successful
delivery for all sellers, rj,t and r−j,t. These probabilities are a function of reputation
(µj,t−1)
2
j=1, effort decisions in equilibrium and the total number of bidders N . The
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equilibrium behavior, represented by the expected second highest bid in seller j’s auc-
tion, then point out at a form of probabilistic assortative matching: buyers self-select
into 2 type zones. Those in the lower type zone will mix between the two sellers, whith
selection probabilities being inversely proportional to the "trustworthiness" (i.e. r) of
an auction. Those on the upper type-zone bid with certainty in the more trustworthy
seller.
First Period Competition Through Reputation Building
As in the one seller case, effort in the second period for seller j has no value ;therefore,
minimum effort is still optimal: eθjj,2 = e ∀ j, θj .
In the first period, conditional on the initial reputations (µj,0, µ−j,0), each seller j of
type θ is faced with the following problem
max
e
θj
j,1
{
rj,1H2,j (rj,1, r−j,1)− c
(
e
θj
j,1
)
+ δE
(
rj,2H2,j (rj,2, r−j,2)− c (e)
∣∣∣eθjj,1, θj)
}
(1.26)
s.t.
e
θj
j,1 ∈ [e, 1]
Here, rj,t = P (yj,t = S|µt−1) is the probability of success attributed to seller j at the
beginning of period t.
Given current beliefs µt, beliefs in t + 1 will depend on yj,t and the predicted ef-
fort for each type of seller. As in previous sections, we denote µSj (ej) and µFj (ej) the
updated beliefs after yj,t = S and yj,t = F respectively. Denote seller’s j profit in pe-
riod 2 as piyj,1y−j,1j,2 , conditional on his and his competitor outcome of the first period yj,1
and y−j,1. In addition, we denote r
yj,1
j,2 the anticipated probability of success of seller
j in the second period, given the outcome of his transaction in the first period yj,1:
r
yj,1
j,2 =
(
µ
yj,1
j,1 ge˜
g
j,2 +
(
1− µyj,11,1
)
be˜bj,2
)
.
Given the (conditional) independence of outcomes, the expected profit of seller j at
time 2, given her type, effort and perceived effort from her competitor is
E
[
pij,2|eθjj,1, θj
]
= e
θj
j,1θr−j,1pi
SS
j,2 + e
θj
j,1θj (1− r−j,1) piSFj,2
+
(
1− eθjj,1θj
)
rj,1pi
FS
j,2 +
(
1− eθjj,1θj
)
(1− r−j,1) piFFj,2
Again, effort best replies to all the other seller’s effort (or to their current reputation)
are characterized by the FOCs of the problem:
c′
(
e
θj
j,1
)
=θjδ
(
r−j,2
[
piSSj,2 − piFSj,2
]
+ (1− r−j,1)
[
piSFj,2 − piFFj,2
] )
(1.27)
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When deciding about effort after auctions in the first period have closed, the timing
and lack of commitment from sellers implies that they will only compete in reputa-
tions for future revenuesR2. In other words, an announcement to a certain effort level
is ruled out by a typical time inconsistency problem. Proposition 3 reveals why the
revenues in period 2 for seller j are a function period-2 buyers’ beliefs about the prob-
ability of success of both sellers; these probabilities, in turn, arise through the updating
of reputation after the effort decisions and outcome in period 1. Therefore, seller’s j
strategic behavior will weight the current cost of effort against the (discounted) poten-
tial future revenue reaps from her competitor; this is the RHS term between parenthesis
in eq. (1.27).
In equilibrium, revenue reaps will be determined by the interaction of three com-
ponents: (i) the updating function; (ii) the valuation threshold t∗v (r1, r2); and (iii) the
bidding probabilities sij (rj, r−j). The current public information about her type and
her competitors type is therefore payoff relevant for a seller since it helps predict her
competitor’s action (effort) in the current period, which is also targeted at influencing
buyer’s beliefs next period. More precisely, the reputations at the beginning of pe-
riod 1 (i.e. µ0) allows sellers to understand the marginal effect of effort when there is
competition.
Before characterizing the equilibrium(s), we show that the primitives of the game
generate effort decisions that are monotonic in types, or what is usually known as
single-crossing condition within a revealed preference argument. We state this in
Lemma 4 below.
Lemma 4 Single-Crossing condition: Let eθjj,1 : [0, 1]
2 × Θ −→ [0, 1] be an effort strategy
for seller j = 1, 2, as a function of her type θj ∈ Θ and reputations µ ≡ {µj, µ−j}. Then,
given the multiplicative technology P (yj = S|θ, e) = θe, it is the case in equilibrium that
egj (µ) ≥ ebj (µ) , ∀µ ∈ [0, 1]2 , ∀j.
Proof. See appendix A.4.
It turns out that, similar to the one seller case, there is a unique equilibrium in (non-
stationary) Markov strategies. This equilibrium has two interesting (and somewhat
counterintuitive) properties regarding the comparative statics on a competitor’s prior
reputation and the total number of sellers in the market. Propositions 4 and 5 below
state these features rigorously.
Proposition 4 An equilibrium of the two periods game in which two sellers of unobservable
are competing for heterogenous buyers exists and is unique.
Proof. See appendix A.4.
Proposition 5 Characterization of the equilibrium In the Markov equilibrium where two
sellers compete during two periods through second price auctions,
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1. Seller j’s (j = 1, 2) effort decision in period 1 is still non-monotonic in her own current
(prior) reputation µj,0, for θ ∈ {g, b}: ∂e
θ
j,1(µj,0,µ−j,0)
∂µj,0
> 0 for µj,0 < µ∗ and
∂eθj,1(µj,0,µ−j,0)
∂µj,0
<
0 for µj,0 > µ∗. The threshold µ∗ is a function of µ−j,0 and the different parameters of the
game (in particular, of g and b).
2. For any
(
µj,0, µ−j,0
)
∈ [0, 1]2 and type θ ∈ {g, b}, seller j’s effort decision in period
1 is monotonically decreasing in her competitor’s prior reputation µ−j,0 ("intensity" of
competition):
∂eθj,1(µj,0,µ−j,0)
∂µ−j,0
< 0.
3. An increase in the total number of buyers in the market from N to N ′, with N ′ > N and
N,N ′ ≥ 2 has two effects:
(a) It reduces the impact of competitor’s period-1-reputation, µ−j,0, on the incentives
to build one’s own reputation:
∣∣∣∂eθj,1(µj,0,µ−j,0;N)∂µ−j,0 ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∂eθj,1(µj,0,µ−j,0;N ′)∂µ−j,0 ∣∣∣ ; and
(b) for any
(
µj,0, µ−j,0
)
∈ [0, 1]2, it increases the equilibrium effort level of both types
of seller j, j = 1, 2:
eθj,1 (µj,0, µ−j,0;N) < e
θ
j,1 (µj,0, µ−j,0;N
′) for θ ∈ {g, b}.
Proof. See appendix A.4.
Discussion
Proposition 5 presents three interesting comparative statics results related to the impact
of period-1 strategic competition, on reputation building. The first result states that, for
a fixed prior belief about the competitor’s type, effort in period 1 is non-monotone and
concave in a seller’s own prior reputation. This implies that the reputation mechanism
discussed for the case of one seller is still in place. The second and more important
result shows that a higher prior (current) reputation of a seller’s competitor leads the
seller to employ lower effort c.p. Third, there are two channels through which the size
of the market influences sellers’ behavior.
Below, we discuss the latter two features, since the first one has been already dis-
cussed for the case of 1 seller. In order to explain the intuition behind these, we will
refer to figures 1.5, 1.4 and figure 1.6, in which we present, respectively, the first period
equilibrium effort, the behavior of the equilibrium valuation threshold t∗v (rj, r−j), and
the expected second highest valuation in a seller’s auction for any pair of reputation
values of the two sellers.
Comparative statics result 2 is rather counterintuitive. Figure 1.5 plots period-1 ef-
fort levels and profits; it considers the case in which sellers can be "very trustworthy"
or "barely trustworthy" (i.e. g = 0.9 and b = 0.1), both for a small and a large num-
ber of bidders (N = 5 in the left column and N = 50 in the right column). The first
row presents seller 1 effort levels as a function of her own reputation, for a fixed value
of seller reputation; the second row plots seller 1 effort as a function of competitor
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reputation, for a fixed value of her own reputation. One the one hand, when intro-
ducing even minimal competition (i.e. adding a seller with a minimal reputation, but
maintaining the number of buyers fixed) the expected level of revenues for a seller of
any given reputation decreases, since as the pool of buyers that will self-select into the
seller’s auction is now (weakly) smaller. This is not surprising, but it is not what drives
marginal effort decisions under competition. On the other hand, one would expect that
the introduction of competition would, for certain regions of the relative reputation
space, rise the marginal benefits from exerting effort. When the reputation of the com-
petitor increases, effort increases would intuitively be generating (with higher proba-
bility) not only a better absolute reputation next period but also a base of bidders with
better valuations, counterbalancing the improved competitor’s reputation13. However,
the opposite seems to be happening: when the prior reputation of a seller’s competitor
increases, the incentives for the seller to exert effort decrease.
FIGURE 1.5 ABOUT HERE
The explanation behind such decreasing incentives as the opponent’s reputation
improves, is to be found in how these help a seller predict her competitor’s effort and
its effect on future relative reputations. Ultimately, the latter will determine, through
buyers behavior, period-2 revenues.
Recall that in the second period, effort is minimum: eθj,2 = e ∀j, θ. Therefore, the
perceived probability of a successful delivery rj,2 will be completely determined from
the updating of reputation, µyj,2. Given the pair of success probabilities, the behavior of
the threshold valuation t∗v (rj, r−j) and the bidding probabilities si (rj, r−j) as defined in
proposition 3 determine the behavior of revenues for both sellers. Figure 1.4 plots the
valuation threshold t∗ as a function of seller 1 success probability r1, for two values of
r2 (blue and green lines). When seller 1 has relatively low reputation in the last period
(to the left of the dashed lines in both plots), an increase in her reputation increases
t∗ towards 1 (where r1 = r2). More importantly, an increase in the competitor’s rep-
utation (making seller 1 relative reputation even smaller) is translated into a decrease
in the slope of t∗v (r1, r2). This implies a smaller marginal return of her own reputation,
measured in terms of the type of buyers that will decide to bid in her auction. A similar
behavior occurs when r1 > r2, i..e., when seller 1 has a relatively high reputation. For
this region, an increase in r1 implies that t∗v (r1, r2) will decrease and fewer buyers will
decide to bid with probability >0 in seller 2, although the slope increases (decreases in
absolute value) for higher values of r2. These characteristics of t∗ are the kernel of the
instantaneous revenues of a seller (expected second highest bid).
The above properties from the selection equilibrium, combined with the way in
which reputations are updated, shape the strategic competition in the first period. In
the third row of figure 1.5 we plot the expected revenue function in equilibrium (in-
corporating equilibrium effort decisions predicted by buyers; the key characteristic is
13This analysis obviously does not take into consideration entry or exit decisions.
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FIGURE 1.4: Equilibrium behavior of t∗v (rj , r−j), N = 5 (left) and N = 15 (right).
Fixed values of r−j
that such function it exhibits decreasing differences. The main implication is that a
seller’s marginal expected revenue increases when his competitor’s reputation µ−j,0,
and therefore r−j,0, decrease. This reasoning can be seen in the right hand side of the
FOC 1.27 for seller j and type θ: the lower is the public reputation of one’s competi-
tor, the more weight is put on the second term of the sum on the RHS of 1.27, which,
given the decreasing differences property of the expected revenues function, is also the
bigger term. In other words, when competitor’s reputation µ−j,0 and respectively his
success probability r−j are low, seller j has higher incentives to exert higher effort to
attain a success and maintain/improve his reputation.
The number of bidders impacts the future profits through two channels: on the
one hand, in line with Bapna, Dellarocas, and Rice, 2010 analysis, a higher number of
bidders reduces the effect of relative reputations on buyers’ auction selection strategies,
and on the other it leads to an increase in the expected price in any single auction
due to a larger pool of bidders available. Expected higher future profits trigger the
seller to employ higher effort in the present. When the number of bidders increases,
their assortative bidding behavior converges towards perfectly randomizing between
sellers. This effect, as argued in the previous section, is due to the fact that a high
total number of auction participants reduces the chances of each of them to win any
particular auction and reduces the expected benefit in the event of winning an auction.
Hence, for high competition among bidders (high N ), their optimal strategy prescribes
them to perfectly randomize between sellers. The change in buyers’ bidding behavior
as we vary N has a significant impact on sellers’ expected profits and hence on their
optimal effort. As the number of bidders increases, the relative reputations ranking
becomes irrelevant as both sellers will receive bids equally probable from all bidders.
In addition to the vanishing assortative bidding, ahigher number of bidders in each
auction c.p. increases the chances that the bidders have higher valuations which leads
to higher expected profits.
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1.5 Final Remarks
On-line markets, loan securitization (or more broadly, asset backed securities) markets
or debt markets are characterized by the intrinsic asymmetry of information regarding
seller (or borrower) trustworthiness, as well as the effort that an originator, a seller
or a borrower put in order to monitor a loan, deliver a good or efficiently manage a
project. In addition, agents in such markets are usually non-anonymous, which means
that reputation building can potentially arise as a way to tackle the adverse selection
or moral hazard problems.
We have shown that, contrary to the common intuition about the effect of (oligopolis-
tic) competition in a general market setting, a seller’ incentives to build a reputation
through effort in order to deliver and complete a transaction decrease when compe-
tition occurs within a 2nd price auction environment and when the reputation of the
competitor increases. This is an important insight, not only from a theoretical point of
view, but also from a more practical perspective, since it allow us to shed light on the
usefulness of reputation measures as a way to solve the "lemons problem" in on-line
markets.
Crucially, in on-line markets such as ebay the public information structure avail-
able to sellers and buyers is the same as the one available to us researchers (except,
perhaps, for potential email correspondence between parties). This implies that pre-
dictions made by buyers about the behavior or characteristics of a particular seller nec-
essarily use public information which we can observe. This, together with the dynamic
game framework could allow us to study quantitatively two identification problems
related to the reduced-form estimation of the impact of seller reputation measures on
revenues, and that have been omitted by recent empirical papers. Biases in the estima-
tion of this elasticity might arise when reputation building and strategic interactions
are not controlled for, since both reputations can be correlated in equilibrium. In other
words, the omission of strategic behavior can bias the estimate of the reputation elas-
ticity of revenues. Nonetheless, our theoretical results also hint that when there is a
reasonable number of buyers in the market, the consequences of omitting information
about other sellers could be milder.
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FIGURE 1.5: Equilibrium efforts in period 1 (top, middle) and PV profits (bottom).
Left column: N = 5 Right column: N = 50
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FIGURE 1.6: Expected second highest bid on seller 1 auction: fixed r1 (top) and
fixed r2 (bottom). Left: N = 5 Right: N = 20
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FIGURE 1.7: Present Value Profits (PV) for one seller, as a function of the competi-
tion’s reputation, in the (i) one seller game, (ii) 2-sellers game. Left: "good" sellers
(g-type). Right: "bad" sellers (b-type). For a proper comparison, the number of
buyers in the 2-sellers case is 2x the number of buyers in the 1-seller case. In the
figures: N=5 for the 1-seller case and N=10 for the 2 sellers case.
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Chapter 2
Monetary Policy when Households
have Debt: New Evidence on the
Transmission Mechanism
joint with James Cloyne (Bank of England) and
Paolo Surico (London Business School)1
Keywords: household expenditure, micro data, housing tenure, monetary policy
2.1 Introduction
How monetary policy affects the real economy is one of the oldest and most inten-
sively investigated topics in macroeconomics. In many of the models with nominal
rigidities that are widely used in academic and policy circles, interest rate changes
primarily affect the price of consumption today relative to the price of consumption
tomorrow — the so-called intertemporal substitution channel. But the recent financial
crisis has sparked renewed interest in whether other, less explored, mechanisms might
complement, amplify or even dominate the quantitative effects implied by intertem-
poral substitution alone.
Two often discussed examples relate to the household balance sheet. In particular,
the impact of interest rates on households, and the economy more generally, could be
significantly affected by (i) the structure of the mortgage market, especially the preva-
lence of adjustable rate versus fixed rate contracts, (ii) the possibility that households
1This chapter has benefited greatly with comments and suggestions from Antonio Ciccone, Joao Cocco, Mark
Gertler, Sebastian Hohmann, Matteo Iacoviello, Michael McMahon, Tommaso Monacelli, Xavier Ragot, Ricardo
Reis, David Romer, Ryland Thomas, Garry Young and seminar participants at the LBS, the NBER Mid-Year Meet-
ings Chicago 2014, Sciences-Po, Banque de France, Bank of England, Sveriges Riksbank, ESSIM 2015, Ghent Em-
pirical Macro Workshop 2015, SED Annual meeting 2015, NBER Summer Institute 2015 (Monetary Economics
group), CEPR-University of St. Gallen Workshop on Household Finance, Econometric Society World Congress
2015, EIEF, the FRB of San Francisco, University of California Davis, University of California San Diego, University
of Mannheim, ECB, University of Cambridge, UCLA, Santa Clara University, Norges Bank and the BoE-ECB-CEPR-
CFM Conference on Credit Dynamics and the Macroeconomy. The views in this paper are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of England, the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy
Committee or the PRA.
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with mortgage debt face some form of liquidity constraints. While a number of impor-
tant recent theoretical and empirical contributions have improved our understanding
of how the transmission mechanism may work, a detailed empirical analysis of which
channels are quantitatively more important is still lacking. Furthermore, despite all
the recent attention paid to the role of household indebtedness in shaping business
cycle fluctuations, we are not aware of empirical studies that quantitatively examine
the ways in which mortgage debt may affect the transmission of monetary policy. This
paper attempts to fill the gap by providing evidence using household survey data for
the United States and the United Kingdom.
In an important dimension, the U.S. and U.K. mortgage markets are often described
as polar opposites. The majority of British products are characterized by relatively ad-
justable rates and shorter durations whilst most American products tend to have fixed
rates and longer durations. If these structural differences in the mortgage markets
play a significant role in the transmission of monetary policy we should observe two
things. First, the direct interest rate effect on mortgage repayments should be signifi-
cantly larger in the U.K. than in the U.S. We find evidence that this is indeed the case.
Second, if this direct effect is the most quantitatively important channel, the difference
between the expenditure of home-owners with a mortgage and home-owners without
a mortgage should be significantly larger in the U.K. than in the U.S. In other words,
the expenditure differences between these housing tenure groups should largely reflect
the magnitude of the effect on mortgage repayments. However, our evidence does not
support this second prediction.
On the other hand, if households with debt cannot easily smooth consumption (be-
cause, for instance, additional equity extraction is constrained by collateral values or by
transaction costs associated with accessing illiquid wealth), the change in mortgagors’
spending should be significantly larger than that of outright owners in both countries.
Furthermore, in general equilibrium, there should be an effect on household income
for all groups, implying a higher marginal propensity to consume for households with
debt. If this mechanism is quantitatively more important than the direct cash flow
effect, there should be similar expenditure differences between mortgagors and out-
right owners in two relatively different mortgage markets like the U.S. and U.K. Our
evidence is indeed consistent with this hypothesis.
In looking at the disaggregated effects of monetary policy, we face a number of em-
pirical and econometric challenges. Specifically, we need good quality micro data on
expenditures and income, together with information on household balance sheets over
a long period of time. Few, if any, datasets include this information. We therefore use
rich micro data from the Living Costs and Food Survey (for the U.K.) and the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (for the U.S.) and focus on a household’s housing tenure
status — specifically whether they own their home with or without a mortgage — as
a proxy for their balance sheet position. Housing tenure status is then used to aggre-
gate individual households into a group with debt (mortgagors) and a group without
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debt (outright home-owners). To tackle the reverse causality problem between interest
rates and consumption, we measure monetary policy shocks using the identification
strategy of Romer and Romer, 2004 for the United States and applied to the United
Kingdom by Cloyne and Huertgen, 2015.
Our main empirical findings can be summarized as follows. Following a change
in monetary policy, in both countries households with mortgage debt adjust their ex-
penditure considerably more than outright owners without debt. The heterogeneity
is far more pronounced for durable goods than for non-durable goods and services.
The direct effect on mortgage repayments in dollars is nearly three times larger in the
U.K. than in the U.S. (for a cumulative interest rate change of the same size). But, even
for the U.K., the repayment effect in dollars is still much smaller (both statistically and
economically) than the dollar change in total expenditure. The income of all housing
tenure groups, however, responds significantly following a monetary policy shock,
and these income changes are of the same order of magnitude as the mortgagors’ ex-
penditure response.
We interpret the similar and sizable response of expenditure relative to income for
mortgagors in both countries as suggestive evidence that (i) households with mortgage
debt tend to be liquidity constrained and (ii) the general equilibrium effect of monetary
policy on income seems quantitatively more important than the direct effect of interest
rate changes on cash-flows. We also show that, in both countries, between 40% and
50% of households with mortgage debt tend to live with net liquid wealth below half of
their monthly income. This group therefore seems to feature a significant proportion of
households who are liquidity constrained despite possessing sizable illiquid assets (i.e.
they are ‘wealthy’ hand-to-mouth in the definition proposed by Kaplan and Violante,
2014).
To corroborate the interpretation of our empirical findings, we lay out a simple het-
erogeneous agent model featuring a liquidity constraint and multi-period debt (where
we can vary a single parameter to reflect the different average fixed-rate contract dura-
tions in two mortgage markets like the U.S. and U.K.). We first employ an exogenous
credit limit. This demonstrates the quantitative importance of a simple liquidity con-
straint in a world where two economies are subject to a different mix of adjustable rate
and fixed rate contracts. We then extend the framework to include a constraint tied
to the collateral value of a mortgagor’s housing assets and an endogenous housing
tenure decision between buying a property with a mortgage and renting. Both mod-
els are able to replicate qualitatively our empirical findings. The performance of the
extended model, however, appears quantitatively superior, suggesting that additional
amplification mechanisms — whether in the form of a (housing) collateral constraint
as in Iacoviello, 2005 and Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997 or in the form of some transaction
costs associated with accessing illiquid wealth as in Kaplan and Violante, 2014 — play
an important role in fully accounting for the aggregate and heterogeneous effects of
monetary policy on the real economy.
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Related literature. This work relates to four strands of the literature. First, we pro-
vide empirical support for theoretical mechanisms that emphasize the role of debt-
constrained agents in the transmission of economic shocks. Prominent examples in-
clude Kaplan and Violante, 2014, Kaplan, Moll, and Violante, 2015, Bayer et al., 2015,
Ragot, 2014, Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012 and Iacoviello, 2005.
Second, we contribute to the large body of evidence on the relationship between
the housing market, credit and real activity, with Mian, Rao, and Sufi, 2013, Mian et al.,
2015, Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2014, Aladangady, 2014, Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor,
2014, Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2015; Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti,
2014 and Cloyne and Surico, 2015 being recent examples. While we share an emphasis
on developments in the mortgage market, unlike most of these contributions we use
expenditure survey data to explore interesting dimensions of heterogeneity which can
be used to identify the groups that are most likely to drive the aggregate effects of
monetary policy.
Third, we relate to a growing literature studying how the structure of the mortgage
market (and repayments in particular) affects the transmission of monetary policy. On
the theoretical side, this includes Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca, 2013 (who also ex-
plore this empirically using aggregate data), Garriga, Kydland, and Sustek, 2013 and
Auclert, 2015a. More recent empirical work using micro data includes Keys et al.,
2015 and Di Maggio, Kermani, and Ramcharan, 2015. While we also consider the re-
sponse of mortgage payments, our empirical analysis focuses on the joint response of
income, non-durable consumption and durable expenditure. We show that consider-
ing all these responses is important for assessing the relative merits of competing views
of the monetary transmission.
Finally, our findings complement the evidence from an increasing number of stud-
ies, including Coibion et al., 2012, Gornemann et al., 2012, Sterk and Tenreyro, 2015
and Wong, 2015a, which report some heterogeneity in the consumption response to
monetary policy across demographic groups. In contrast, we focus on household debt
positions and find strong evidence of heterogeneity over and above any possible het-
erogeneity arising from demographic factors alone.
Structure of the paper. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents
the datasets, discusses the identification of the monetary policy shocks and the strat-
egy of grouping households by their heterogeneous debt positions. The baseline es-
timates are reported in Section 2.3, together with evidence that a significant portion
of mortgagors are ‘wealthy’ hand-to-mouth. We also show that the general equilib-
rium effect on income is quantitatively more important that the direct effect of interest
rate changes on interest cash-flows. Further empirical results are presented in Sec-
tion 2.4, where we assess whether other traits such as demographics or compositional
changes in the housing tenure groups may be responsible for our findings. In Section
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2.5, we examine the extent to which the predictions of a class of heterogeneous agent
models with a liquidity constraint and multi-period debt are consistent with our novel
empirical findings on the transmission of monetary policy. The Appendices provide
some additional results, detail the derivation of the theoretical models and report the
response of house prices and housing equity withdrawal to a monetary policy shock.
2.2 Data and empirical framework
In this section, we describe our main sources of household survey data and the vari-
ables we use. We then lay out the strategy to group individual observations into
pseudo-cohorts using housing tenure status to proxy a household’s debt position and
discuss the identification of the monetary policy shocks. Finally, we present the empir-
ical specification that we use.
2.2.1 Household survey data
In order to measure how different types of consumers respond to monetary policy
across spending categories, we use household survey data with rich coverage of ex-
penditure variables. For the U.K., this is the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS),
previously known as the Family Expenditure Survey (FES). For the U.S., we use the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
We make use of detailed information on weekly expenditures both on non-durable
goods and services, and on durable goods (excluding housing and rental-related costs),
as well as on household income.2 The latter is defined as labor income (wages and
salaries) plus non-labor income (income from investments and social security pay-
ments), net of taxes paid by each household. In the appendix, we provide a more
detailed description of the variable definitions and the sample restrictions.
In addition, the survey provides information on other two sets of variables which
will be useful for our main empirical estimation: (i) demographics, in particular house-
hold size and the year of birth of the household head, (ii) mortgage payments for
households with outstanding debt. On the one hand, the information on birth years
will be used to verify that the heterogeneity we uncover across housing tenure groups
does not reflect (omitted) differences in life-cycle positions (as opposed to genuine dif-
ferences in debt positions that are independent of demographics). On the other hand,
the mortgage payments data will be used to quantify the extent to which differences
in mortgage market structures across the two countries, specifically that the share of
2As documented in the household consumption literature (Aguiar and Bils, 2015 and Attanasio, Battistin, and
Leicester, 2006 using the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and Crossley, Low, and O’Dea, 2012 and Brewer
and O’Dea, 2012 using the U.K. LCFS), the non-durable consumption and the durable expenditure reported by
households fall short, when aggregated, of the figures in the U.K. and U.S. National Accounts. Following this
literature, we adjust the household data in the following way: in each quarter and for each household, we scale-up
the reported expenditure categories (either non-durable or durable) using the inverse of the ratio of aggregated
expenditure (implied by the LCFS/CEX) to the values in the National Accounts.
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adjustable rate products in the U.K. is significantly larger than in the U.S., may change
the effectiveness of monetary policy. The information on household size will allow us
to conduct the analysis at the per capita level.
We convert weekly data into a quarterly time series using the date of interview. The
resulting series is then deflated by the Retail Prices Index (excluding mortgage interest
payments) for the U.K. and the Consumer Price Index for the U.S. to convert the data
into real series. Our sample covers 1975 to 2007 for the U.K. and 1981 to 2007 for the
U.S.. The key variables of interest are available in the FES from the mid-1970s whereas
the CEX begins in 1981. Our focus is on interest rate changes, so we deliberately stop
just prior to the financial crisis, excluding the period of “unconventional" monetary
policy.
2.2.2 Grouping households into pseudo-cohorts
The first empirical challenge we face is that, to our knowledge, there are few, if any,
datasets that contain disaggregated information on both (i) wealth/household balance
sheets and (ii) a rich array of expenditure categories at the household level over a suf-
ficiently long period of time. Unfortunately, the LCFS and the CEX are no exceptions
but they do record detailed expenditure and income data as well as information on
housing tenure positions, namely whether a household lives in rented accommoda-
tion, is an owner-occupier with a mortgage or owns the property outright without a
mortgage. As shown in Cloyne and Surico, 2015 for the U.K. — and further explored
here for both the U.K. and the U.S. — housing tenure status is an effective proxy for
the household debt position. This allows us to bypass the drawback that most sur-
veys with rich expenditure data contain little other information about household bal-
ance sheets. Accordingly, and in keeping with the tradition of Browning, Deaton, and
Irish, 1985, we employ a grouping estimator to aggregate individual observations into
pseudo-cohorts by housing tenure.
At this point, it is worth discussing two potential concerns about grouping house-
holds by their housing tenure status. The first concern is about compositional change,
namely that a household may change housing tenure status in response to a monetary
policy shock. The second concern is about selection, namely that the assignments into
the mortgagor and outright owner tenure groups are not random and some other (un-
observed) characteristics may be potentially responsible for the heterogeneity in our
estimated responses.
In terms of compositional changes, the time series of the tenure shares in Figure 2.1
are clearly slow-moving. The variation in monetary policy we exploit, however, occurs
at a much higher frequency (as can be seen from Figure 2.2). In Section 2.4, we formally
provide evidence that compositional change seems unlikely to be driving our results
by showing that the monetary policy shocks do not significantly affect the shares of
households in each housing tenure group.
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Turning to the issue of selection, a number of factors seem to make it less severe in
our context. First, the choice to group by housing tenure can be motivated from var-
ious theoretical frameworks. For example, the distinction between households with
and without mortgage debt fits well with the predictions of a range of theoretical het-
erogeneous agent models that would imply heterogeneous expenditure responses to
monetary policy shocks. Prominent examples include the financial accelerator mech-
anism in Iacoviello, 2005, following Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, where a collateral con-
straint governs the household’s ability to extract equity from housing and the ‘wealthy’
hand-to-mouth framework in Kaplan and Violante, 2014 where households have to
pay a transaction cost to access their net illiquid wealth. Since our mortgagor group
appears to have a close mapping with the constrained households in these models, our
estimates can shed light on the empirical relevance of these theoretical mechanisms.
Second, we document in Section 2.3 that between 40% and 50% of mortgagors live
with net liquid wealth below half of their monthly income and therefore appear far
more likely to be liquidity constrained than outright owners. Hence, housing tenure
seems a good predictor of the household’s balance sheet position.3
Third, one of our main findings — namely that the direct effect of monetary policy
on interest payments seems less important in the aggregate than the indirect effect —
is not based on a comparison across housing tenures but on the relative magnitude
of the responses of two different variables (mortgage payments and income) for the
same household group (mortgagors). Furthermore, we show that income responds by
a similar order of magnitude for all housing tenure groups.
Finally, in Section 2.4, we discuss other possible explanations and show that our
results for mortgagors and outright owners are robust to controlling for these other
mechanisms. In particular, we show that the expenditure response of young mort-
gagors appears to be similar to the response of middle-aged mortgagors. The responses
of middle-aged outright owners and middle-aged mortgagors are, however, still sig-
nificantly different. We interpret this further evidence as suggesting that the hetero-
geneity that we uncover based on housing tenure exists over and above any possible
heterogeneity purely due to demographics.
Selected descriptive statistics for all housing tenure groups are reported in Ap-
pendix A. There appears to be some (small) differences across the distributions of
per-capita income and across the shares of post-compulsory educational attainment
between mortgagors and outright owners. While the age difference between these
two groups seems larger, (i) the age distributions for mortgagors and outright owners
still overlap significantly and (ii) as already noted, the heterogeneous responses across
housing tenure groups are not over turned in the sensitivity analysis of Section 2.4
where we further control for demographics.
3 Kaplan and Violante, 2014 for the U.S., Cloyne and Surico, 2015 for the U.K. and Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner,
2014 for a number of other advanced economies show that households with mortgage debt also tend to have higher
levels of unsecured debt relative to outright owners.
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Before ending this section, it is also worth noting that we have information on the
remaining group of households in the sample, namely renters. These are a relatively
heterogeneous group comprised of social renters (those renting from local authorities
and housing associations or benefiting from certain government transfers) and private
renters (who — on average — tend to represent around 10 % of the population). The
balance sheet information presented in Cloyne and Surico, 2015 suggests that renters
are likely to be an interesting proxy for the type of liquidity constrained households
typically found in one asset models. While our main focus in Section 2.3 is on the com-
parison between home-owners with mortgage debt and home-owners without mort-
gage debt, the results for renters are of independent interest as one may expect their
responses to be more similar to those of mortgagors than outright owners. The findings
for renters’ expenditure and income responses are explored in Section 2.4.
2.2.3 Identification
Our goal is to examine the effect of monetary policy on the spending and income of dif-
ferent groups of households. As such, we face the usual macroeconomic reverse causa-
tion problem: the economy responds to movements in monetary policy, but monetary
policy also responds to developments in the macroeconomy. To identify unanticipated
changes in the short-term interest rate we need a monetary policy shock series that can
be used for estimation.
There is a vast literature on the identification of monetary policy changes. Older
approaches, mainly developed for the United States, relied on timing restrictions and
a Choleski decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals from a
Vector Autoregression, such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1996; Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999. But when applied to the United Kingdom, this method
produces a large rise in inflation following a monetary contraction, the so-called price
puzzle, even after controlling for variables shown to ameliorate this issue for the U.S.
(Cloyne and Huertgen, 2015). Another popular approach for the U.S. was introduced
by Romer and Romer, 2004. This method first constructs a measure of the target policy
rate (since the effective Federal Funds Rate is moved around by other factors than just
policy decisions) and then regresses the change in the target rate around the policy de-
cision on a proxy for the information set available to the policymaker just prior to that
decision. This information set includes a range of real time indicators and forecasts to
reflect the forward-looking nature of monetary policy. Cloyne and Huertgen, 2015 con-
struct a measure for the U.K. employing this methodology and show that it improves
on conventional VAR methods. Hence, we use an updated version of the Romer and
Romer, 2004 shock series for the U.S. (whose original analysis ended in 1996) and the
Cloyne and Huertgen, 2015 shock series for the UK.4 One particular advantage of using
4Unfortunately, the length of the sample that we consider prevents us from using a high frequency identification
strategy as in Gertler and Karadi, 2015.
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shocks based on the Romer and Romer, 2004 method is that we have two comparable
series across the two countries we study.
The shock series match the micro-data sample periods, which are from 1975 to 2007
for the U.K. and 1981 to 2007 for the U.S. The shock series deliberately stop before
the recent financial crisis, when the policy rate hit the zero bound in both countries.
To boost the number of household observations used to generate the pseudo-cohorts
at each point in time, we aggregate household survey variables to a quarterly fre-
quency. The original shock series are monthly but, following Romer and Romer, 2004
and Coibion, 2012, we sum up the monthly innovations to obtain a quarterly series.
The construction of the U.K. series also allows for a break in 1993 around the adoption
of the inflation targeting framework. The monetary policy shock series for the two
countries are shown in Figure 2.2.
Cohort-specific Granger causality. The shock series we use should already be regarded
as monetary innovations from a macroeconomic perspective. But there is still a concern
that the monetary policymakers might have been reacting to the conditions in partic-
ular groups. While some of this should be captured in the policymakers’ forecasts, for
example if they were concerned about developments in the housing market, it is use-
ful for our purposes to test whether the U.S. and U.K. shock series can be predicted
by movements in cohort level consumption and income. Finding that these shocks
are unpredictable on the basis of cohort level concerns would therefore be reassuring.
Specifically, we conduct Granger causality tests based on a VAR which contains con-
sumption, expenditure and income per capita for each household group. We cannot
reject the hypothesis that the cohort-specific time-series from household survey data
(as well as the aggregate time-series from national statistics) do not Granger cause the
monetary policy shocks in each country.
2.2.4 Empirical specification
Using the two monetary policy shock series, our empirical specification closely resem-
bles Romer and Romer, 2004. Accordingly, we regress the variable of interest on a
distributed lag of the monetary policy shocks. As in Romer and Romer, 2004, we also
control for the lagged endogenous variable as is common in exercises with relatively
short samples. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
Xi,t = α
i
0 + α
i
1trend+B
i(L)Xi,t−1 + Ci(L)St−1 +Di(L)Zi,t−1 + ui,t (2.1)
where Xi,t is real non-durable consumption, durable expenditure or income recorded
by households interviewed at time t.5 The monetary policy shocks are denoted by S
and Z is a vector with additional controls, including quarterly dummies. The α terms
5Households interviewed at time t are typically asked to report expenditure over the previous three months
(with the exception of non-durable consumption in the LCFS which refers to the previous two weeks). To eliminate
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represent intercepts and coefficients on a time trend polynomial, with a break in 1993
for the U.K. and no break for the U.S.. Finally, i ∈Mortgagors,OutrightOwners,Renters
represents the housing tenure group each household belongs to. The orders of the
lag polynomials are chosen using an optimal lag length criteria, namely the corrected
AIC.6 Standard errors are bootstrapped using a recursive wild bootstrap.
2.3 Main findings
In this section, we present the results from estimating our benchmark specification
(3.1) with both aggregate and cohort level data. In order to make the results compara-
ble with the previous literature, all the impulse response functions (IRFs) are computed
by simulating a 25 basis points (bp) temporary cut in the policy rate. All figures display
point estimates together with bootstrapped 90% confidence bands generated from 5000
resamples. We begin with evidence using official national statistics before presenting
results for non-durable consumption, durable expenditure, income and mortgage re-
payments using household survey data. In the last part of this section, we transform
the percent changes estimated from our IRFs into the implied dollar changes and find
that the mortgagor group’s expenditure responds the most relative to income. Finally,
we use data from the American Survey of Consumer Finance and the British House-
hold Panel Survey to provide independent evidence on the extent to which mortgagors
may be liquidity constrained despite owing sizable illiquid assets.
2.3.1 Evidence from official national statistics
Before exploring the response of different household groups, it is useful to examine the
aggregate response of non-durable expenditure, durable expenditure and household
income from the U.K. and U.S. official aggregate statistics. These results are presented
in Figure 2.3. We find that a cut in the policy rate raises durable expenditure, non-
durable expenditure and disposable income. More specifically, a 25 basis point mone-
tary policy expansion leads to (i) a persistent (but small) rise in non-durable consump-
tion, which peaks at around 0.2% after about 10 quarters for the U.K. and 0.1% after 11
quarters for the U.S., (ii) a larger percentage increase in durable expenditure (peaking at
1.2% for the U.K. and 1% for the U.S.), consistent with the evidence in Barsky, House,
and Kimball, 2007 and Sterk and Tenreyro, 2015 and (iii) a rise in household income
(that reaches its maximum at 0.4% in the U.K. and just below 0.3% in the U.S.). While
the U.K. aggregate variables tend to exhibit a slightly larger adjustment, the differences
between the two countries are not large or significant. But to establish the possible role
some of the noise inherent in survey data, Xi,t is smoothed with a backward-looking (current and previous three
quarters) moving average.
6We have also explored a generalized specification where X is a vector, but with similar results. In addition, we
have experimented with including the contemporaneous value of the shock and with assuming a different type of
trend. In all cases, our results are robust.
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of indebted households, including the direct effect of interest rate changes on mortgage
payments, we need to look at the more disaggregated behavior of different housing
tenure groups.
2.3.2 Evidence from household expenditure survey data
We now explore the heterogeneous response by housing tenure status. The results
comparing mortgagors and outright owners can be seen in Figure 2.4 for the consump-
tion of non-durable goods and services, in Figure 2.5 for the durable good expenditure,
in Figure 2.6 for mortgage payments (mortgagors only) and in Figure 2.7 for income.
The corresponding variables for renters are discussed in Section 2.4 and presented in
Appendix Figure B.10. In each chart, the top row refers to the U.K. and the bottom
row to the U.S.. The left column corresponds to the behavior of mortgagors, the right
column refers to outright owners.
Beginning with the response of non-durable consumption in Figure 2.4, the re-
sponse of mortgagors tends to be larger than the adjustment made by outright owners.
Specifically, the response of households with mortgage debt in the U.K. peaks at 0.3%
after about 10 quarters but the response of households without debt is never statisti-
cally different from zero, suggesting that the behavior of mortgagors drives the aggre-
gate result for non-durables in Figure 2.3. For the U.S. the pattern is similar, with the
peak response in the left column reaching about 0.25%.
Strong evidence of a heterogeneous effect between groups can also be seen in the
response of durable expenditures in Figure 2.5. The heterogeneity between housing
tenure groups is now starker. The response of U.K. mortgagors’ expenditure peaks at
around 1.2%, whereas the reaction of outright owners’ durables is statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero. The bottom row paints a similar picture for the U.S., with the
significant and persistent response of households with debt peaking around 1.2%, and
driving the aggregate durable response reported in Figure 2.3.
In summary, in response to a monetary policy shock, the percentage changes in
expenditure tend to be large and significant for mortgagors but small and insignifi-
cant for outright owners. Furthermore, this heterogeneity is far more pronounced for
durable goods. Importantly, there does not seem to be any significant difference across
the two countries. While the lack of heterogeneity in the response of mortgagors be-
tween the U.K and U.S. may already suggest a limited role for the different mortgage
market structures, in the next subsection we tackle this directly.
2.3.3 The response of mortgage payments and income
A possible explanation for the sensitivity of mortgagors’ expenditure to monetary pol-
icy is that a change in the interest rate triggers a direct effect on mortgage payments.
More specifically, a monetary expansion should lead to a fall in interest payments for
borrowers and a fall in interest income for savers. But for this redistribution to have
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an impact on the wider economy, it would still need to be the case that borrowers (the
mortgagor group in our context) are credit constrained, so that these cash flow effects
do not net-out in the aggregate. This is where the comparison between the U.S. and
the U.K. is an ideal assessment of this hypothesis. The U.S. tends to have longer dura-
tion mortgage contracts and a dominance of fixed rate products whereas the U.K. has
shorter duration contracts and more variable rate products. As such, it should be that
the effective lending rates facing indebted American households are relatively insensi-
tive, leading to a smaller change in their repayments following a monetary expansion.
As discussed in Section 2.2, we use household mortgage payments from the LCFS
and the CEX. Figure 2.6 reports the impulse response function for the percentage change
in this variable following a cut in the policy rate, revealing that mortgage payments fall
significantly following a monetary expansion. The response for the U.K. appears con-
siderably faster than in the U.S., peaking at around 0.7% versus the U.S. peak of around
0.4%. As we show in the next section, these estimates imply that the direct effect of in-
terest rate changes on repayments is nearly three times larger in the United Kingdom
than in the United States. This is intuitive given the differences in the mortgage market
structures. Our results therefore suggest that the distinction between adjustable and
fixed rates may play some quantitative role in the transmission of monetary policy.
A different (but not mutually exclusive) explanation for the mortgagors’ expendi-
ture response, however, is that the bulk of the effects of the interest rate change is in fact
indirect. This can be best understood by looking at joint responses of consumption and
income. Figure 2.7 shows that income responds significantly for both housing tenure
groups and in a similar proportion across the two countries, with the average point
estimates for mortgagors and outright owners typically around 0.3−0.4%.7 In the next
section, we show that the percentage changes in Figure 2.7 map into dollar changes
in income that are significantly larger than the dollar changes in mortgage payments
induced by the monetary policy shock.
2.3.4 Inspecting the mechanism
The evidence above is consistent with the presence of both direct and indirect effects
of interest rate changes. But this does not yet establish whether one of the channels
is quantitatively more important in accounting for the absolute magnitude of the re-
sponse of mortgagors’ expenditure. This requires converting the estimated percent
changes in the IRFs into dollar changes and then assessing how the dollar change im-
plied by the cash flow effect (the direct move in mortgage payments) and the gen-
eral equilibrium effects (captured by the response of income) compares with the dollar
change in total expenditure.
7Trimming the top 5% of the financial income distribution does not overturn our main findings but reduces the
uncertainty around the point estimates of the income responses by about 25%.
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To this end, we convert the percentage changes in the impulse response functions
of Figures 2.4 to 2.7 into an equivalent dollar change using the average value of each
variable for each cohort in each country (as reported in the Appendix Table B.1). We
use the U.S. price level in 2007 and the average exchange rate between pounds sterling
and U.S. dollars in that year to compute the cumulative change over the period of the
simulated impulse response functions.8
In Table 2.1, we report the results (with 90% bootstrapped confidence bands in
square brackets). The first three columns correspond to non-durable consumption,
durable expenditure and mortgage payments. The last column reports the cumulative
dollar change in household income. Panel A refers to the United Kingdom and Panel
B to the United States. Within each panel the first row corresponds to mortgagors,
the second row refers to outright owners without mortgage and, for completeness, the
third row is for renters. In interpreting these magnitudes, it is worth noting that, while
the absolute numbers in this table may appear small, we are considering a small and
temporary change in interest rates (25 basis points on impact and then returning to
zero relatively quickly over the forecast period).9 These numbers are also an average
of the effect on loan rates for newly originated mortgages and the effect on existing
(adjustable and fixed rate) loans.
A number of important findings emerge from Table 2.1. First, the dollar change in
mortgage payments in the U.K. is nearly three times larger than in the U.S., consistent
with the notion that the share of adjustable rate products has been historically signifi-
cantly higher in the U.K. (Besley, Meads, and Surico, 2013). Second, the change in aver-
age mortgage payments is significantly smaller than the overall change in mortgagors’
spending on non-durable and durable goods. This suggests that the direct effect of the
interest rate change on cash-flows alone does not generate sufficient resources to fund
the expenditure change that we observe in the data.10 Third, in contrast, the dollar
change in mortgagors’ income is of a similar order of magnitude as the dollar change
in mortgagors’ expenditure. But it is also not statistically different from the dollar
change in income for the other tenure groups. The response of income for all groups
seems most likely to reflect the general equilibrium effects of monetary policy on the
macroeconomy. Fourth, the dollar changes in expenditure for outright home-owners
8The response of the policy rate to the monetary policy shock tends to be slightly more persistent in the U.S.
than in the U.K., as can be seen in Coibion, 2012 and Cloyne and Huertgen, 2015. To make the magnitudes compa-
rable, we rescale the U.K. numbers by the ratio of the cumulated response of the U.S. Federal Funds Rate and the
cumulated response of the U.K. Bank Rate. This is like rescaling by the relative movement in the long-rate.
9Note that the size of our monetary policy shock is about twelve times smaller and at least five to six times less
persistent than the shock in Keys et al., 2015 and Di Maggio, Kermani, and Ramcharan, 2015.
10The size of the change in the average mortgage payments in Table 1 refers to a temporary 25 basis points cut in
the policy rate and accords well with a back-of-the-envelope calculation using an effective mortgage duration of ten
years, an effective loan to value ratio on outstanding debt of 0.5 and, for the U.K., the average house value from the
Land Registry since 1995 (and from Halifax before then) as well as a share of mortgages on adjustable rates of 45%.
This yields an average change in U.K. mortgage payments of 168 US dollars. Replacing the UK share of mortgage
contracts on adjustable rates with a share of 15% for the U.S., we obtain a value of 56 dollars.
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are never statistically different from zero, despite significant movements of their in-
come in both countries. It is therefore the mortgagor group who adjusts expenditure
significantly relative to income, which is consistent with the notion that households
with debt are characterized by higher marginal propensities to consume.
Wealthy hand-to-mouth mortgagors. To corroborate the conclusion of Table 2.1, we draw
on independent evidence on the extent to which households with mortgage debt may
face a liquidity constraint, using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the
American Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) for the (multi-year) waves that corre-
spond to our baseline samples.11 As these households own sizable illiquid assets (in
the form of housing) and respond significantly to changes in interest rates, they appear
to fit well the definition of ‘wealthy’ hand-to-mouth (WHTM) put forward by Kaplan
and Violante, 2014. More specifically, we define a household as ‘wealthy’ hand-to-
mouth if at any given point in time both (i) their net illiquid wealth is positive and (ii)
their net liquid wealth is less than half of their total monthly household labor income.12
In Figure 2.8, we report the share of mortgagors who are ‘wealthy’ hand-to-mouth
for pairs of temporally close waves in the BHPS and SCF. While there are more waves
than displayed for the SCF, there are only three waves of the BHPS over our sample
period (but we have confirmed that similar results emerge from the SCF waves that
we have not reported). The clear message from this chart is that between 40% and 50%
of households with mortgage debt have very low levels of liquid wealth, suggesting
that they may find themselves liquidity constrained. In Figure B.6 of Appendix C, we
also show that most WHTM agents in the sample do have a mortgage. This section
has therefore presented further evidence to support the idea that many mortgagors
may behave in a liquidity-constrained manner, with important implications for the
aggregate effects of monetary policy.
11These surveys do not contain wealth information at a sufficiently high frequency to be used for our main anal-
ysis and they lack rich consumption data over a long period of time.
12When constructing the relevant household income and wealth measures, we select variables to make the con-
cepts of net liquid and illiquid wealth as consistent as possible across the two datasets. The BHPS only reports
quantities for overall investment and debts whereas for specific assets it only records whether these are held or not.
The SCF, in contrast, does provide quantities for particular assets and overall investment. Furthermore, the assets
on which information is provided differ slightly between surveys. Accordingly, net liquid wealth in the U.K. is
constructed as total amount of liquid savings and investments (National Savings Bank Accounts and Cash ISAs or
TESSAs, Premium Bonds, Stocks and shares ISAs or PEPs) minus non-mortgage debt (Hire purchase agreements,
Personal Loans, Credit and store cards, DWP Social Fund loans). Following Kaplan and Violante, (2014), net liquid
wealth in the U.S. is the value of checking, saving and MM accounts, directly held mutual funds, stocks, bonds
and t-bills, net of outstanding unsecured debt. Net illiquid wealth in the U.K. is measured using a binary variable
which takes value 1 if housing equity> 0 or the household has positive investments in (relatively) illiquid instru-
ments such as National Saving Certificates, NS/BS insurance bonds, private pensions, non-regular savings. Net
illiquid wealth in the U.S. is the value of housing equity (housing value - mortgage debt) plus pension/retirement
funds, life insurance, saving bonds and certificate of deposits.
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2.4 Further results
In the previous section, we showed that mortgagors tend to alter their overall expen-
diture far more than outright owners following a change in monetary policy. We also
provided evidence on the relative response of expenditure and income, suggesting that
mortgagors behave in a manner consistent with them facing liquidity constraints. Fi-
nally, we showed that, in the data, about half of the mortgage group have low liquid
wealth and that the majority of ‘wealthy’ hand-to-mouth households hold a mortgage.
But one may still be concerned that our housing tenure distinction is simply picking
up another (deeper) characteristic or changes in group composition over time. In this
section we explore this issue further. We also consider the results for renters.
2.4.1 Demographics
An important issue is whether our housing tenure distinction is simply picking up
life-cycle effects. To explore this issue, we follow the micro-econometric literature and
focus on birth cohorts. We regard households as ‘older’ if the head was born before
1935, as ‘middle-aged’ if the head was born in the interval [1935, 1949] and as ‘younger’
if the head was born after 1949.
In Figure B.1 of the Appendix, we show the breakdown of our tenure groups by
birth cohort. As expected, there is a prevalence of mortgagors among younger house-
holds and a prevalence of outright owners without mortgage debt among older house-
holds but, importantly, not all younger households are mortgagors and not all older
households are outright owners. Furthermore, the middle-aged group is populated by
even shares of all housing tenure cohorts.
Within each housing tenure group, we further sub-divide households into birth
cohorts. We then consider three experiments to explore whether age/life-cycle consid-
erations could be driving our results rather than mortgage debt per se. First, we inves-
tigate whether younger mortgagors respond more than older mortgagors. Second, we
focus on whether the response of middle-aged mortgagors is similar to the response of
middle-aged outright owners.13 Third, we verify whether excluding households with
a retired head makes a difference to our results. If the answers to these questions are
all negative, we can be more confident that the heterogeneity across housing tenure
groups documented in the previous section is not picking up omitted demographic
factors.
The comparison between the first and the second columns in Appendix Figures B.2
and B.3 shows that younger and middle-aged mortgagors respond similarly. This is
true both in terms of the magnitude and in terms of the significance of the point es-
timates (both for non-durable consumption and durable expenditure). This suggests
that conditional on the housing tenure group, age — as proxied by birth cohort —
13Unfortunately, there are neither enough mortgagors in the older birth cohort nor enough outright owners in the
younger birth cohort for us to look at these two other sub-groups.
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does not seem to play a significant role in the transmission of monetary policy in any
of the two countries. On the other hand, the comparison between the second and
third columns in Appendix Figures B.2 and B.3 reveal that the changes in middle-aged
mortgagors’ expenditures are typically large and significant whereas the changes in
middle-aged home-owners’ expenditures are typically small and statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. We interpret these findings as further suggestive evidence that,
conditional on the age/life-cycle position, household debt plays an important role in
the monetary transmission mechanism.
Finally, we consider restricted samples from the LCFS and the CEX where we ex-
clude households with a retired head. The results from this exercise are reported in
Appendix Figures 14 and 15. The figures show that our baseline estimates in Section 3
are confirmed when imposing this restriction.
In summary, the findings from the previous section are not overturned when con-
sidering the impact of demographics. In particular, the heterogeneous responses asso-
ciated with housing tenures status appear to hold over and above any possible hetero-
geneity associated with age or birth cohort.
2.4.2 Compositional changes
To interpret our estimates as the causal effect of monetary policy on the expenditure
and income of mortgagors, we need that the policy change does not cause households
to move from one housing tenure status to another. Note that this is likely to be more
problematic, if anything, for the U.K. survey data which consist of repeated cross-
sections, than for the U.S. survey data where, given the short panel dimension, we
already consider only those households who have not changed housing tenure status
between interviews.
Housing tenure shares. In this exercise, we examine whether the monetary policy shock
triggers any net inflows or outflows into each of the house tenure groups. Specifically,
we look at the response of the group shares. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the very
gradual rate at which home ownership has changed in both countries relative to the
high frequency movements in the monetary policy series, already suggests a limited
response of the tenure shares. In Figure B.7, we examine this formally. Each panel
reports the response of the group shares for mortgagors, outright owners and renters.
It is clear that none of the shares responds significantly, indicating that changes in
monetary policy do not seem to trigger significant endogenous changes in the hous-
ing tenure status.14 This is possibly unsurprising given that the shock is only 25 basis
points and the dollar changes in income from Table 2.1 are not especially large in an
absolute sense.
14While it may be theoretically possible that the inflows into one group might be offset by its outflows, it would
seem difficult to think that at the same time, for example, some renters become mortgagors and other households
with debt become renters following a monetary policy shock.
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A propensity score approach. One way of addressing concerns about endogenous changes
in group composition more explicitly is to apply the Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner, 2002
propensity score approach. Rather than grouping based on actual housing tenure,
this approach groups households based on the probability of being a mortgagor, us-
ing exogenous household characteristics as predictors. Specifically, we run a probit
regression over the full sample to generate individual predicted probabilities of hav-
ing a mortgage based on a high order polynomial in age, education, a time trend and
their interactions.15 For households observed in quarter t, we compute the probability
that they had a mortgage in the previous quarter. For these two periods, we classify
households as ‘likely’ or ‘unlikely mortgagors’ if the probability in the first of the two
periods is larger or smaller than the share of mortgagors in the sample.16 We then take
the growth in consumption across these two quarters for each group, from which we
can construct the implied consumption series for each of the groups that we then use
for estimation.
The results of this exercise are shown in Appendix Figures B.8 and B.9. As can be
seen, the main findings of our earlier analysis are not overturned. The likely mortgagor
group still exhibits stronger expenditure responses than the unlikely mortgagors, de-
spite income increasing for both groups. The possibility of changes in group composi-
tion therefore does not seem to be driving our estimates.
2.4.3 Renters
Turning to renters, Figure B.10 in the Appendix shows that, for both countries, the
percentage changes in non-durable consumption are similar in magnitude and signif-
icance to those of mortgagors. The responses of durable goods are, however, typically
smaller (especially in the U.K.) and less precisely estimated than for the other cohorts,
possibly reflecting the heterogeneous composition of the renter group. On the other
hand, income moves in a similar manner to the other cohorts and by a significant
amount. In both countries, the impulse response functions for renters translate into
positive dollar changes in expenditure (Table 2.1). In particular, Table 2.1 shows that,
in both countries, the response of non-durable expenditure for renters is greater than
the response of durables. The difference between the two expenditure responses is
also larger for renters than for mortgagors. The overall dollar change in expenditure
relative to income appears far larger for renters than outright owners and is line with,
or smaller than, the magnitude for mortgagors.
15To maximize the number of households in each quarter and cohort, we place no restrictions on the birth year of
the household head in this exercise but include age among the demographic variables in the probit regressions. To
sharpen the comparison between mortgagors and outright owners, we do not include renters in the analysis in this
section. While these restrictions do not affect the point estimates from the propensity score method significantly,
they improve their accuracy.
16As time variation in the probability of being a mortgagor may induce changes in the group composition, we
use a constant threshold for determining the group of ‘likely’ mortgagors.
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2.5 Theoretical insights
Our empirical results suggest four main findings (i) the expenditure response of mort-
gagors is far larger than the expenditure response of outright owners, (ii) the hetero-
geneity is more pronounced for durable goods, (iii) income responds significantly for
all groups and (iv) the direct effect of interest rate changes in both countries is modest
relative to the effect on expenditure and income.
To explore the possible mechanisms behind these results further, we need a frame-
work that allows us to quantify the relative contribution of possibly competing chan-
nels. Crucially, given the structural differences between the U.K. and U.S. mortgage
markets, the model should allow for a meaningfully distinction between fixed rate con-
tracts with different durations (or a different mix of fixed and adjustable rate products).
At the same time, we want the model to be tractable enough so that we can analyze
the transmission of interest rate changes in general equilibrium. With the above goals
in mind, we consider a simple environment with households that are heterogeneous
in their degree of impatience. Households also derive utility from leisure, non-durable
consumption and the flow of services associated with the stock of durable goods and
the stock of housing that they choose to hold. In the full version of the model, we also
allow for a choice between renting and owning. In addition, households can smooth
consumption using a long term (multi-period) debt instrument.
The liquidity constraint. We assume that households are subject to a constraint in the
amount they can borrow. We first present a simple version where the credit limit is
fixed exogenously. This will already allow us to understand the differential response
of constrained versus unconstrained households under fixed rate contracts with dif-
ferent maturities. Building on this, we then consider a richer version where borrowing
needs to be backed by a collateralizable asset, in this case housing stock. In addition,
households make a housing tenure decision between owning (possibly with a mort-
gage) and renting. While the exogenous credit limit version produces results qualita-
tively in line with the estimates in Section 2.3, we show that the presence of a collateral
constraint provides one (but by no means the only) mechanism that can amplify the
effects associated with an otherwise exogenous credit limit.
Multi-period debt. We assume that borrowing and lending can only go through a
nominal, long-term, risk free bond (or mortgage). One unit of debt issued at t pays,
starting in t+ 1, the sequence of nominal installments 1, ρ, ρ2, ... , which decay at a rate
ρ, following Woodford, (2001). Different values of ρ conveniently map into different ef-
fective average durations of fixed-rate periods. For example, ρ = 0 would correspond
to a case in which the entire stock of debt in the economy is renegotiated in every quar-
ter. On the other hand, a value of ρ = 0.8 (0.974) translates into a fixed-rate duration
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of about one (seven) year(s), which we take as a rough approximation of the average
effective duration in the U.K. (U.S.) mortgage market.17
Rest of the economy. The other elements of the model are relatively standard features
of a New Keynesian environment, such as sticky prices, habit formation and a Tay-
lor rule for setting the short-term nominal interest rate. Houses are in fixed supply
and wages are flexible. The model includes durable expenditures following Mertens
and Ravn, 2011 and Monacelli, 2009. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that our model,
while sufficiently rich to look at all the variables in our empirical analysis, has been
kept deliberately stylized to highlight the relative importance of the key theoretical
mechanisms that are most likely to be at play in the data. Accordingly, our theoret-
ical analysis abstracts from a number of features which — in the empirical literature
on DGSE models — have been shown to be quantitatively important to generate the
persistence in the response of the endogenous variables observed in the data. Details
and derivations of the two models below, including the description of the production
side, pricing and monetary policy, are confined to the Appendix.
2.5.1 An exogenous credit limit
We first consider the case where households face an exogenous and constant constraint.
Specifically, suppose there is a fixed credit limit, Ωt = Ω¯ ∀t such that
Stbt+1 ≤ Ω¯ (2.2)
where bt+1 is the real value of the debt repayment at the end of period t and Stbt+1 is
the current market value of outstanding debt. Note that for ρ = 0, bt+1 becomes the
real value of the entire outstanding debt and St becomes the inverse of the one-period
bond return. This set up is similar to the one analyzed in Eggertsson and Krugman,
(2012), with the distinction that here we consider debt with maturities longer than one
quarter.
Our objectives are twofold: (i) to see whether this simple framework can rational-
ize our empirical findings; (ii) to disentangle the importance of the direct and indirect
channels. Specifically, the former is a cash-flow effect, through which the budget con-
straint of debtors is directly affected by the interest rate change. The latter is a wider,
17On average over our sample period, nearly half of products in the U.K. mortgage market were originated at
a fixed rate, with the most popular deal being over two years (Besley, Meads, and Surico, 2013). Accordingly, we
regard an economy with ρ = 0.8 (or one year fixed rate period) as being sufficiently close to the average effective
duration in the U.K. mortgage market. As for the U.S., Doepke and Schneider, (2006) report that since the 2000s, the
average duration of financial assets has been around four years. Given that mortgages are typically characterized
by higher duration than any other asset, this would seem to represent a lower bound for our calibration. On the
other hand, the pace of entries and exits in the mortgage market suggests that an average effective duration above
ten years would probably be implausible. For the sake of concreteness, we set ρ = 0.974 (a seven year fixed rate
duration) for the U.S. but we have verified that the set of impulse responses below are not sensitive to choosing any
value between four and twenty years.
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indirect, general equilibrium effect where other variables such as household income can
move, possibly significantly, following a monetary policy shock.
To quantify the relative importance of the cash-flow channel, we solve and simulate
the model under different values of the duration parameter ρ, with zero representing
the extreme case of an economy which refinances its entire stock debt in every period.
The values of ρ are calibrated to match the average effective duration in the U.K. and
U.S. mortgage markets discussed above.18
In Figure 2.9, we report the effects of a 25 basis point cut in the policy rate on
non-durable consumption (top row), durable expenditure (middle row) and income
(bottom row). Two important results are worth noting. First, this simple set-up can
replicate the two main dimensions of heterogeneity we uncover in the micro data: (i)
for a given expenditure category, constrained agents respond more than unconstrained
agents, (ii) for a given household group, the change in durable goods is larger than the
change in non-durables. This reflects that fact that it is the stock of durables that en-
ters the utility function of the households. As income also moves in the data for both
groups, the expenditure responses in the model reinforce our interpretation of debtors
as hand-to-mouth agents.
Second, the impulse responses under different mortgage market structures show
that the effects of monetary policy are larger when ρ is smaller, consistent with both
our empirical findings for mortgage repayments and the theoretical results in Auclert,
2015a. The reason why this happens in the model is simple: when an indebted (con-
strained) household is financing a given consumption stream through debt with short
maturities, the proportion of the total amount that needs to be re-financed each period
is higher. An unexpected decrease in the refinancing costs generates an improvement
in household resources. But, importantly, this does not appear to be main driver of
the large response of debtors’ consumption, even in the empirically unrealistic case in
which everyone refinances the entire stock of debt in every period (i.e. ρ = 0). The
simple model therefore already seems to capture the main aspects of our empirical
findings, though the absolute magnitudes of the responses tend to be smaller than the
peak effects that we have estimated in the micro data.
2.5.2 An endogenous collateral limit
In this section, we relax the assumption of a fixed borrowing limit and assess the quan-
titative performance of an extended model which adds two features: (i) an endoge-
nous collateral constraint, (ii) a housing tenure decision, choosing between how much
housing to own and how much housing to rent, with the relative price determined
endogenously.
18 Importantly, and as shown in the appendix, the real interest rate and consumption/income in steady state are
independent of the value of ρ. This ensures a meaningful comparison of impulse responses under economies with
different values of ρ.
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We embed the collateral constraint as in Iacoviello, (2005) into our multi-period debt
framework, with mortgagors who can borrow up to a given fraction φ of their expected
housing wealth next period:
Stbt+1 ≤ φEt
(
qht+1htpit+1
Rt
)
(2.3)
where qht+1 is the real house price, ht is the housing stock, pit+1 is the inflation rate
between t and t + 1, and Rt is the one-period nominal interest rate. Full details and
derivations are reported in the Appendix.
In Figure 2.10, we show the results for mortgagors in the left column and those for
outright owners in the right column (renters’ responses are reported in the Appendix).
Note that in this extended version of the model, mortgagors’ income still comes from
labor only while for outright owners this is the sum of labor and financial income, with
the latter stemming from asset returns. The main message from the collateral constraint
model in Figure 2.10 chimes with the previous results in Figure 2.9 from the exogenous
credit limit model. In particular, it is still the case that (i) the spending responses are
heterogeneous across both household groups and goods categories, (ii) the gap in the
expenditure changes between the one year (solid red line) and the seven year (broken
green line) maturity calibrations is small and (iii) the income responses of households
with mortgage debt and outright owners are similar.
The difference between the calibration with a one quarter fixed-rate duration (blue
line with circles) and the calibration with a seven year fixed-rate duration can be as
large as 25%. On the one hand, this suggests that two economies with a very different
mix of adjustable and fixed rate mortgage products may, in principle, exhibit quite
different expenditure responses. On the other hand, Figure 10 also reveals that, using
two empirically more plausible calibrations for the average effective fixed rate duration
of one year for the U.K. and seven years for the U.S., the differences in the expenditure
responses to a temporary monetary policy shock tend to be relatively small, consistent
with the results in Garriga, Kydland, and Sustek, 2013.19
The results in Figure 2.10 suggest that a more detailed specification of the con-
straint(s) facing indebted households can provide an important amplification mech-
anism for the effects of monetary policy. While in the Appendix we provide some
19More extreme calibrations of the other structural parameters such as, for instance, the degree of price rigidity
and the maximum loan to value in the constraint, can generate significantly larger gaps between the one quarter and
the seven year duration impulse response functions. This would come, however, at the cost of two counterfactual
predictions. First, the magnitude of both non-durable and durable spending would tend to become implausibly
large relative to what we report in the empirical analysis. Second, the income responses would display a marked
heterogeneity between mortgagors and outright owners. On the other hand, the small difference between fixed rate
contracts of one year and seven years is robust to these more extreme parameterizations.
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evidence that a financial accelerator mechanism may be at play in both countries, mod-
eling other frictions — such as the transactions costs of accessing illiquid wealth pro-
posed by Kaplan and Violante, 2014 and investigated further by Kaplan, Moll, and Vi-
olante, 2015 in a business cycle model with incomplete markets and nominal rigidities
— may have the potential to produce an even larger amplification, which could com-
plement the collateral constraint channel.20 Nevertheless, our key conclusion is that
the general equilibrium effect on income, triggered by the behavior of debt-constrained
mortgagors, appears quantitatively more important than the direct effect of an interest
rate change on debt repayments. This would seem a key feature for any quantitative
model of the monetary transmission mechanism to match.
2.6 Conclusions
Does household indebtedness matter for the transmission of monetary policy? And if
so, why? Our analysis suggests that it does matter: the reason is that mortgagors tend
to hold little liquid wealth relative to their income and exhibit hand-to-mouth behavior
despite owning sizable illiquid assets. Consequently, the general equilibrium effects
of an interest rate change on income appear quantitatively more important than the
direct ‘cash-flow’ effect on mortgage payments in accounting for the magnitudes of the
estimated expenditure responses across heterogeneous debt positions. We reach these
conclusions by performing a detailed evaluation of the effects of monetary policy using
survey micro data for the United States and the United Kingdom, grouping households
by their housing tenure status.
The focus on the U.S. versus the U.K. is motivated by the marked differences in
mortgage market structures, with the majority of American contracts featuring longer
durations and fixed rates and the majority of British deals featuring shorter durations
and adjustable rates. The focus on households with debt versus outright owners is mo-
tivated by the close resemblance of these groups to the constrained and unconstrained
agents typically found in heterogeneous agent business-cycle models with housing
wealth. Indeed, we also report independent evidence that between 40% and 50% of
mortgagors in each country are potentially hand-to-mouth, and that the majority of
‘wealthy’ hand-to-mouth households are mortgagors.
To corroborate the interpretation of our evidence, we lay out a simple heteroge-
neous agents framework with a credit constraint and multi-period debt. In the model,
the credit constraint and the general equilibrium effect on income play a quantitatively
more important role than the direct cash flow effect on mortgage payments in rational-
izing our empirical findings. This paper therefore highlights a novel mechanism that
20In particular, Appendix F shows that, in both U.K. and U.S. data, (real) house prices and mortgage equity
withdrawal change significantly following a monetary policy shock.
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works through liquidity shortages facing indebted households and extends our under-
standing of the transmission of monetary policy beyond the conventional intertempo-
ral substitution channel in representative agent models.
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FIGURE 2.1: Share of mortgagors, outright home owners and renters in the U.K.
(source: FES/LCFS, 1975-2009) and the U.S. (source: CEX, 1981-2009).
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FIGURE 2.2: Monetary policy shocks series. United Kingdom: Cloyne and Huert-
gen, 2015; United States: updated version of Romer and Romer, 2004.
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FIGURE 2.4: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut
on the consumption of non-durable goods and services by housing tenure group.
Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands. Top row: UK (FES/LCFS
data). Bottom row: US (CEX data).
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FIGURE 2.5: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut
on the expenditure of durable goods by housing tenure group. Grey areas are
bootstrapped 90% confidence bands. Top row: UK (FES/LCFS data). Bottom
row: US (CEX data).
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FIGURE 2.6: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on
mortgage payments. Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands. Left:
UK (FES/LCFS data). Right: US (CEX data).
Mortgagors Outright Owners
U
N
IT
ED
K
IN
G
D
O
M
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Quarters
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Quarters
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
U
N
IT
ED
ST
A
T
ES
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Quarters
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Quarters
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
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TABLE 2.1: CUMULATIVE CHANGES OVER FOUR YEARS IN US$
Panel A: United Kingdom
non-durable durable mortgage after-tax income
consumption expenditure payments
Mortgagors 308.3 292.3 -166.4 695.9
[112.8, 516.1] [ 189.2 , 369.0 ] [ -272.2 , -41.7 ] [ 186.5 , 1105.1 ]
Outright -62.6 46.5 451.7
Owners [ -148.2 , 77.4] [ -24.6 , 107.6 ] [ 122.5 , 797.2 ]
Renters 155.3 19.0 397.3
[ 17.9 , 261.8 ] [-36.5 , 62.9 ] [ 94.2 , 596.1 ]
Panel B: United States
non-durable durables mortgage after-tax income
consumption expenditure payments
Mortgagors 305.8 229.3 -56.3 757.3
[ 58.3 , 554.3 ] [ 122.0 , 350.8 ] [ -112.8 , -4.3 ] [ 196.8 , 1302.0 ]
Outright -72.3 54.8 585.3
Owners [ -324.8 , 186.0 ] [ -10.5 , 127.8 ] [ 83.3 , 1012.8 ]
Renters 223.3 123.5 439.3
[ 32.3 , 412.3 ] [ 30.3 , 213.8 ] [ 112.8 , 699.8 ]
Note: The Table reports point estimates and bootstrapped 90% confidence bands
for the cumulative response (over the 16 quarters of the IRF) of the quarterly val-
ues of the variable of interest in 2007 US dollars, following an unanticipated 25
basis point cut in the policy rate. The magnitudes are per household averages.
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FIGURE 2.9: Response of non-durable consumption, durable expenditure and
income in the exogenous debt limit model: constrained vs. unconstrained agents.
Duration refers to the effective duration of fixed-rate mortgage contracts in the
aggregate economy, which on average is about one year for the U.K. and 7 years
for the U.S.
62
Chapter 2. Monetary Policy when Households have Debt: New Evidence on the Transmission
Mechanism
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
N
on
−d
ur
ab
le
s
Mortgagors
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Outright owners
 
 
Duration = one quarter
Duration = one year (U.K.)
Duration = seven years (U.S.)
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
D
ur
ab
le
s
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
In
co
m
e
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
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income in the housing collateral constraint model: mortgagors versus outright
owners. Duration refers to the effective duration of fixed-rate mortgage contracts
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Chapter 3
Monetary Policy and The Mortgage
Market: Evidence from Loan-Level Data
Keywords: mortgage market, first-time-buyer, monetary policy
3.1 Introduction
In Cloyne, Ferreira, and Surico, 2016 we argue that almost 50% of mortgagors in the
UK and the US have positive housing and illiquid wealth1, but are liquidity constrained
in the sense that liquid assets amount to less than half the monthly (net) income of
the household. The consequence of this is that, after an unexpected decrease in short
term interest rates, mortgagors consumption of durable and non-durable goods / ser-
vices increase significantly more than the consumption by outright homeowners (i.e.
homeowners without mortgage debt). We show that, although the direct change in cash
flows due to the nature of variable rate mortgages might explain part of the consump-
tion expenditures increase, most of such increase over a window of 3-4 years seems to
arise from general equilibrium effects that affect he household’s income stream.
The above conclusions, however, emerge from analyzing an average mortgagor, both
in the data and in a model. This clearly hides differences between households with
a mortgage which might turn out to be relevant to understand the transmission of
shocks into household decisions and macroeconomic aggregates: whether a mortgagor
is able / willing or not to re-mortgage after a number of years paying back the original
mortgage (and therefore accumulating equity), or whether a household is a first-time-
buyer (FTB) who has saved a minimum deposit, can provide key information about the
household’s balance sheet position. If there are reasons to believe that the permanent
income hypothesis fails in the data, then balance sheet positions will affect decisions
about consumption and saving. As recently argued by, among others, Auclert, 2015b
and Berger et al., 2015, the joint distribution of marginal propensities to consume (MPC)
and balance sheet positions (including net housing equity) will then determine the
1Illiquid wealth is composed of pension funds, life insurance, and other relatively illiquid investments.
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transmission of shocks (such as interest rate or house price) into aggregate variables
such as consumption and output.
In this chapter I do two things. Using data on more than 5,000,000 individual mort-
gages issued in the UK from 1981q1 until 2007q4, I first provide novel evidence on
the evolution and behavior of the mortgage market as characterized by the leverage
and afford-ability positions of households when mortgages are originated. The data
only covers mortgage origination, and the same household is not followed in time (i.e.
data are repeated cross-sections). In order to analyze the time evolution of house-
hold and contract characteristics, I look at the evolution of different percentiles of the
conditional distributions for the variables of interest (LTV, LTI, real income, age). The
distribution of individual loan-to-values (LTV) has remained pretty stable over time,
while loan-to-income (LTI) ratios at origination have increased by more than 50% in
the same period, tracking pretty closely the evolution of house prices. Furthermore,
LTIs are also significantly more responsive than LTV to unexpected changes in inter-
est rates. Not surprisingly, there is significant heterogeneity in the evolution and re-
sponse of LTV and LTI between FTB and non-FTB households. Households that are
first-time-buyers tend to enter mortgage contracts with much higher LTVs than those
that already own a house, have some positive housing equity, and are re-mortgaging.
This is of course intuitive, since the latter have already payed part of the principal
of their original mortgage when they decide to re-mortgage. I find that after an un-
expected decrease in the benchmark interest rate, those households that are able to
re-mortgage with relatively low LTV (leverage) tend to extract part of their accumu-
lated equity over and above possible capital gains arising from an increase in the price
of their house. This is in line with recent evidence put forward by Mian, Rao, and
Sufi, 2013, Mian et al., 2015, Wong, 2015b and Berger et al., 2015 among others. On the
other hand, LTV at origination remains unchanged for both non-FTB with high (above
85%) LTV and FTB households. I then argue that these responses to shocks are con-
sistent with a type of general equilibrium models with savers and borrowers, where
the latter are constrained by the value of their (housing) collateral, and are able to re-
mortgage. These are the same models which Cloyne, Ferreira, and Surico, 2016 show
do a good job in replicating the behavior of non-durable consumption, durable expen-
ditures and disposable income observed from household level data in the UK and the
US. The mechanism through which the model replicates the empirical findings is the
following. Relatively impatient households are required to use housing as collateral
when borrowing. If the desired borrowing is higher than their maximum collateral-
izable value of their real estate, then their current consumption expenditures will be
determined by current labor income, as well as current changes in house prices. A
contractionary monetary policy shock that triggers a decrease in house prices (given
the nominal short-term rigidities in the goods market), forces a constrained household
to deleverage 1-to-1, while optimally adjusting hours worked. An expansionary mon-
etary shock (i.e. a decrease in the benchmark interest rate) that triggers an increase
3.2. Mortgage Origination in the U.K. 65
in house prices, allows a household with positive housing equity to either (i) use the
extra equity to increase borrowing and current consumption 1-to-1, or (ii) save part of
the increased housing value as a precaution for future expected consumption needs
and negative income shocks. This implies a potential asymmetry in the individual and
aggregate response to monetary policy shocks. The monetary policy shock I identify
in the data is relatively small, with a standard deviation of around 30bp in the period
1975-2007. By construction (i.e. given the estimation methodology), the estimated im-
pulse response functions (irfs) for LTV and LTI at origination are symmetric. Although
the size of the identified interest rate shocks doesn’t seem large enough to make the
desired borrowing or equity extraction slack, there is not sufficient data to test this
empirically. I therefore go back to the structural model and adapt the methodology
proposed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2015b in order to approximate the model solu-
tion locally while capturing the occasionally binding nature of the collateral constraint.
For a standard parametrization of the model economy, including the interest rate rule,
numerical exercises seem to confirm the intuition: the interest rate shock considered,
parametrized in order to match the data, is not large and/or persistent enough to make
the collateral constraint slack. Borrowers then extract all available equity for current
consumption, leaving the observed LTV unchanged after a shock, while labor income
does not react as much as the value of the stock of debt. These results are in line with
previous empirical and model-estimates of responses to monetary policy shocks, as in
Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin, 2010 and Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2015a.
The remaining of this chapter is structured as follows: in section 3.2, I present the
mortgage market data and institutional characteristics for the U.K; section 3.3 presents
the main empirical results; section 3.4 then contrasts such results with a relative stan-
dard general equilibrium model with collateral constraints; finally, section 3.5 con-
cludes.
3.2 Mortgage Origination in the U.K.
3.2.1 Basic Institutional Characteristics
As it has been well documented elsewhere2, the evolution of the mortgage market in
the UK has some particularities. First, and starting in the early 1980s, a series of dereg-
ulation measures introduced significant competition and laissez-faire in the market for
residential mortgages, which until then was dominated by a cartel of Building Soci-
eties. Among other important measures, several policies introduced the use of credit
scoring techniques (1982), allowed lenders to set interest rates without a “recommen-
dation” from the Building Societies Association (BSA) (starting in 1984), and made it
easier for lenders to access wholesale funding and to choose the composition of their
2See, for example, Besley, Meads, and Suirco, 2012, Best et al., 2015 and Cloyne, Ferreira, and Surico, 2016.
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loan book (starting in 1986 with the Building Society Act). These limits and restric-
tions have been steadily updated until these days. Second, and for reasons which are
still being debated (see the discussion in Miles, 2005), residential mortgages originated
in the U.K until right before the starting of the financial crisis where mostly of two
types: (i) a fully adjustable rate type (ARM), meaning that the interest rate payments
are usually adjusted with changes in the Bank Rate set by the Bank of England and the
corresponding changes in the funding costs of lending institutions; and (ii) a mortgage
type with a rate that is fixed for 2 to 5 years, after which the rate is “reset” and becomes
variable with a high mark-up over the funds rate. These prevalent mortgage types are
very different from the prevalent ones in the US.3
3.2.2 Data
I use information on individual mortgage origination for the U.K. at a quarterly fre-
quency between 1981q1 and 2013q4.4 The data comes from two main sources: (i) be-
tween 1981q1 and 2005q1, I use a 5% sample of all mortgages originated each quarter
and collected by the Survey of Mortgage Lenders (SVL)5, and (ii) after 2005q2, the uni-
verse of mortgage origination / product sales as collected by the Financial Conduct Au-
thority (FCA). Both sample and universe contain basic information on the household
and the completed mortgage product6. In particular, I retrieve the following common
information for all quarters in the period of analysis: (i) data on product information:
loan size, issuance date, property valuation at the time of issuance, initial interest rate;
(ii) data on borrower information: age, gross income on which the mortgage is issued
and whether the household / borrower is a first-time-buyer (FTB) or a non-first-time-
buyer (Non-FTB).7 . Importantly, households in the data-set are not followed in time;
i.e. I only have access to repeated cross sections of mortgage origination.
The final database I use presents a distribution for each quarter of, among other
variables, loan-to-values (LTV) and loan-to-income (LTI) from individual mortgage
deals at origination. The average share of the fixed-rate (2-5 years) products for the
period 1981-2007 has fluctuated around 40%-50%.8 Table 3.1 provides some descrip-
tive statistics on the full sample (1981-2007), while table 3.2 provides statistics for two
separate periods: before and after 2001q1. The reason for such split is that around this
3For a detailed description of the mortgage markets in the two countries see, among others, Campbell, 2013 and
Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca, 2013.
4Data is available from 1975 onwards; however, for reasons related to the market structure back in the 70s as
describe above, I start my analysis from 1981.
5The survey was previously carried out by the Survey of Building Society Mortgages (SBSM).
6Mortgages used in a buy-to-let scheme or a comercial property are excluded.
7More information was added into the surveys throughout the period. For example, from 1997 onwards, the
survey started providing information on the specifics of non-FTB, namely whether the household is moving home,
buying a second property, or simply remortgaging (as well as the reasons for rre-mortgaging). Relevant informa-
tion omitted by the survey and the FCA data are, for example, whether the mortgage is of fixed or variable rate,
the credit score assigned to the borrower / loan. More information on the data can be found at the Council of
Mortgage Lender’s website, http://www.cml.org.uk/home/, as well as at the Product Sales Database of the FCA,
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/systems-reporting/gabriel/help/product-sales-data.
8Since 2008, this has radically changed, with fixed-rate mortgages becoming the predominant type.
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date, house prices and LTI at origination started a steep increase, as shown in figure
3.3, which lasted until the beginning of the financial crisis.
The main differences between the pre- and post- periods can be seen in terms of
the average age and down-payments (in absolute and relative to real income) of mort-
gagors. Households that where able to get a mortgage before house prices started to
increase around 2000-2001, tended to be younger and could afford a house of a given
quality with a lower down payment than those that got a mortgage after 2001. This
is intuitive: as house pries increase sharply, if banks don’t relax credit conditions at
the same pace, then a household needs a higher down payment to access a house of a
given quality. If such household is a first-time-buyer, then it will need to have saved for
a longer period in order to accumulate the required deposit. Indeed, the consequences
of increasing house prices can be seen in figure 3.1 which shows the evolution of the
composition of mortgagers, i.e. the shares of FTB and non-FTB across time. Starting at
the end of the 90s, the share of FTB decreases significantly. Given that the total number
of mortgagors has not changed dramatically, this implies a decrease in the number of
FTB too.
Pricing and availability of mortgage products bu U.K. banks can be (informally) de-
scribed as having some sequential aspect to it: First, most banks restrict, either explic-
itly or implicitly, the loan size and avilability according to, among other things, a certain
LTI ratio requirement. Second, and conditional on being cataloged within “creditwor-
thy” limits, mortgage products are offered with an initial interest rate which varies in
“notches” at different LTV values. In particular, the interest rate offered changes at
pre-specified LTVs: 60%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85% and 90%. In between such notches, the
(average) interest rate is almost constant, although the exact “location” of these notches
differs by bank and particular product.
3.2.3 Mean and Marginal Mortgagors
Figure 3.2 plots the evolution of the mean (left panel) and 90th percentiles (right panel)
for the LTV and LTI distributions in the period 1981q1-2013q4. The figure uses data
for all buyers / borrowers. Given the menu of contracts that banks and building societies
tend to offer in reality, which are usually characterized by a maximum LTV offered, we
can thin of the th percentile of the LTV distribution as the marginal mortgage originated.
This will become clear in section 3.
A first interesting feature emerges: while both the mean and the 90th percentile
of the LTV seems to barely move throughout the period (except for the sub-period
starting in 2008), the mean (90th percentile) of the LTI distribution almost doubles. In
particular, and as seen from figure 3.3, the evolution of the higher percentiles of the LTI
distribution seem to track the steep upward movement in house prices since 2001, as
measured by the Halifax House Price index (HHPI) and the NationWide House Price
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Index (NHPI).9 This pattern of LTVs and LTIs is not unique to the U.K.. Among other
recent works, Campbell and Cocco, 2015 present similar evidence for the U.S. (see fig-
ure 1 in their paper). Their ratios, however, and unlike the evidence I am presenting
here, are constructed fromaggregate series for household debt, income and house prices.
In addition, the data they use on household mortgages does not include second mort-
gages (or re-mortgaging), which, as mentioned above and shown in figure 3.1, tended
to gain importance once house prices started to increase in the early 2000s. Although
before 1997 information on the different types of non-FTB was not available from the
surveys, it can be hinted that before 2001, 30% of mortgage origination each quarter
corresponded to FTB households; 15%-20% corresponded to households remortgag-
ing, and the other 50%-55% corresponded to other non-FTB (movers, second home
buyers, etc). The evolution post-2001 shows a sharp decrease in the share of FTB, which
was taken-up by homeowners re-mortgaging. This is intuitive: for a given supply and
pricing of mortgages, as soon as house prices started to increase rapidly, renters that
had been saving for a deposit having a particular house size / quality in mind, saw
their chance to acquire such house significantly reduced (or the cost in terms of current
consumption significantly increased). On the other hand, homeowners that had al-
ready payed back part of their mortgage saw the value of their corresponding housing
equity increase sharply. This created incentives to re-mortgage either in order to ex-
tract part of such equity increase, or in order to get a better rate deal assuming lenders
priced differently mortgages with different initial LTVs (there is ample evidence for
this, on which I comment below).
3.3 Response to Interest Rate Shocks
The information on individual mortgages, though quite granular, represent outcomes
of an equilibrium between household’s consumption-saving decisions and supply /
pricing decisions by banks. In this sense, movements in the observed distributions of
LTV’s and LTI’s over time contain changes in both demand and supply forces.
Notwithstanding these confounding forces behind the observed outcomes, analyz-
ing how LTVs and LTIs change after an unexpected movement in interest rates ( inter-
temporal consumption price for households and cost of funding for banks) can still
shed light on the transmission of shocks through the mortgage market. With this in
mind, I estimate the following empirical model
Xi,t = α
i
0 + g
(
trend;αi
)
+Bi(L)Xi,t−1 + Ci(L)St−1 +Di(L)Zi,t−1 + ui,t (3.1)
where Xi,t can be both the mean and 90th percentile of the distribution of LTV and
LTIs at origination (at time t); in other words, i ∈{mean LTV, mean LTI, 90th lTV, 90th
9The HHPI includes information on all residential property sales in England and Wales going back to 1983 that
are sold for full market value and are lodged nk for registration. The NHPI use similar statistical methods to
construct the index, goes back longer than the HHPI, but uses a representative house within the newly built.
3.3. Response to Interest Rate Shocks 69
LTI}.10 The monetary policy shocks are denoted by S and Z is a vector with additional
controls, including quarterly dummies. The g (trend;α) term represents intercepts and
coefficients on a time trend polynomial, with a break in 1993 for the U.K. due to the
change towards an inflation targeting monetary policy, as well as a break in 2000q4
when using LTI data.11
The usual macroeconomic reverse causation problem arises: the mortgage market,
both in terms of demand by households and supply of funds by lending institutions,
responds to movements in monetary policy, but monetary policy also responds to de-
velopments in household consumption as well as lending and investment. Therefore,
regarding unanticipated changes in the short-term interest rate, I use a shock series
St constructed for the U.K. by means of a “narrative” identification. This method re-
gresses the change in the Bank Rate12 around the policy decision date on a proxy for
the information set available to the policymaker just prior to that decision. This infor-
mation set includes a range of real time indicators and forecasts to reflect the forward-
looking nature of monetary policy.13 I restrict the shock series 1981q1 - 2007q4, in order
to avoid the period where the Bank Rate hit the effective zero-lower bound (ZLB). I
then use the estimated parameters from eq. (3.1) to construct point estimates, as well as
associated 90% confidence intervals bootstrapped from 10,000 repetitions, of impulse
response functions (IRFs) to a 25bp decrease in the Bank Rate.
3.3.1 From Monetary Policy shocks to Mortgage Rate Changes
As a first check and validation of the shock series, I estimate (3.1) using as depen-
dent variable: (i) an average interest rate for mortgages (new and outstanding) at each
point in time, and (ii) a marginal mortgage rate (i,e, rate for new mortgage origina-
tion) averaged over all LTV values.14 Figure 3.4 presents the results. Two reassuring
patterns emerge: first, after a 25bp (i.e. 0.25% points) decrease in the benchmark pol-
icy rate, both the average and marginal mortgage rates decrease; second, the marginal
rate reacts and peaks significantly faster than the average rate: while the former reacts
with statistical significance already 2 quarters after the shock and peaks at 0.15% af-
ter 3-4 quarters, the average rate starts reacting with statistical significance only after
6 quarters. This second result is intuitive given that the average rate emerges from a
10I use a backward-looking moving average of 4 quarters for each series in order to eliminate some of the noise
inherent in survey data.
11The orders of the lag polynomials are chosen using an optimal lag length criteria, namely the corrected AIC.
In addition, we have experimented with including the contemporaneous value of the shock and with assuming a
different type of trend. Results are robust. Standard errors are bootstrapped using a recursive wild bootstrap.
12In the UK, contrary to the US, the Bank rate is indeed the effective interbank rate.
13For a detailed description of the method and the resulting series, see among others, Romer and Romer, 2004,
Cloyne and Huertgen, 2015 and Cloyne, Ferreira, and Surico, 2016. Importantly, Cloyne and Huertgen, 2015 con-
struct a measure for the U.K. employing this methodology and show that it improves on conventional VAR identi-
fication methods.
14These variables enter equation (3.1) in levels. The data for bith series is put together by the Bank of England,
using the same information I use regarding mortgage origination. They can be found here: BoE Statistical Interactive
Database: Interest and Exchange Rates Data.
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mix between variable rate mortgages, with a rate that tracks the benchmark rate each
period, and fixed rate (2-5 years) mortgages.15
The negative response of both rates, which is what one would expect, implies that
there is a significant pas-through from policy rates to loan rates. This becomes more
apparent if we note that, even when the unexpected changes in the policy rate are
correctly identified, the impulse responses estimated above are general equilibrium out-
comes. In other words, they emerge from the interaction of two forces: on one side,
banking sector decisions and competition translates part or all of the funding rate de-
crease into loans rate decreases (for every LTV or down payment, meaning a shift in
the supply curve), while on the other side, the potential increase in loan demand by
borrower households due to an inter-temporal substitution channel.
3.3.2 Response in LTVs and LTIs at Origination: All mortgagors
Figure 3.5 then presents the results when (3.1) is estimated on LTV and LTI origination
data for all buyers. The patterns emerging from the time series in figure 3.2, namely
that LTIs at origination have moved significantly more than LTVs over time (both in
absolute terms and in % terms), is apparently also present when one looks at the devi-
ations from a trend: while the distribution of LTV at origination seems not to move after
an interest rate shock, as captured by the IRF at different percentiles, the opposite is
true for the distribution of LTIs. the mean, 75th and 90th percentiles of the latter move
significantly and in similar magnitude (as % point deviations from the trend).
Again, these are general equilibrium responses. Notwithstanding, some interesting
conclusions can be hinted. First, at the individual loan level, the change in the loan size at
origination is stronger than the change in household income for (new and existing) bor-
rowers. Second, loan sizes are moving proportionally to house prices; in other words,
if house prices are moving in response to the change in the policy rate, then loans
are moving proportionally to those. The latter result implies, among other things, that
those households getting a new mortgage are either (i) putting a higher down payment
in absolute terms if they are a first-time-buyer, or (ii) maintaining or extracting hous-
ing equity if they are re-mortgaging, depending on whether house prices are moving
or not.
Interestingly, as shown by Best et al., 2015, conditional on lender and product fea-
tures, household characteristics such as age of principal person and gross income, have
very little impact on the level and slope of interest rates charged as a function of the
LTV at origination.
15 At first sight, the fact that the marginal rate peaks at 0.15% after 4 quarters following a 0.25% shock seems a
bit low and delayed, given what one would expect in terms of pass-through. Recall, however, that I am filtering
the original series before estimation using a 4-quarter backward-looking moving average. This both decreases and
delays the irf peak relative to what one would estimate using the original series without filtering.
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3.3.3 Heterogeneity Within Mortgagors: FTB vs. non-FTB
The above results rely on looking at all households (contracts) pooled together. Mort-
gagors differ, however, in (at least) on important dimension: some of them are tak-
ing out a mortgage for their first time, moving from a rented dwelling into their own
home; a second group is composed by those households that already have some pos-
itive housing equity, and are getting a second (or more) mortgage, or re-mortgaging.
Their balance sheet, as well as their demographic characteristics, can differ signifi-
cantly, as shown in table 3.3.
The table shows that FTB are younger, have lower real income, and enter a mort-
gage with higher LTV and LTI. Interestingly, the spread attached to contracts issued
to FTB tends to be smaller than the one attached to contracts for non-FTB. The reason
for this is that loans to non-FTB households tend to be bigger than those of FTB. For
a given maturity, bigger loans increase default probabilities. Such pricing behavior is
also in line with the results in Besley, Meads, and Suirco, 2012.
Figure 3.6 now plots the mean and 90th percentile of the LTV and LTI distributions
for FTB and non-FTB separately. An interesting feature is worth noting: while the LTV
and LTI distributions for FTB seem to be quite tight (at least as measured by the mean
and 90th percentile) until the years before 2008, when looking at non-FTB that is only
the case for LTI. For most of the sample period, mortgages originated for non-FTB’s
were characterized by a wide range of initial LTV: the mean LTV for this group is stable
around 55%, while the 90th percentile fluctuates between 80% and 90%.
The heterogeneity apparent in figure 3.6 implies that the IRFs in figure 3.5 estimated
from eq. (3.1) by pooling FTB and non-FTB data, are potentially misleading. To see
this, figure 3.7 plots the LTV distributions that are behind the time series in figure 3.6
(pooling all quarters together). The figure shows the LTV distributions for non-FTB
and FTB separately, as well as (the thick line) the distribution generated by pooling the
data on FTB and non-FTB together. It is clear that the mean and the 90th percentile of
the “pooled” distribution might correspond to different type of households altogether.
The next logical step, then, is to look at IRFs for these two groups of mortgagors
separately. To do this, I re-estimate eq. (3.1) for FTB and non-FTB series separately.
The estimated IRFs and confidence bands are shown in figures 3.8 and 3.9. Some in-
teresting facts emerge: (i) both the response of different percentiles of the LTV and
LTI distributions show some heterogeneity between types of mortgagors; (ii) the het-
erogeneity is particularly strong for percentiles below 90 of the LTV’s: the response for
non-FTB is positive and significantly different from 0, while the response for FTB is not
statistically different from 0; and (iii) the response of LTI ratios is economically and sta-
tistically significant for both type of households. Of course, one would expect smaller
responses, as a percentage deviation from trend, for the LTV at origination of FTB, since
these are on average higher than those of non-FTB (and both are probably constrained
by a number very close to 1). However, the interesting fact is the difference in statistical
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significance.
The positive response for percentiles between below 90 of non-FTB’s LTV is consis-
tent with recent evidence in Wong, 2015b and Best et al., 2015 on the fact that house-
holds that re-mortgage after a decrease in interest rates (or after the fixed interest rate
period ends) tend to withdraw some of the housing equity and use it for consump-
tion expenditures. Note that the positive response of LTV might be implying that re-
mortgagors extract equity over and above the one gained from house price increases.
One possible reason behind this could be the nature of the fixed-rate mortgages in the
UK: those households that remortgage are the ones with a 2-5 years fixed rate mort-
gage, and, given high transaction costs16, they tend to do so almost exactly when they
are supposed to, i.e. mainly at the time that the interest rate is set to change. Therefore,
when they do re-mortgage, the equity extraction might be larger than if re-mortgaging
were costless. As argued by Best et al., 2015, this same nature of UK mortgages seems
to render less plausible a change in re-mortgagors characteristics as the explanation
behind the positive LTV response for non-FTB. Of course, one possibility that we can-
not rule out is that the type of households that choose a fixed-rate mortgage in the first
place (i.e. FTB that go for a fixed rate mortgage) changes when interest rate change.
For the 90th percentile (and above) of the non-FTB’s LTV at oirigination, on the other
hand, the response is close to 0, while the same percentiles of the LTI exibit still positive
responses: almost 4 times as big in peak magnitudes (around 0.06% for LTV, and 0.24%
for LTI after a 25bp cut in the interest rate).
3.4 LTVs and LTIs in a Model with (Re-)Mortgagors
In this section I propose a relatively standard general equilibrium model with savers
and borrowers facing credit constraints, and firms facing nominal rigidities. The goal is
to understand whether the transmission of monetary policy shocks generates a pattern
in leverage and income in line with the empirical behavior of LTVs and LTIs estimated
in the previous section. The framework below is a simplified version of the one used in
Cloyne, Ferreira, and Surico, 2016.17 The focus of the analysis will be on the behavior of
borrowers who, in the equilibrium I will analyze in simplified set-up, can be mapped to
16For example, search costs for an appropriate new mortgage, mortgage booking fees and early repayment fees.
17It builds on the original set-up with savers-borrowers proposed by Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997 and Mankiw, 2000,
where relatively impatient households face a credit constraint and can use real assets as collateral for borrowing.
This framework was extended by Iacoviello, 2005 to analyze the response of consumption to transitory monetary
policy shocks, by assuming that firms face costs to adjust prices; more recently it was used by Eggertsson and
Krugman, 2012 to study the interaction of household debt, deleveraging and the zero lower bound in nominal
interest rates after a shift in the borrowing limits faced by households. In the paper, we modify the standard
framework with three ingredients which we argue are relevant to map the model into the data, and help to generate
the heterogeneity in consumption expenditures and income responses that we find using detailed household level
data. First, we differentiate between non-durable, durable and housing consumption. Second, we allow for an
endogenous housing tenure decision: each household can decide whether to rent housing from others, buy housing
with a mortgage, or buy housing outright; households that own housing stock can also choose whether to rent to
others. Third, we introduce mortgage products (bonds) with durations longer than 1 period (quarter). Importantly,
none of these three ingredients is crucial for the arguments and results below.
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non-FTB with high leverage in the data. As seen from figure 3.1, this group represents
around 70% of new mortgage contracts issued each quarter, with such share increasing
to almost 90% at the peak of the house price boom in the UK. In addition, and although
the version of the full model presented in Cloyne, Ferreira, and Surico, 2016 allows
for mortgages of varying duration and length of fixed interest rates, I will focus on
flexible rate mortgages (i.e. 1-period mortgages). As it is well known18, these type of
mortgages represent around 75% of all mortgages issued before 2007. This translates
to an average duration of the fixed-interest period of 1 year.
There are two types of households which are ex-ante heterogeneous: a share ωPH of
patient households (PH) and a share ωIH of impatient households (IH). Their discount
factors satisfy 0 < βI < βP < 1 . In equilibrium, as shown below, impatient house-
holds will borrow from patient ones, so I will denote them as borrowers and savers
respectively. We assume that impatient (patient) households can trade a complete set
of arrow securities with other impatient (patient) households, but not with the patient
(impatient) households. This implies that idiosyncratic risk can be perfectly shared
within households of the same type, but other risks cannot be insured with households
of a different type. All households derive utility from the consumption of non-durable
goods Ct, services from their stock of durable goods, Vt and services from their stock of
housing h˜t, as well as (dis-) utility from hours worked Lt. The lifetime utility is given
by
U i0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
(
βi
)t( x1−σt
1− σ + j log h˜t −
Lηt
η
)
i ∈ {I, P} (3.2)
with xt ≡ x (Ct, Dt; θ, µ) a Cobb-Douglass function of non-durables and durable stock,
Ct, Vt, with share parameter θ and can also incorporate habits µ. Households might
also face convex cost of adjusting both the durable stock and the housing stock, given
by ΦV (Dt, Dt−1) and Φh (ht, ht−1) (housing adjustment costs are given in terms of non-
durables) where Dt are durable purchases.I assume the following functional forms for
the convex AC:
Φh (ht, ht−1; θh) =
θh
2
(
∆ht
ht−1
)2
qht ht−1 (3.3)
ΦV (Dt, Dt−1; θV ) =
θV
2
(
Dt
Dt−1
)2
(3.4)
In the next subsection, I assume 0 adjustment costs, since these are not crucial for the
argument.
The durable stock depreciates at rate δD and evolves as
Vt+1 =
(
1− ΦV (Dt, Dt−1; θV )
)
Dt + (1− δ)Vt
18See for example Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca, 2013 and Besley, Meads, and Suirco, 2012.
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Households can only save and borrow by means of a 1-period mortgage.19 Borrow-
ers face a credit constraint, and they can use their housing stock as collateral20:
bt ≤ φqht ht (3.5)
where bt+1 is the real market value of the stock of long term mortgages at the end of
period t and qht is the house price in terms of non-durables. φ is the maximum LTV at
origination; below, I treat this as a fixed parameter. The budget constraint of a bor-
rower, in terms of non-durable consumption, can then be written as21
Ct + q
d
tDt + q
h
t ∆ht +
bt−1
pic,t
+ Φh (ht, ht−1; θh) = wtLt + Stbt (3.6)
where St = 1Rt is the price of a bond with return Rt. For the saver, denoting variables
with “ ′ “
C
′
t + q
d
tD
′
t + q
h
t ∆h
′
t −
b
′
t−1
pic,t
+ Φh
(
h
′
t, h
′
t−1; θh
)
= wtL
′
t − Stb
′
t + ΠC,t + ΠD,c (3.7)
where ΠC,t and ΠD,t are the profits from the firms that produce non-durables and
durables.
Analyzing the model around such steady state implies that the problem aced by an
impatient household is to maximize (3.2) subject to (3.6) (multiplier λt), (B.2) (multi-
plier λtqvt ), (3.5) (multiplier λCC,t), non-negativity constraints and a transversality con-
dition. PH maximize (3.2) subject to (B.117), (B.2), non-negativity constraints and a
transversality condition.
Since one group of households is more impatient than the other, the equilibrium
solution around the steady state implies that IH will borrow up to their limit (3.5). The
optimality conditions for the borrower’s problem are then
λt = β
LEt
(
λt+1
1
Stpic,t+1
)
+ λCC,t (3.8)
qdt = β
LEt
(
λt+1
λt
(
UV,t + (1− δ)qdt+1
))
(3.9)
λtq
h
t
(
1 + θh
∆ht
ht−1
)
=
j
h˜t
+ Et
(
βLλt+1q
h
t+1
(
1 + θh
∆ht+1
ht
))
+ λCC,tφq
h
t (3.10)
Lη−1t = λtwt (3.11)
19In Cloyne, Ferreira, and Surico, 2016 we consider long-duration mortgages. However, the analysis around a
0-inflation steady state as carried out below is independent from the duration of the assets. For further discussion
on this point, see also Auclert, 2015b.
20Here I provide no micro-foundations for this contract outcome. However, there are many ways to do so; see for
example Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997 and all the literature thereafter.
21Here I assume zero adjustment costs both for durables and housing stock.
3.4. LTVs and LTIs in a Model with (Re-)Mortgagors 75
with λt = ∂U∂Ct . Equation (3.8) defines consumption expenditures given that the
collateral constraint binds; eq. (3.9) is the optimal decision for durables expenditures;
eq. (3.10) is the optimal decision of housing purchases; and (3.11) is the intra-temporal
labor decision. The conditions for the savers are similar, with the difference that now
λ
′
CC,t = 0; therefore, condition (3.8) is replaced by the standard Euler equation
λ
′
t = β
HEt
(
λ
′
t+1
1
Stpic,t+1
)
(3.12)
The production side is standard. Output is endogenous. There are two sectors, one
producing non-durable consumption goods Ct and another producing durable goods
Dt. In each sector, a final producer aggregates different intermediate varieties, with
elasticities of substitution between varieties given by C and eD . Monopolistic pro-
ducer of intermediate variety i in sector j, with j ∈ {C,D}, uses a simple technology
which requires only labor as an input
Yj,t(i) = Lj,t(i) (3.13)
Labor markets are competitive. Each intermediate producer sets price Pj,t(i) but faces
quadratic adjustment costs a la Rotemberg, 1982, characterized by parameter θj mea-
suring the degree of sector j’s price rigidity:
AC(i)j,t =
θj
2
(
Pj,t(i)
Pj,t−1(i)
− 1
)2
Yj,t j ∈ {C,D} (3.14)
In the symmetric equilibrium where intermediate producers use the same amount
of labor, the evolution of prices in each sector (Phillips curves) in log-deviations from
a 0-inflation steady state are:
pˆiD,t = β
HEt (pˆiD,t+1) +
(
D − 1
ϑD
)
mˆcD,t
pˆic,t = β
HEt (pˆic,t+1) +
(
C − 1
ϑC
)
mˆcC,t
where mcj,t = WtPj,t is the real marginal cost in sector j ∈ {C,D}.
To close the model Monetary policy is carried out via a simple Taylor rule
Rt = (Rt−1)
rR
(
pi1+rpit−1
(
Yt−1
Y
)rY
r¯r
)1−rR
R,t (3.15)
where pit is the CPI, a composite index of non-durable and durable inflation rates
piC,t, piD,t, Yt = YD,t + YC,t is total output in the economy, and R,t ∼ (0, σR) is an un-
expected monetary policy shock.
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Since all production is consumed, and since housing adjustment costs Φh (ht, ht−1)
are defined in terms of non-durable goods C, the feasibility constraints are
YC,t = ωIH
(
Ct + Φ
h (ht, ht−1)
)
+ ωPH
(
C
′
t + Φ
h
(
h
′
t, h
′
t−1
))
+
θC
2
(piC,t − 1)2 YC,t(3.16)
YD,t = ωIHDt + ωPHD
′
t +
θD
2
(piD,t − 1)2 YD,t (3.17)
Finally, labor, housing and mortgage markets clearing requires
LC,t + LD,t = ωIHLt + ωPHL
′
t
H = ωIHht + ωPHh
′
t
0 = ωIHbt + ωPHb
′
t
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a set of sequences for Ct, C
′
t , Dt, D
′
t,
Vt, V
′
t , ht, h
′
t, Lt, L
′
t, bt, b
′
t, Lagrange multipliers and prices PC,t, PD,t, wt, qht , qdt , St, Rt such
that:
1. Ct, C
′
t , Dt, D
′
t, Vt, V
′
t , ht, h
′
t, Lt, L
′
t, bt, b
′
t , as well as the corresponding Lagrange
multipliers, solve the household problems for given prices and interest rate Rt.
2. PC,t, PD,t, LC,t, LD,t solve the firms problem for given wt
3. Rt is set according to (3.15), and St, Rt satisfy a no arbitrage condition.
4. Prices PC,t, PD,t, wt, qht , qdt , St, Rt are such that all markets clear.
In this set-up, the steady state interest rate is given by the discount factor of the
patient household
rSS =
1− βH
βH
From the optimality conditions for a borrower, in steady state we have
1 = βLR +
λCC
λ
with λ = ∂U
∂C
. For standard properties of xt (see below) it is the case that
λCC =
(
1− βLR)λ > 0 (3.18)
indeed verifying that the borrower is constrained in SS.
Near22 such steady state, then, consumption for borrowers is given by
C˜t = wtLt + Stbt − qht ∆ht −
bt−1
pic,t
(3.19)
22See for conditions under which a linearization around this steady state is valid.
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where C˜t ≡ Ct + qdtDt is total real (in terms of non-durables) expenditure in con-
sumption goods.
3.4.1 Parametrization
For the numerical analysis below, I assume the following functional form for consump-
tion utility:
xt =
(
Cθt V
1−θ
t − µCθt−1V 1−θt−1
)
(3.20)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is a share parameter and µ ∈ [0, 1) captures habit persistence. In the
bench,ark calibration, I will assume no habits, µ = 0.
Table 3.4 presents the parameter values used in the experiment below. Most of the
values are calibrated in a standard way. A couple of parameters deserve some further
explanation, though. I calibrate the housing demand shifter j as well as the elasticity
for different varieties of intermediate goods (which determines the wage in a steady
state) in such a way that, in a 0-inflation steady state the maximum LTV, as well as
the LTI, match the 90th percentile of the LTV and LTI at origination, averaged over
the period 1981-2007 in the UK; these numbers are 92% and 2.6 respectively. Impor-
tantly, given that the model described above abstracts from investment, government
spending and next exports, I calibrate the debt-to-output SB
Y
in the model to match the
debt-to-expenditure in the data, which for the UK is around 1.8.
3.4.2 Solution and Results
Linear Approximation
I first log-linearize the optimality and equilibrium conditions of the model around a 0-
inflation steady state in which the collateral constraint binds for borrowers, and repli-
cate the 25bp monetary policy shock used to construct the empirical IRFs. Figures
3.10-3.13 present results regarding the response of the LTV and LTI, as well as the real
value of debt, house prices and labor income for the representative borrower.23I carry
out two different comparisons. First, I compute IRFs for economies with different val-
ues of the housing adjustment cost parameter, θh, and a benchmark Frisch elasticity of
224. Figure 3.10 plots the response of the LTV and LTI. and 25 The IRFs are qualitatively
similar to what we observe using data on all mortgage origination, and they are intu-
itive. As shown above, the borrowing constraint is binding for impatient households
in such steady state. After a decrease in the short term interest rate, savers are willing
to bring non-durable, durable as well as housing consumption forward in time. Given
23As mentioned above, Cloyne, Ferreira, and Surico, 2016 argue that a similar environment to this one can match,
qualitatively and quantitatively, household consumption and income responses for different housing tenure groups
as estimated from micro data in the UK and the US. I therefore abstract from showing other IRFs here.
24This is the benchmark value used in Cloyne, Ferreira, and Surico, 2016.
25It can be shown that the steady state value of variables in this environment does not depend on the value of the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, 1
η−1 .
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goods prices are sticky in the short run, this starts to put pressure on wages and house
prices in order for labor and house markets to clear. The impatient borrowers take
advantage of both higher wages and higher house prices in order to increase hours
worked and, due to the positive value of housing as collateral, also the stock of houses.
The adjustment of the housing stock is costly, though, which is reflected in the fact
that, as also shown in figure 3.11, the increase in the housing stock (translated into a
bigger loan) is smaller when adjustment costs increase. This is reflected into a smaller
and more gradual increase in the LTI, approximately matching what we observe in the
data. In addition, around the steady state borrowers extract as much equity as possible,
given that interest rates are still relatively low. This implies that the LTV at origination
remains constant at the maximum available to the household, given by φ.
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 present the IRF under different Frisch elasticities of labor sup-
ply, for a benchmark value of the adjusting costs for housing of θh = 0.6.
Piecewise-Linear Approximation And Asymmetric Responses
The main advantage of the (log-)linear approximation is that it can easily deal with
many state variables, as in the current case. However, a natural caveat arises regard-
ing the above simulation results: the the null response of the LTV is indeed an artifact
of the local linear approximation around the steady state in which the collateral con-
straint binds for borrowers. The approximation is valid if the the interest rate shock
is “small enough”, such that the impatient households still want to borrow up to their
credit limit in order to consume or roll over existing debt. In such cases, then, the
loan obtained by the borrower is always the largest allowed by their housing collateral
value. The same household might, however, decide to de-leverage or not use their full
collateral value if the change in interest rates and income is above certain level. For
“big” shocks, the linear approximation to the household behavior might be very poor.
In order to capture the possible asymmetric response of variables to shocks due to
the nature of the collateral constraint binding only occasionally, I adapt the non-linear
approximation method proposed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2015b. The idea behind
it is the following. I identify two “regimes”, depending on whether the collateral con-
straint binds or not for the impatient household. Then a first-order approximation to
the solution around the same point for each regime is used. In the model above, that
point is the 0-inflation steady-state where the collateral constraint binds, as shown in
equation (3.18). Although the approximated solution is linear for each regime, house-
hold decisions and the dynamics of the economy after a shock can be highly non-linear,
depending on how long the agents expect the current regime to last, which depends on
the current state variables, as well as the size and persistence of the shock.26 An impor-
tant drawback of the approximated solution is that, as any linear solution, it discards
26A similar approach has been used in the analysis of the zero-lower-bound (ZLB) as a constraint to nominal
interest rates; see for example Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011.
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information about the volatility of future shocks and therefore about precautionary
behavior. In appendix section C.1 I sketch the basics of the solution algorithm.
I carry out the following simulation: two sequences of 60 interest rate innovations
is fed into the piece-wise linear solution of the model. Each sequence is composed of:
an initial sub-period 1, ..., t∗1 − 1 with 0 innovations, a negative innovation in period t∗1,
0 innovations in periods t∗1 + 1, ..., t∗2− 1 , a positive innovation in period t∗2 , and 0 inno-
vations in periods t∗2 + 1, ..., T , with T = 60. Figure 3.14 illustrates the response of LTV
and LTI at origination when the size of the negative and positive interest rate innova-
tions in periods t∗1 and t∗2 is 25bp (as in the empirical irfs), while figure 3.15 presents the
case where the size of the innovations is 300bp (a change of 3 p.p in the interest rate).
This magnitude close the smallest innovation which generates some asymmetry, con-
ditional on the benchmark persistence in the monetary policy rule (3.15) as presented
in table 3.4. For comparison, the the behavior of LTV and LTIs under the linear solution
are also showed.
The simulations suggest that the behavior portrayed in irf coming out from the first-
order approximation is not purely an artifact of the linearity of the solution around the
steady state where the collateral constraint binds. Given the empirically motivated
size of the monetary policy shock, and the benchmark parametrization of the mone-
tary policy rule, the general equilibrium effects on labor income and house prices are
not enough for borrowers to expect current and future collateral constraints to be slack.
Again, this approximation ignores the consequences of precautionary behavior. There-
fore, the above results cannot rule out the possibility that, for the same shock size that
triggers an increase in house prices and parametrization of the monetary policy rule,
borrowers decide to deleverage in order allow some room for borrowing in the event
of a negative shock in the future.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
I have presented evidence on the behavior of observed leverage (LTV) and affordability
(LTI) ratios at the individual mortgage level in the UK mortgage market. Perhaps
surprisingly, both the evolution and response to interest rate shocks of the distribution
of LTVs at origination appears to be much less volatile than that of LTIs. Although I
cannot rule out the possibility of the endogenous selection of households into getting
a mortgage affecting the interpretation of these results, evidence form previous papers
on the pricing of mortgage contracts point suggest that the mechanism behind the
transmission of monetary policy through the mortgage market is worth studying.
I then analyzed potential mechanisms through the lens of a standard general equi-
librium model with heterogeneous agents and nominal rigidities, with certain impor-
tant features that are close to the mortgage market in the UK. Simple numerical ex-
ercises which account for local non-linearity in the behavior of households seem to
confirm that the patterns estimated from the (albeit imperfect) data are not spurious,
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and can provide information on the transmission of monetary policy into expenditures
and income. Of course, significant work, both empirical and theoretical, still needs to
be done on this front. This is part of my ongoing research agenda.
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Tables
TABLE 3.1: Descriptive statistics for selected variables. All years 1975q1-2007q4.
All mortgagors.
Mean Median St.Dev. p25 p75
Age a 32.3 30 8.5 26 37
Real Income b 147.80 127.15 87.80 95.52 173.65
Downpayment 116.68 59.38 156.13 19.75 157.70
LTV 0.77 0.83 0.18 0.64 0.94
LTI 2.19 2.16 0.58 1.76 2.57
Spread c 2.40 1.68 1.71 1.14 4.00
Note: individual mortgage origination come from (i) the Survey of Mortgage
Lenders (SML) between 1975 and 2005q2 (excluding 1978 due to lack of data);
and (ii) the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA after 2005q2.
a Age reflects the age of the main borrower in the contract. b Real values for
income and down-payments are computed by deflating nominal values us-
ing the consumer retail price index that excludes mortgage interest payments
(RPIX). c The spread at origination is computed as the difference between
the contracted mortgage rate and the average deposit rate for Building Soci-
eties.
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TABLE 3.2: Descriptive statistics for selected variables. Pre and Post 2001. All
mortgagors.
Mean Median St.Dev. p25 p75
1975q1-2000q4
Age a 32 30 8.4 26 37
Real Income b 141.74 124.26 77.62 94.06 167.10
Downpayment 107.26 55.40 139.03 18.83 147.77
LTV 0.78 0.83 0.18 0.64 0.94
LTI 2.13 2.12 0.53 1.74 2.50
Spread c 2.53 1.84 1.72 1.25 4.00
2001q1-2007q4
Age 34.8 33 9.09 28 40
Real Income 213.36 178.56 145.65 124.82 255.37
Downpayment 218.36 128.77 260.00 40.00 304.88
LTV 0.76 0.80 0.18 0.63 0.92
LTI 2.76 2.78 0.80 2.18 3.27
Spread 0.99 0.83 0.71 0.46 1.40
Note: individual mortgage origination come from (i) the Survey of Mortgage
Lenders (SML) between 1975 and 2005q2 (excluding 1978 due to lack of data);
and (ii) the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA after 2005q2. a Age reflects the
age of the main borrower in the contract. b Real values for income and down-
payments are computed by deflating nominal values using the consumer retail
price index that excludes mortgage interest payments (RPIX). c The spread
at origination is computed as the difference between the contracted mortgage
rate and the average deposit rate for Building Societies.
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TABLE 3.3: Descriptive statistics for selected variables. All years 1975q1-2007q4.
FTB and Non-FTB.
Mean Median St.Dev. p25 p75
FTB
Age a 29.2 27 7.6 24 33
Real Income b 132.58 117.74 69.91 89.62 155.81
Downpayment 54.33 23.98 92.90 12.10 57.95
LTV 0.87 0.91 0.14 0.83 0.95
LTI 2.22 2.20 0.56 1.81 2.60
Spread c 2.34 1.64 1.72 1.03 4.00
Non-FTB
Age 34.9 33 8.4 29 40
Real Income 161.08 137.23 98.95 101.88 190.01
Downpayment 171.03 123.61 178.22 52.20 227.60
LTV 0.69 0.70 0.18 0.55 0.86
LTI 2.16 2.12 0.61 1.72 2.53
Spread 2.46 1.74 1.70 1.20 4.00
Note: individual mortgage origination come from (i) the Survey of Mortgage
Lenders (SML) between 1975 and 2005q2 (excluding 1978 due to lack of data);
and (ii) the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA after 2005q2. a Age reflects the
age of the main borrower in the contract. b Real values for income and down-
payments are computed by deflating nominal values using the consumer retail
price index that excludes mortgage interest payments (RPIX). c The spread
at origination is computed as the difference between the contracted mortgage
rate and the average deposit rate for Building Societies.
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TABLE 3.4: Calibration of the model.
Parameter Description Value
σ elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.5
βL, βH discount factor: mortgagors, outright owners 0.95, 0.99
1/(η − 1) Frisch elasticity of labor supply (benchmark) 2
j housing demand shifter 0.468
δ depreciation rate durables 0.025
εC,D elasticity of varieties 4
ϑC,D cost of adjusting prices 150
rpi, rY , rR Taylor rule: CPI, output, smoothing 1.5,.05,.6
ωIH share constrained households 50%
ωPH share unconstrained households 50%
φ maximum LTV 92%
Sb/Y debt to expenditure ratio 1.8
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FIGURE 3.1: Evolution of the composition of mortgage origination in the U.K.
Annual averages of quarterly data between 1975q1-2013q4. Constructed using
data from: the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) until 2005q1, and Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA) from 2005q2 onwards.
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FIGURE 3.2: Evolution of the mean (left) and 90th percentile (right) of the LTV
and LTI distributions for mortgage origination in the UK. All buyers. Con-
structed using annual averages of quarterly data between 1981q1-2013q4 from
the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
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FIGURE 3.3: Real House Prices and 90th percentile of the LTI distribution (all buy-
ers). Annual averages of quarterly data between 1981q1-2013q4 1981q1-2013q4.
Constructed using data from: (i) NationWide , and (ii) the Council of Mort-
gage Lenders (CML) until 2005q1, and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) from
2005q2 onwards.
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FIGURE 3.4: Impulse response functions (IRFs) to a 25bp decrease in the bench-
mark (Bank) rate of: the average effective mortgage rate (left) on all mortgages,
and marginal mortgage rate (right) on new mortgages. Point-estimates con-
structed from (3.1) in the text, estimated on 1975q1-2007q4 data; shaded areas
represent 90% confidence intervals bootstrapped from 10,000 repetitions. Data
source: Bank of England, Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) and Financial Con-
duct Authority (FCA).
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FIGURE 3.5: Impulse response functions (IRFs) to a 25bp decrease in the bench-
mark (Bank) rate of: the mean (top row), 75th percentile (middle row) and 90th
percentile (bottom row) of the LTV (left column) and LTI (right column) distri-
butions at origination for all buyers. Point-estimates constructed from (3.1) in the
text, estimated on 1981q1-2007q4 data; shaded areas represent 90% confidence in-
tervals bootstrapped from 10,000 repetitions. Data source: Council of Mortgage
Lenders (CML) and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
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FIGURE 3.6: Evolution of the mean (left) and 90th percentile (right) of the LTV
and LTI distributions for mortgage origination in the UK. Separate series for
First-time-buyers (FTB) and Non-First-time-buyers (Non-FTB). Constructed us-
ing annual averages of quarterly data between 1981q1-2013q4 from the Council
of Mortgage Lenders (CML) and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
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FIGURE 3.7: Confounding LTV distributions at origination
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FIGURE 3.8: Impulse response functions (IRFs) to a 25bp decrease in the Bank
rate of: the mean (top row), 75th percentile (middle row) and 90th percentile
(bottom row) of the LTV distribution at origination for FTB (left column) and
Non FTB (right column). Point-estimates constructed from (3.1) in the text, es-
timated on 1981q1-2007q4 data; shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals
bootstrapped from 10,000 repetitions. Data source: Council of Mortgage Lenders
(CML) and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
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FIGURE 3.9: Impulse response functions (IRFs) to a 25bp decrease in the Bank
rate of: the mean (top row), 75th percentile (middle row) and 90th percentile
(bottom row) of the LTI distribution at origination for FTB (left column) and
Non FTB (right column). Point-estimates constructed from (3.1) in the text, es-
timated on 1981q1-2007q4 data; shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals
bootstrapped from 10,000 repetitions. Data source: Council of Mortgage Lenders
(CML) and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
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elasticity of labor supply is set to 2. The LTV in the model is computed as Stbt+1
htqht
,
while the LTI is computed as Stbt+1Ltwt .
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FIGURE 3.11: Mortgagor’s value of debt (Stbt+1), house price (qht ) and real labor
income (wtLt) responses to a 25bp decrease in the interest rate. Different values
for housing adjustment costs. The wage (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply is
set to 2.
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FIGURE 3.12: Mortgagor’s LTV and LTI model responses to a 25bp decrease in the
interest rate. Different values for the wage (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply,
computed in the model as 1η−1 . Housing adjustment costs set to θh = 0.6. The
LTV in the model is computed as Stbt+1
htqht
, while the LTI is computed as Stbt+1Ltwt .
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FIGURE 3.13: Mortgagor’s value of debt (Stbt+1), house price (qht ) and real labor
income (wtLt) responses to a 25bp decrease in the interest rate. Different values
for the wage (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply, computed in the model as 1η−1 .
Housing adjustment costs set to θh = 0.6
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FIGURE 3.14: Mortgagor’s LTV and LTI model responses to a 25bp decrease and
a subsequent 25bp unexpected increase in the interest rate. Benchmark parame-
ter values as in table 3.4. The LTV in the model is computed as Stbt+1
htqht
, while the
LTI is computed as Stbt+1Ltwt .
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FIGURE 3.15: Mortgagor’s LTV and LTI model responses to a 500bp unex-
pected decrease and a subsequent 500bp unexpected increase in the interest rate.
Benchmark parameter values as in table 3.4. The LTV in the model is computed
as Stbt+1
htqht
, while the LTI is computed as Stbt+1Ltwt .

95
Appendix A
Appendix Chapter 1
A.1 Feedback Systems in On-line Markets: Some Examples
The feedbacksystem is the backbone of online markets in which anonymous parties
are transacting. Its role is to facilitate transactions by inducing trust in interactions
in which traditional contractual agreements are not always enforceable. A feedback
mechanism, otherwise called reputation system, is a public record of a trader’s past
transactions. Revealing an agent’s past actions will affect the future behavior of the en-
tire comunity towards that agent. It can hence discipline traders’ behavior and provide
them with incentives not to missbehave in the short-run.
In the early 2000, eBay was by far the most successful on-line market with almost
fifty million users and twelve million auctions run daily. The success of the platform
is due moslty to its feedback system. eBay’s reputation system has a simple and for
all users accessible design. At the end of each transaction, both parties can evaluate
each other using ratings from a tripartite scale- positive (1), neutral (0) and negative
(-1) - and an optional short comment. Following the argument in Cabral and Hortaçsu,
(2010), according to which neutral grades are rather perceived as negative ratings, we
devise our model with a binary rating system. We assume that traders in our model
thuthfully report the outcome of each transaction as either a "Success"(S) or a "fail-
ure"(F). Under the assumption that bidders are interested in purchasing one object
only and hence their aim is not to build a reputation, we restrict our attention to the
sellers’ track record. The aggregate measure used on eBay as a reputation indicator
consists of the number of positive net of negative ratings. The bidders in our model
are Bayesian updaters. The reputation measure they attach to a particular seller is their
belief that the seller they are facing is of a certain type.
eBay’s feedback system doesn’t distinguish between feedbacks received from sell-
ers or buyers. Cabral and Hortaçsu, (2010) documents that in general, traders start
their career as buyers and accumulate a number of positive feedbacks. With an estab-
lished reputation, they then start their seller’s career. For simplicity, we assume that
traders can be either sellers or buyers. Sellers in our model enter the game with a given
reputation and build it gradually.
Even though eBay’s feedback system promotes cooperation, it suffers from a couple
of severe drawbacks. The free entry and exit for all market participants opens the door
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for opportunistic behavior. Sellers can choose to exit the market and re-enter under a
new identity at basically no cost. Cabral and Hortaçsu, (2010) document that before
exiting the market, sellers "milk" their reputation. In the benchmark version of our
model we assume that sellers don’t have the option to exit the market. In a further
extension of our model we investigate the case in which sellers can exit the market
once their reputation has fallen below a threshold and can opt for re-entry against
paying a fixed cost.
A.2 Buyer’s Selection Strategy and Sellers’ Expected Revenues
Buyer’s Selection Strategy
In what follows, we describe the main features that characterize the buyer’s optimal se-
lection strategy, and the resulting expected type of the second highest bidder in seller’s
j auction.
The ex-ante utility of a buyer with valuation vi bidding in j’s auction is defined as
following:
pii(vi) =
N
Σ
n=1
Pr[n other bidders choose auctionj]× Pr[all n other bidders have types ≤ vi]
×rj × (vi − E[2nd highest type in j’s auction | highest type = vi ∧ ∃ n other bidders])
(A.1)
Following Bapna, Dellarocas, and Rice, (2010), we introduce a series of measures that
will prove useful in defining the equilibrium results. Given the auction selection strat-
egy of a bidder s : [0, 1]× [0, 1]J ⇒ [0, 1]J , the following function defines the probability
that a buyer is of type vi or lower and bids in seller’s j auction.
Qj(v
i|s) = ∫ vi
0
sij(u)f(u)du, j = 1, . . . , J
The expression Qj(1|s) stands for the probability that a random buyer bids in j’s auc-
tion, whereas 1 − Qj(1|s) + Qj(vi|s) is the probability that a random buyer is not of a
higher type than vi and bids in j’s auction.
It results that the above defined expected profit of a buyer with valuation vi bidding in
j’s auction can be written as: pii(vi) =
∫ vi
0
(1−Qj(1|s) +Qj(x|s))N−1 dx
Further we provide a short description of buyers’ equilibrium strategies as outlined
Proposition 3 in Dellarocas Bapna, Dellarocas, and Rice, (2010).
In the general set-up with J sellers in which we have assumed a complete order of
their reputations, let there be an L defined as the lowest integer 2 ≤ L ≤ J − 1 for
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which rL+1 <
(
L−1∑L
j=1
N−1
√
1
rj
)N−1
. If the integer does not exist, then L = J . The unique
one-bid auction selection equilibrium is described as following:
1. Buyers are divided intoL zones according to their types. Let tz z = 0, 1, . . . , Lwith
t0 = 1, tL = 0 be the zone delimiters. Buyers whose types satisfy tz < t ≤ tz−1
belong to zone z.
2. Zone z buyers randomly chose among sellers j = 1, . . . , z with corresponding
selection probabilities:
szj =
N−1
√
1
rj∑z
j=1
N−1
√
1
rj
3. If L < J , then sellers L+ 1, . . . J are never chosen by any buyer
4. Zone delimiters tz z = 0, 1, . . . , L− 1 are the solution to the following equations:
F (tz) =
(
N−1√rz+1
z∑
j=1
N−1
√
1
rj
)
− (z − 1)
Sellers’ Expected Revenues
Lemma 3 in Dellarocas Bapna, Dellarocas, and Rice, (2010) provides the closed-form
solution of seller’s j expected revenue. In the auction of a seller with reputation rj ,
where we assume w.l.o.g. r1 ≥ . . . ≥ rj ≥ . . . ≥ rM , the expected type of the second
highest bidder given their equilibrium strategies is given by:
H2,j(r1, ..., rJ) = 1 + (N − 1)
∫ 1
0
(1−Qj(1) +Qj(t))N dt−N
∫ 1
0
(1−Qj(1) +Qj(t))N−1dt
The function H2,j(rj, r−j) is increasing in seller’s j reputation and decreasing in his
competitors’ reputations.
When reputations are equal r1 = r2 = . . . = rJ , the expected type of the second highest
bidder is the same in each auction and equals:
H2(rj, r−j) = 1 +
N − 1
JN
∫ 1
0
(M − 1 + F (t))Ndt− N
MN−1
∫ 1
0
(M − 1 + F (t))N−1dt
In the case of one seller in the market, the expected type of the second highest bidder is
constant throughout the periods and equal to H2(N) = N−1N+1 , assuming the monopolist
faces the same number of buyers N every period whose valuations are drawn from
the same distribution. In the case of only one seller or when all sellers have the same
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reputation, they profit vary linearly with their reputation.
Two Sellers
For the case of two sellers, further called i and j, our results are summarized in the fol-
lowing section. We assume that the reputations of the two sellers satisfy the following
relation r−j > rj .
• Assortative Matching: there exists a threshold type tj,−j such that bidders with
valuations higher than tj,−j-bidders of zone −j- bid their expected valuation in
the auction of the seller with the highest success probability, which we assume to
be r−j . Buyers whose types are below this threshold have a mixed optimal auction
selection strategy that places a higher weight in choosing the auction of the seller
with the lowest reputation rj . Under the assumption of a uniform distribution
of buyers’ valuations, the threshold value and strategy selection vector take the
following form:
tj,−j(r−j, rj) = N−1
√
rj
r−j
s−j = (s−j,−j, s−j,j) = (1, 0)
sj = (sj,−j, sj,j) =
(
N−1√rj
N−1√rj + N−1√r−j ,
N−1√r−j
N−1√rj + N−1√r−j
)
• As a result, the seller with the highest reputation, rj , expects to get more bids and
from buyers with higher valuations. The expected second highest valuation in
his auction, henceforth called H2,j is given by
H2,−j(r−j, rj) = 1 + (N − 1)
∫ 1
0
(1−Q−j(1) +Q−j(t))N dt−N
∫ 1
0
(1−Q−j(1) +Q−j(t))N−1dt
=
N − 1
N + 1
(
sNj,−j
(
(1 + tj,−j)N+1 − 1
)
+ 1− tN+1j,−j
)− sN−1j,−j ((1 + tj,−j)N − 1)+ tNj,−j;
• The seller with the relatively lower reputation, ri, expects to get a lower number
of bids than seller j and also from buyers with valuation from the low part of the
distribution. The expected second highest type in i’s auction is:
H2,j = 1 + (N − 1)
∫ 1
0
(1−Qj(1) +Qj(t))N dt−N
∫ 1
0
(1−Qj(1) +Qj(t))N−1dt)
= tj,−j +
N − 1
N + 1
(1− sj,−j)N
(
(1 + tj,−j)
N+1 − 1
)
− (1− sj,−j)N−1((1 + tj,−j)N − 1)
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A.3 Informative signals and the dynamics of beliefs
The way in which buyers (and other sellers) update their beliefs about the seller’s
type (trustworthiness) depends on the "informativeness" of the signal they receive. In
our case, the signal is simply the realization of a transaction. Observing a success
(S) or a failure (F) provides the buyer with information about the type of the seller
(although both are unobservable, buyers and sellers understand the way in which other
sellers behave in equilibrium and therefore they acknowledge the effort decisions by
the different seller types. If the probability of an outcome, conditional on effort, is
relatively “flat” in types, meaning that in equilibrium it does not change much with
the type of a seller, then we say that the outcome is not an informative signal.
Along the previous lines, therefore, if we observe within the model that the up-
dating of beliefs after a failure is much more gradual than after a success, this might
be due to the characteristics of the conditional density of outcomes (conditional on ef-
fort): for certain parameter values, what might be happening is that the probability
of a failure is relatively high (note that such probability is an equilibrium object which
depends on the effort level). This implies that observing a success provides much more
information about the type of the seller than observing a failure.
Lets see this with an example. In our model, we have that the probability of a
success, conditional on effort and type is
p (r = s|e∗, θ) = e · θ
Lets consider as an example the benchmark case, in which θ ∈ {0.1, 0.9}. When we
solve the model, for a particular cost function we obtain an optimal effort level e∗ ∈
[0.1, 0.15]. This implies that the probability of a success, conditional on type is psθ=g ∈
[0.09, 0.135] for the good type, and psθ=b ∈ [0.01, 0.015] for the bad type.1 The “likelihood
ratio” for a good type is given by
LRθ=g ≡ p (r = s|θ = g)
p (r = s|θ = b) = 9
On the other hand, the conditional probabilities of a failure are pfθ=g ∈ [0.865, 0.91] and
pfθ=b ∈ [0.985, 0.99] for good and bad types respectively. In this case, the likelihood ratio
for a bad type is given by
LRθ=b ≡ p (r = f |θ = b)
p (r = f |θ = g) ∈ [1.088, 1.138]
The above implies that a success is much more informative about a good type than a
failure about a bad type, and therefore gives rise to an asymmetry in the updating of
beliefs.
1 This is not entirely correct, since the optimal effort functions are different for good and bad types. However,
with lower effort for bad types, the argument beow would be even more extreme.
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A.4 Proofs
A.4.1 Proof of Lema 3
• Separating Equilibria
In a separating equilibrium with commitment, a seller of type θ will announce eθ1
in the first period and eθ2 in the second period such that e
g
1 6= eb1 and eg2 6= eb2. In
a separating equilibrium, upon the announcement of the policy any type would
like to commit to, the type of the seller is immediately inferred and the reputation
of the seller becomes degenerate.
The problem for each type of seller would then be the following:
max
(eθ1,e
θ
2)∈[0,1]2
Πθ = θeθ1H2 − c
(
eθ1
)
+ δ
(
θeθ2H2 − c
(
eθ2
) )
(A.2)
The FOCs are given by
c′
(
eθ∗1
)
= θH2
c′
(
eθ∗2
)
= θH2
implying eθ∗1 = eθ∗2 . However, unless the cost function is such that the profits
of the two types are equal, Πg (eg∗) = Πb
(
eb∗
)
, one of the two types will have
incentives to deviate and announce an effort level equal to the one from the other
type. Thus, the separating equilibrium would break down.
• Pooling equilibria
Pooling Equilibrium in the stage game
We start our analysis by investigating the existence of a pooling equilibrium in
the stage game. This correspond to analyzing the second period of our 2-period
game.
Definition 8 A pooling equilibrium of the stage game is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
in which each type of agent chooses the same announcement in equilibrium: eg2 = eb2 = e∗2
such that Prob(θ = g|e∗2) = µ and Prob(θ = b|e∗2) = 1− µ and the expected amount bid
by a principal with valuation vi is b(vi) = vi(µg + (1− µ)b)e∗2
The expected equilibrium stage profits of a monopolist in a pooling equilibrium
are given by the following expression:
pi(e∗2) = (µg + (1− µ)b)e∗2H(N)− c(e∗2) (A.3)
where H(N) = N−1
N+1
is the expected second highest bid in the auction of the mo-
nopolist. To characterize the set of pooling equilibria, we need to specify first
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how beliefs are formed out of equilibrium. Suppose now that, whenever a seller
deviates from e∗2, buyers will attach probability 1 of him being a bad type, i.e.
µ = 0. Whenever a seller deviates from e∗2 and chooses to announce e˜2 instead, his
expected deviation profits are described by:
pi(e˜2) = be˜2H(N)− c(e˜2) (A.4)
Further we compute a monopolist’s maximum attainable profits under deviation.
The effort level that maximizes the deviation profits of the monopolist can be
computed from the FOC:
c′(e˜∗2) = bH(N) (A.5)
and equals:
e˜∗2 = c
′−1(bH(N)) (A.6)
The maximum attainable profit under deviation is given by pi(e˜∗2). Further, we
assume that when deviating, the seller will choose e˜∗2.
We investigate now what efforts can be sustained in a pooling equilibrium. In-
centive compatibility requires that pi(e∗2) ≥ pi(e˜∗2). The set of pooling equilibria,
as illustrated in figure A.1, is composed of all the effort levels comprised in the
interval [e, e∗d2 ], where e∗d2 is the effort level that makes the incentive constraint
hold with equality pi(e∗d2 ) = pi(e˜∗2) . In figure A.1, e∗d2 is the value on the x-Axis cor-
responding to the crossing of Equilibrium Profits line with the Maximum Deviation
Profits. Hence, the set of pooling equilibrium is given by:
Sp = {(e∗g2 , e∗b2 )|e∗g2 =e∗b2 = e∗2,with e∗2 ∈ [e, e∗d2 ],
where e∗d2 is the solution to pi(e
∗d
2 ) = pi(e˜
∗
2), e˜
∗
2 = c
′−1(bH(N))}
Solving for e∗d2 depends on the functional form of the cost function. For our choice
of cost function, this amounts to solving a third degree equation.
Pooling Equilibrium in the repeated game
We now go back to the first period and analyze the possibility of having a pooling
equilibrium, keeping in mind the effect of announced efforts on the updating of
beliefs and on the induced probability distribution over future outcomes.
The question we address at this point is, whether, given the set of pooling equi-
librium of the second period, can pooling be sustained in the first period as well?
The analysis follows a similar pattern as the one above.
Suppose there exist a pooling equilibrium, in which both seller types announce
eg1 = e
b
1 = e
∗
1 at the beginning of the first period, given . As in the last stage,
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FIGURE A.1: One Period Pooling Equilibrium
the off-equilibrium-path beliefs assign a zero probability to the seller being of
good type,when deviating from e∗1. Remark that, a deviation in the first period
will attribute a "bad seller" label to the deviating seller both in the first and in the
second period.
For simplicity, assume that the equilibrium effort chosen in the second period
is the same, no matter the outcome of the first period. The equilibrium inter-
temporal profit of a seller of type θ, in which the efforts are pooled in both periods
can be written as:
Π(e∗1, e
∗
2, θ) =pi
∗
1 + δ(θe
∗
1pi
∗S
2 + (1− θe∗1)pi∗F2 ) where
pi∗1 = (µg + (1− µ)b)e∗1H(N)
pi∗S2 = (µ
Sg + (1− µS)b)e∗2H(N)
pi∗F2 = (µ
Fg + (1− µF )b)e∗2H(N)
On the equilibrium path, beliefs update according to Bayes rule.
µS =
µg
µg + (1− µ)b
µF =
µ(1− ge∗1)
µ(1− ge∗1) + (1− µ)(1− be∗1)
When the seller deviates by announcing e˜∗1 in the first period, the buyers will infer
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that he is of bad type. This information will be transmitted to the next generation
of buyers. Hence, after deviating in the first period, the best choice in the second
period is to play e˜∗2 in the second period. Hence, the inter temporal profits from
deviating in the first period are:
Πd(e˜∗1, e˜∗2, θ) =pi∗d1 + δpi
∗d
2 where
pi∗dt = bH(N)e˜∗t, t = 1, 2
The maximum attainable profit at deviation, is obtained when employing an ef-
fort level e˜∗t = c′−1(bH(N)). This effort is optimal in both periods, as beliefs don’t
play any role in this case (for these specified out-of-eq beliefs).
Πd(e˜∗1, e˜∗2, θ) = (1 + δ)pi∗d
= (1 + δ)(bH(N)c′−1(bH(N)))
We turn back now to characterize the set of pooling equilibrium of the first period.
First, observe that inter temporal profits for the bad type are always lower than
those of the good type, i.e. min(Π(e∗1, e∗2, g),Π(e∗1, e∗2, b)) = Π(e∗1, e∗2, b).
To determine the set of pooling equilibria, we must make sure the announced
choice is incentive compatible for both types. Given the above relation between
types’ profits, the only constraint that needs to hold is:
Π(e∗1, e
∗
2, b) ≥ Πd(e˜∗1, e˜∗2, θ)
In the first panel of figure A.2, we observe how the intertemporal profits of the
bad type (blue area) relate to a deviating seller’s profits (green area). For values
of e∗1 and e∗2 for which the blue surface is above the green surface, we have that
deviation from the pooling equilibrium never pays. The lower figure provides
a better picture of the possible pairs of effort levels that can be sustained in a
pooling equilibrium. A formal description of this set is given by:
SpI = {((e∗g1 , e∗b1 ), (e∗g2 , e∗b2 ))|e∗g2 = e∗b2 = e∗2 ∧ e∗g1 = e∗b1 = e∗1such that
(e∗1, e
∗
2) ∈ [e, e∗d2 ]× [e, e∗d1 ]where e∗d2 ande∗d2
are jointly determined from the relation Π(e∗d1 , e
∗d
2 ) = pi(e˜
∗
1, e˜
∗
2), }
The points (e∗d1 , e∗d2 ) describe precisely the border between the blue and the green
surface in the right panel of figure A.2.
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FIGURE A.2: Pooling Eq in the intertemporal game
A.4.2 Proposition 1
An equilibrium of the two-periods game where a monopolist of unobservable type
chooses higher than minimum effort exists and is unique.
A.4.3 Proof of Proposition 1
We start by proving that a pooling equilibrium cannot exist.
First, we notice that both types exerting minimal effort level cannot be a solution since
the marginal cost of effort is lower than the marginal benefit at this level. Furthermore,
given the monotonicity and strict convexity of the cost function and given the linear
delivery technology, it follows that a given effort level for both types, the good type
has a higher marginal benefit compared to the bad type. In equilibrium the good type
will employ more effort than the bad type.
The solution to the monopolist’s problem must satisfy following FOCs:
c′(e
∗g
1 ) = gf(e
∗g
1 , e
∗b
1 )
c′(e∗b1 ) = bf(e
∗g
1 , e
∗b
1 )
(A.7)
where f(e∗g, e∗b) = δHm2 e
(
µS(e∗g1 , e
∗b
1 )− µF (e∗g1 , e∗b1 )
)
and Hm2 =
N−1
N+1
is the expected
second highest valuation in the monopolist’s auction. e∗g1 , e∗b1 are the equilibrium effort
levels of the good type resp. the bad type monopolist in period 1.
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First, we prove that feg(eg, eb) > 0 and feb(eg, eb) < 0.
Recall that µS = µge
g
µgeg+(1−µ)beb and µ
F = µ(1−ge
g)
µ(1−geg)+(1−µ)(1−beb) .
It easily follows that ∂µ
S
∂eg
= µ(1−µ)gbe
b
(µgeg+(1−µ)beb)2 > 0 and
∂µF
∂eg
= −µ(1−µ)gbe
b
(µ(1−geg)+(1−µ)(1−beb))2 < 0.
Hence:
feg(e
g, eb) =
∂µS
∂eg︸︷︷︸
>0
− ∂µ
F
∂eg︸︷︷︸
<0
> 0 (A.8)
Similar analysis applies for feb(eg, eb):
∂µS
∂eb
= −µ(1−µ)gbe
g
(µgeg+(1−µ)beb)2 < 0 and
∂µF
∂eb
= µ(1−µ)gbe
g
µ(1−geg)+(1−µ)(1−beb))2 > 0.
Hence:
feb(e
g, eb) =
∂µS
∂eb︸︷︷︸
<0
− ∂µ
F
∂eb︸︷︷︸
>0
< 0 (A.9)
We are looking for an interior solution. Since c′(e) = 0 and f(eg, e) > 0 and resp.
f(e, eb) > 0, it follows that c′(e)− gf(e, eb) < 0 and c′(e)− bf(eg, e) < 0 for eg < e∗gand
eb < e∗b respectively. In equilibrium A.7 holds, namely c′(e∗b) − bf(e∗g, e∗b) = 0 and
c′(e∗g)− gf(e∗g, e∗b) = 0.
It follows that on the [e, e∗b] × [e, e∗g]: c′(eb) − bf(eg, eb) is increasing in eb and c′(eg) −
gf(eg, eb) is increasing in eg.
∂
(
c′(eg)− gf(eg, eb))
∂eg
|e∗g > 0
∂
(
c′(eb)− bf(eg, eb))
∂eb
|e∗b > 0 (A.10)
Hence:
c′′(e∗g) > gfeg(e∗g, eb)
c′′(e∗b) > bfeb(e
g, e∗b) (A.11)
∀ eg ∈ [e, e∗g], eb ∈ [e, e∗b].
We take implicit derivatives of the FOCs in A.7
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c′′(e∗g)∂e
∗g
∂eb
= gfe∗g(e
∗g, eb)∂e
∗g
∂eb
∣∣
(e∗g ,e∗b) + gfeb(e
∗g, e∗b)
c′′(e∗b)∂e
∗b
∂eg
= bfe∗g(e
g, e∗b) + bfeb(e∗g, e∗b)
∂e∗b
∂eg
∣∣
(e∗g ,e∗b)
⇒ (A.12)
⇒

(
c′′(e∗g)− gfeg(e∗g, e∗b)
) ∂e∗g(eb)
∂eb
∣∣
(e∗g ,e∗b) = gfeb(e
∗g, e∗b) > 0(
c′′(e∗b)− bfeb(e∗g, e∗b)
) ∂e∗b(eg)
∂eg
∣∣
(e∗g ,e∗b) = bfeg(e
∗g, e∗b) < 0
(A.13)
From A.8, A.9 and A.11 it follows that ∂e
∗g
∂eb
∣∣
(e∗g ,e∗b) < 0 and
∂e∗b
∂eg
∣∣
(e∗g ,e∗b) > 0. Hence
best responses are monotonically decreasing respectively increasing. Hence, there ex-
ists just one intersection of the best responses, which implies that the equilibrium is
unique. 
A.4.4 Proposition 2
For any type θ, θ ∈ {b, g}, in the equilibrium with hidden effort and unobserved type,
the equilibrium effort level:
1. increases with the discount factor δ
2. The effort level of the good type is increasing in g and decreasing in b. The oppo-
site is true for the effort level of the bad type.
3. is a concave in initial beliefs µ0
4. For any g, b, δ ∈ [0, 1] it holds that eθobsNC1 < e∗θ1 ≤ eθobsC1 < eθeff1 . Moreover,
A.4.5 Proof of Proposition 2
The first order conditions are given by:
c′(e∗θ1 ) = δθH
m
2 (µ
S
1 − µF1 )(g − b)e
1. For any type, the effort level is increasing in the discount factor δ
We take the derivative of the F.O.C. with respect to δ keeping in mind that the
equilibrium effort e∗θ1 depends on δ as well:
c
′′
(e∗θ1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂e∗θ1
∂δ
= θHm2 (µ
S
1 − µF1 )(g − b)e︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
⇔ ∂e
∗θ
1
∂δ
> 0
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2. For any type, the effort level of the good type is increasing in g and decreasing in b. The
opposite is true for the effort level of the bad type.
We look first at the first derivatives of µS1 and µF1 w.r.t g and b.
∂µS1
∂g
=
µbebeg(1− µ)
beb(1− µ) + eggµ)2 > 0
∂µS1
∂b
= − µge
beg(1− µ)
beb(1− µ) + eggµ)2 < 0
∂µF1
∂g
= − µ(1− be
b)ebeg(1− µ)
(1− (beb(1− µ) + eggµ))2 < 0
∂µF1
∂b
=
µ(1− geg)eb(1− µ)
(1− (beb(1− µ) + eggµ))2 > 0
It easily follows that:
c
′′
(e∗θ1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂e∗θ1
∂g
= δH12 (µ
S
1 − µF1 )e∗θobs + δgH12e∗θobs
∂µS1
∂g︸︷︷︸−
∂µS1
∂b︸︷︷︸
<0
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
⇔∂e
∗θ
1
∂g
> 0
and
c′′(e∗θ1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂e∗θ1
∂b
= δH12 (µ
S
1 − µF1 )e∗θobs + δgH12e∗θobs
∂µF1
∂b︸︷︷︸−∂µ
F
1
∂b︸︷︷︸
>0
<0︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
⇔∂e
∗θ
1
∂b
< 0
3. For any type, the effort level is first increasing then decreasing in µ0 (effort level is a con-
cave function of µ0)
(a) We notice first that when µ0 = 0 or µ0 = 1 ⇒ µS1 = µF1 = 0 respectively
µS1 = µ
F
1 = 1. This implies in both cases that the RHS of the F.O.Cs is 0. ⇒
c′(e∗θ1 ) = 0. Hence, the optimal effort level when initial beliefs are either 0 or
1 is the maximal costless effort, i.e. e∗θ1 = e∗θobs
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(b) For µ0 > 0, derive the F.O.Cs implicitly w.r.t. µ0.
c′′(e∗θ1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂e∗θ1
∂µ0
= δθH12
∂(µS1 − µF1 )
∂µ0
e∗θobs2
∂(µS1 − µF1 )
∂µ0
=
ge∗gbe∗b
(µ0ge∗g + (1− µ0)be∗b)2 −
(1− ge∗g)(1− be∗b)
(1− (µ0ge∗g + (1− µ0)be∗b))2
(A.14)
∂(µS1 − µF1 )
∂µ0
|µ0=0 =
ge∗g
be∗b︸︷︷︸
>1
− (1− ge
∗g)
(1− be∗b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
> 0 and
∂(µS1 − µF1 )
∂µ0
|µ0=1 =
be∗b
ge∗g︸︷︷︸
<1
− (1− be
∗b)
(1− ge∗g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
and (A.15)
In the first expression A.15 we state the derivative of the RHS of the F.O.Cs
w.r.t. µ0. The denominator of the first fraction is strictly increasing in µ0,
which implies that the first fraction is decreasing in µ0. The opposite is true
for the second fraction. It follows immediately that ∂(µ
S
1−µF1 )
∂µ0
A.15 is strictly
decreasing in µ0. It must be then the case that up to a threshold value of µ0,
the RHS of the F.O.Cs is positive, which implies that ∂e
∗θ
1
∂µ0
> 0. For values of
µ0 which are higher than the threshold, the RHS of the F.O.Cs turns negative,
which implies ∂e
∗θ
1
∂µ0
< 0. Hence the optimal effort level is concave in µ0.
A.4.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Numerical.
Lemma 4
Single-Crossing condition: Let ej,t : Θj ×Ht −→ [0, 1] be a decision rule for seller j = 1, 2,
as a function of her type θj ∈ Θj and a history ht ∈ Ht. Then, given the multiplicative
technology P (yj = S|θ, e) = θe, it is the case in equilibrium that ej (g;ht) ≡ egj (ht) ≥
ebj (h
t) , ∀ht ∈ Ht, ∀j.
A.4.7 Proof of Lema 4
Define eg ∈ [0, 1] and eb ∈ [0, 1] as the equilibrium effort decisions for a seller of type
g and type b respectively. Relying on a revealed preference argument, it must then be
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the case that, for seller j of type θ
Πj,0
(
eθj,1; θ
) ≥ Πj,0 (eθ′j,1,; θ)
This implies, for type g and b,
c (eg)− c (eb) ≤ δg (eg − eb) [r−j,1 (piSSj,2 − piFSj,2 )+ (1− r−j,1) (piSFj,2 − piFFj,2 )] (A.16)
and
c (eg)− c (eb) ≥ δb (eg − eb) [r−j,1 (piSSj,2 − piFSj,2 )+ (1− r−j,1) (piSFj,2 − piFFj,2 )] (A.17)
Here,
pi
y1,1,y2,1
j,2 = e
(
gµ
yj,1
j,1 + b
(
1− µyj,1j,1
))
H2,j (r1,2, r2,2)− c (e)
is the profit for seller j in period 2 after the outcomes (yj,1, y−j,1) have been realized in
period 1, and
r−j,1 = ge
g
−j,1µ−j,0 + be
b
−j,1 (1− µ−j,0)
is the reputation of seller −j in period 1, with initial type-beliefs given by (µj,0, µ−j,0).
Summing eq.(A.16) and eq.(A.17) we have
δ
(
eg − eb) (g − b) ≥ 0
which, given the assumption 0 < b < g ≤ 1, implies that eg ≥ eb > e. 
A.4.8 Proof of Proposition 4
Existence
The equilibrium is described by the following system of equations:

c′
(
e∗gj,1
)
= gδ
[
r−j,1
(
piSSj,2 − piFSj,2
)
+ (1− r−j,1)
(
piSFj,2 − piFFj,2
)]
c′
(
e∗bj,1
)
= bδ
[
r−j,1
(
piSSj,2 − piFSj,2
)
+ (1− r−j,1)
(
piSFj,2 − piFFj,2
)]
c′
(
e∗g−j,1
)
= gδ
[
rj,1
(
piSS−j,2 − piFS−j,2
)
+ (1− rj,1)
(
piSF−j,2 − piFF−j,2
)]
c′
(
e∗b−j,1
)
= bδ
[
rj,1
(
piSS−j,2 − piFS−j,2
)
+ (1− rj,1)
(
piSF−j,2 − piFF−j,2
)] (A.18)
where rj,1 is the perceived probability of success of seller j at time 1, pi
yj ,y−j
j,2 is
the time 2 profit of seller j given that the two players have registered the outcomes
yj, y−j ∈ {S, F}
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To prove the existence of a MPE of the two-stage game with two sellers we use
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
We start first by characterizing the marginal cost function c′(·) and its inverse c′−1(·).
c′ : [e, 1) → [0,∞) is a monotonically increasing and strictly convex function. Hence
c′(·) is a bijection. This guarantees the existence of well defined inverse function c′−1 :
[0,∞)→ [e, 1).
The above system of FOC’s hence translates into:

e∗gj,1 = c
′−1 (gδ [r−j,1 (piSSj,2 − piFSj,2 )+ (1− r−j,1) (piSFj,2 − piFFj,2 )])
e∗bj,1 = c
′−1 (bδ [r−j,1 (piSSj,2 − piFSj,2 )+ (1− r−j,1) (piSFj,2 − piFFj,2 )])
e∗g−j,1 = c
′−1 (gδ [rj,1 (piSS−j,2 − piFS−j,2)+ (1− rj,1) (piSF−j,2 − piFF−j,2)])
e∗b−j,1 = c
′−1 (bδ [rj,1 (piSS−j,2 − piFS−j,2)+ (1− rj,1) (piSF−j,2 − piFF−j,2)])
(A.19)
Denote now e ≡ (egj , ebj, eg−j, eb−j) the 4-dimensional vector of efforts (actions) for
seller-types, with e ∈ E4 = [e, e¯]4. Note that E is a convex and compact subset of the
one-dimensional Euclidean space.
For e > 0, the type-belief µ, the success probability function r (µ0, e) ≡ P (yj = S)
and the expected valuation of the second highest type in seller’s j auction, Hj,2 (r), are
all vector-valued functions continuous in e.
Define the function (for a fixed δ, θ and µ0) Sθj : E4 −→ D with D ⊂ R and i = 1, 2
as
Sθj (e; θ, δ, µ0) = θδ
[
r−j,1
(
piSSj,2 − piFSj,2
)
+ (1− r−j,1)
(
piSFj,2 − piFFj,2
)]
where piyj ,y−jj,2 = r
yj
j Hj,2 is the profit for seller j in period 2 after the (joint) outcome for
seller j and −j y = (yj, y−j). One can readily see that Sθj is a continuous and bounded
function.
Hence, also the function composition
(
c′−1 ◦ Sθj
)
: E4 −→ E is continuous and
bounded. Denote the vector function composition as (c′−1 ◦ S) : E4 −→ E4.
So far we have proven that E is a convex and compact subset of the 4-dimensional
euclidean space on which a continuous and bounded function (c′−1 ◦ S) is defined.
Then, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem guarantees the existence of a fix point: ∃e∗ s.t.
e∗ = (c′−1 ◦ S) (e∗).
Uniqueness
To prove uniqueness of this equilibrium, we use the results developed by Mason
and Valentinyi Mason and Valentinyi, (2007). Their paper provides sufficient con-
ditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in monotone pure strategies in
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a broad class of Bayesian games. When incremental interim payoffs satisfy the uni-
form single crossing and the Lipschitz continuity (with respect to other’s strategy) condi-
tion, then a contraction mapping argument can be applied to prove the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
In our setup, the interim payoff of a seller j (when seller j knows its type θj , θj ∈
{g, b}) is given by its expected inter-temporal profit.
Πj = rj,1H2,j(rj,1, r−j,1)− c(eθjj,1) + δ[θjeθjj,1r−j,1(rSj,1H2,j(rSj,2, rS−j,2)) + θeθjj,1(1− r−j,1)(rSj,1H2,j(rSj,2, rF−j,2)))
(1− θjeθjj,1)r−j,1(rFj,1H2,j(rFj,2, rS−j,2)) + (1− θjeθjj,1)(1− r−j,1)(rFj,1H2,j(rFj,2, rF−j,2))]
(A.20)
Bearing in mind that rj,1 = µjge˜
g
j,1+(1−µj)be˜bj,1, and denoting period 1 payoff byRj,1 =
rj,1H2,j(rj,1, r−j,1) and period 2 payoffs respectively Rj,2(yj, y−j) = r
yj
j,2H2,j(r
yj
j,2, r
y−j
−j,2)
where yj, y−j ∈ {S, F} represent the outcomes of the transactions between period 1
and period 2, we can rewrite the expression in the following way:
Πj = µ−j,1
[
Rj,1 − c(eθjj,1) + δ
[
ge˜g−j,1
(
θje
θj
j,1Rj,2(S, S) + (1− θjeθjj,1)Rj,2(F, S)
)
+
+ (1− ge˜g−j)
(
θje
θj
j,1Rj,2(S, F ) + (1− θieθjj,1)Rj,2(F, F )
)]]
+
(1− µ−j,1)
[
Rj,1 − c(eθjj,1) + δ
[
be˜b−j
(
θje
θj
j,1Rj,2(S, S) + (1− θjeθjj,1)Rj,2(F, S)
)
+
+ (1− be˜b−j)
(
θje
θj
j,1Rj,t(S, F ) + (1− θjeθjj,1)Rj,2(F, F )
)]]
(A.21)
Further, we define the ex-post payoff function pi :
pij(e
θj
j,1, θj, e˜
θ−j
−j,1, g) =Rj,1 − c(eθjj,1) + δ
[
ge˜g−j
(
θje
θj
j,1Rj,t(S, S) + (1− θjeθjj,1)Rj,2(F, S)
)
+
+ (1− ge˜g−j)
(
θje
θj
j,1Rj,2(S, F ) + (1− θjeθjj,1)Rj,2(F, F )
)]
(A.22)
and hence the expression A.21 can be rewritten as:
Πj(e
θj
j,1, θ−j, e˜
θ−j
−j,1, θ−j) =
∑
θ−j∈{g,b}
pij(e
θj
j,1, θj, e˜
g
−j,1, θ−j)f(θ−j|θj) (A.23)
where f(θ−j|θj) is the conditional density of j’s types.
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Further, we define the incremental ex-post payoffs by:
∆pij(e
θj
j , e
′θj
j , θj; e˜
θ−j
−j , θ−j) ≡ pij(eθjj , θj; e˜θ−j−j , θ−j)− pij(e
′θj
j , θj; e˜
θ−j
−j , θ−j) (A.24)
Given the assumptions on the cost function, the ex-post payoff function satisfies the
following property as in Mason and Valentinyi, (2007)
P1 The payoff function pij : [0, 1]×{g, b} → R is bounded and measurable, and (upper
semi-) continuous in own action. The types have conditional densities w.r.t the
Lebesgue measure. The conditional density of θ−j given θj , f(θ−j|θj) is strictly
positive.
Given this property, we proceed to present conditions U1-U3 and D1-D2 as in Ma-
son and Valentinyi, (2007). These conditions will enable us to prove uniqueness of the
equilibrium.
U1 Uniformly Positive Sensitivity to Own Action and Type. There is a γ ∈ (0,∞) s.t.
for all eθjj,1 ≥ e
′θj
j,1 ,θj ≥ θ′j , e˜θ−j−j ,θ−j
∆pij(e
θj
j,1, e
′θj
j,1 , θj; e
θ−j
−j,1, θ−j)−∆pij(eθjj,1, e
′θj
j,1 , θ
′
j; e˜
θ−j
−j , θ−j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡∆θj∆u
(
e
θj
j,1,e
′θj
j,1 ,e˜−j,1,θj ,θ−j
) ≥ γ(e
θj
j,1 − e
′θj
j,1)dT (θj, θ
′
j).
(A.25)
We assume dT (θj, θ′j) = |θj − θ′j|
Following the notation above and expression A.22, the ex-post incremental payoff
for seller j (IPj) for e
θj
j > e
′θj
j is given by
∆pij(e
θj
j,1, e
′θj
j,1 , θj; e
θ−j
−j,1, θ−j) =
= −
(
c
(
e
θj
j,1
)
− c
(
e
′θj
j,1
))
+ δ
(
E
[
Rj,2 (yj, y−j)
∣∣∣eθjj,1, e˜θ−j−j,1,θ]− E [Rj,2 (yj, y−j) |e′θjj,1 , e˜θ−j−j,1,θ]
)
= −
(
c
(
e
θj
j,1
)
− c
(
e
′θj
j,1
))
+ δθj(e
θj
j,1 − e
′θj
j,1)
(
θ−j e˜
θ−j
−j,1
(
Rj,2 (S, S)−Rj,2 (F, S)
)
+
+
(
1− θ−j e˜θj−j,1
)(
Rj,2 (S, F )−Rj,2 (F, F )
))
It follows then that
∆θj∆u
(
e
θj
j,1, e
′θj
j,1 , e˜
θ−j
−j,1, θj, θ−j
)
=δ(θj − θ′j)(eθjj,1 − e
′θj
j,1)
(
θ−j e˜
θ−j
−j,1
(
Rj,2 (S, S)−Rj,2 (F, S)
)
+
+
(
1− θ−j e˜θj−j,1
)(
Rj,2 (S, F )−Rj,2 (F, F )
))
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Proving that condition U1 holds is equivalent to proving that ∃ γ ∈ (0,∞) s.t.
for all eθjj,1 ≥ e
′θj
j,1 ,θj ≥ θ′j , e˜θ−j−j , θ−j
δ
(
θ−j e˜
θj
−j,1
(
Rj,2 (S, S)−Rj,2 (F, S)
)
+
(
1− θ−j e˜θ−j−j,1
)(
Rj,2 (S, F )−Rj,2 (F, F )
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A
≥ γ
(A.26)
A = δ
(
θ−j e˜
θ−j
−j,1
(
rSj,2H2,j (S, S)− rFj,2H2,j (F, S)
)
+
(
1− θ−j e˜θ−j−j,1
) (
rSj,2H2,j (S, F )− rFj,2H2,j (F, F )
))
(A.27)
The measure for the success probability r = µge˜g + (1 − µ)be˜b is bounded above
by r¯ = g and bounded below by r = be. Since the H2,j(rj,1, r−j,1) is monotonically
increasing in the first variable and decreasing in the second, we can define the
lower bound for the H2,j = H2,j(r, r¯). The upper bound would be then H¯2,j =
H2,j(r¯, r). It is straightforward then that also A is bounded.
In what follows, we will need to determine a lower bound for A given the param-
eters N, g, b, δ. We call this lower bound γ. In the following Theorem 1 we will
numerically determine values for γ together with other boundaries, for given pa-
rameter values N, g, b, δ.
U2 Lipschitz Continuity in Own Action There is an ω ∈ (0,∞) s.t. for all eθjj,1 ≥
e
′θj
j,1 ,θj ≥ θ′j , e˜θ−j−j,1, θ−j,1
|∆pij(eθjj,1, e
′θj
j,1 , e˜
θ−j
−j,1, θj, θ−j)| ≤ ω(eθjj,1 − e
′θj
j,1).
The cost function and marginal cost function are monotonically increasing and
bounded on the domain [0, 1], max{c(1), c′(1)} < C. Hence given any two actions
e
θj
j,1, e
′θj
j,1 ∈ [0, 1], eθjj,1 > e
′θj
j,1 there exists an
˜
e
θj
j,1 ∈ {e
′θj
j,1 , e
θj
j,1} such that c′( ˜eθjj,1)(eθjj,1 −
e
′θj
j,1) = c
(
e
θj
j,1
)
− c
(
e
′θj
j,1
)
. On the other hand, we know that A ≤ H2,j(S, F ) ≤
H2,j(r¯, r) ≡ H¯2,j . It hence follows that:
|∆pij(eθjj,1, e
′θj
j,1 , e˜
θ−j
−j , θj, θ−j)| =| − (c
(
e
θj
j,1
)
− c
(
e
′θj
j,1
)
) + δθj(e
θj
j,1 − e
′θj
j,1)A|
≤ | − (c
(
e
θj
j,1
)
− c
(
e
′θj
j,1
)
)|+ |δθj(eθjj,1 − e
′θj
j,1)A|
≤ c′( ˜eθjj,1)(eθjj,1 − e
′θj
j,1) + δθjH¯2,j(e
θj
j,1 − e
′θj
j,1)
=
(
c′( ˜eθjj,1) + δθjH¯2,j
)
(e
θj
j,1 − e
′θj
j,1)
≤ (C + δθjH¯2,j) (eθjj,1 − e′θjj,1)
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We can now define the parameter ω = C + δθjH¯2,j s.t.
|∆pij(eθjj,1, e′θjj,1, e˜θ−j−j , θj, θ−j)| ≤ ω(eθjj,1 − e
′θj
j,1)
U3 Uniformly Bounded Sensitivity to Opponent’s Action. There is a κ ∈ (0,∞) s.t.
for all eθjj,1 ≥ e
′θj
j,1 ,θj ≥ θ′j , e˜θ−j−j,1, θ−j
|∆pij(eθjj,1, e
′θj
j,1 , θj; e˜
θ−j
−j,1, θ−j)−∆pij(eθjj,1, e
′θj
j,1 , θj; e˜
′θ−j
−j,1, θ−j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
|∆
e˜
θ−j
−j,1
∆pij(e
θj
j,1,e
′θj
j,1 ,θj ;e˜
θ−j
−j,1,θ−j)|
| ≤ κ(eθjj,1 − e
′θj
j,1)
|∆
e˜
θ−j
−j,1
∆pij(e
θj
j,1, e
′θj
j,1 , θj; e˜
θ−j
−j,1, θ−j)| =
∣∣∣∣∣δ
((
Rj,2 (S, S)−Rj,2 (F, S)
)
−
−
(
Rj,2 (S, F )−Rj,2 (F, F )
))
θjθ−j
(
e˜
θ−j
−j,1 − e
′θ−j
−j,1
)(
e
θj
j,1 − e
′θj
j,1
)∣∣∣∣∣
Similar reasoning as in U1 applies to conclude that the term
∣∣∣∣∣δ
((
Rj,2 (S, S)−Rj,2 (F, S)
)
−
(
Ri,2 (S, F )−Ri,2 (F, F )
))
θiθ−i
(
e˜
θ−j
−j − e˜
′θ−j
−j
)∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡K
(A.28)
is bounded. We denote the upper bound of this term by κ. In what follows,
we will need to determine an upper bound for K given the parameters N, g, b, δ.
In Theorem 4 we will numerically determine values for κ together with other
boundaries, for given parameter values N, g, b, δ.
D1 There is a ι ∈ (0,∞) s.t. for any θk > θ′k and k ∈ {j,−j}
√
I(θk, θ′k) ≤ ιdT (θk, θ
′
k),
where
I(θk, θ′k) ≡ V arT−k
(
f(θ−k|θk)− f(θ−k|θ′k)
f(θ−k|θk)
)
This is a condition on the Fisher’s information of a player’s type about the types
of the opponents. Note that in our case, we assume independence of types. In
other words, f
(
θ−k
∣∣∣θk = g) = f (θ−k∣∣∣θk = b) which implies that I(θk, θ′k) = 0.
Therefore, the condition √
I(θk, θ′k) ≤ ι (g − b)
holds for any ι ∈ (0,∞).
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D2 There is a ν ∈ [0,∞) s.t. f−j(θ−j|θj) ≤ ν for all j 6= −j. This is a condition on the
(ex-ante) heterogeneity of types. We are looking for some ν ∈ [0,∞) such that
f−j
(
θ−j
∣∣∣θj) ≤ ν ∀j,−j. In terms of initial beliefs, this implies for k ∈ {j,−}µk ≤ ν1− µk ≤ ν
⇒ Any ν ∈ [1,∞] satisfies this condition.
Theorem 4: If assumptions U1-U3 and D1-D2 hold, and if
γ > ιω + υκ (A.29)
then the best response (BR) correspondence is a contraction, and hence there is a unique
equilibrium of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, this equilibrium is in monotone pure
strategies.
In compliance with conditions U1-U3 and D1-D2, we now determine value of the
parameters N, g, b, and δ (to determine the values for γ and κ ) for which the relation
A.29 holds. We recall that:
ω = C + δθjH¯2,j,where C ≤ c′(1)
ι = 
ν = 1
where we have chosen  to be arbitrarily small, → 0.
We investigate now how the maximal value ofK (henceforth denoted by K¯ = maxK)in
expression A.28 and the minimal value of A in A.26 (henceforth denoted by A = minA)
vary with the parameters N, g, b and δ. Our target is to pin down restrictions for these
parameters for which K¯ < A
A.4.9 Proof of Proposition 5
Numerical.
A.5 The Value of Reputation in Infinite Horizon
Estimating the effect of reputation on revenues and sales is a key question for both mar-
ket participants (sellers) and market makers or regulators (eBay, etc). The latter need
to design a way for buyers to have information about the reliability of sellers, while re-
liable sellers will be reliable depending on how outcomes and information might affect
their revenues. Reputation mechanisms are considered to be a solution to the market
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failures arising from the different sources of inherent asymmetric information. Con-
cretely, and in the spirit of Akerlof, (1970), a well-functioning reputation / feedback
mechanism might help welfare improving trades that where previously not happen-
ing to materialize, and in the process allow "good"/ "truthful" sellers to increase their
revenues.
In this section we are interested in quantifying the bias that might arise in the re-
duced form estimation of the impact of reputation on short-run seller revenues when
reputation building and strategic behavior are not incorporated into the identification
strategy. Although recent empirical studies using both longitudinal (panel) data on
sellers and "field" experiments, such as Resnick et al., (2006) and Cabral and Hortaçsu,
(2010), have gone a long way in trying to identify such effect, we argue that their omis-
sion of the above two behaviors might render their estimates misleading.
First, strategic behaviors can generate reputations of competing sellers that are cor-
related across time and a determinant of revenues. Under such scenario, not accounting
for competitors’ information will bias the estimation of the reputation-elasticity of rev-
enues. The idea is simple: in our setting, when buyers select an auction and bid, it
is in their best interest to judge the trustworthiness of all sellers through the available
public information. The publicly observed reputation of competitors then helps seller
j predict the behavior of future potential buyers and other seller, behaviors which will
determine her revenues. Seller j’s effort strategies, therefore, will take into account
how current beliefs will affect the updating process of buyers2, and how this will affect
the pool of future buyers that bid in her auction.3
Second, Resnick et al., (2006) does not control for the kind of reputation building
behavior that has been characterized in seminar works such as Holmstrom, (1999).
We will frame the analysis within an infinite horizon version of the game described
in the previous sections; this will allow us to incorporate the main mechanisms into
an environment where "professional" sellers care about the medium-long term when
making decisions. A potential drawback with the benchmark environment is is that
it is stripped from many relevant characteristics of on-line markets and industries in
general, such as a large number of sellers or the possibility to exit and re-enter the
market. Nonetheless, it still allows us to do a first quantification of the endogeneity
problem.
In a second step, we will extend the benchmark model by incorporating more seller
into the market, and maintaining the assumption that both sellers and buyers behave
strategically. In order to keep the problem computationally tractable, Our approach
will follow the recent developments in computable models of industry dynamics, re-
cently reviewed by Doraszelski and Pakes, (2007). In these lines, in the multiple seller
2 Since seller −j acts in the same way, seller’s j best response to her competitors actions and buyers behavior is
a best response to current reputation levels. This is simply the main insight from a Markov equilibrium.
3Perhaps the strongest assumption here is both the rational expectation of sellers and buyers and their optimal
use of all the available information. One could argue that such processing capacity is not realistic, or that the forma-
tion of expectations by sellers follows a more reduced form version of the fully rational one. Such considerations,
though certainly valid and perhaps even accurate, are outside the scope of this paper.
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setup we assume that each seller only
A.5.1 Strategic Competition: Recursive Formulation
We first present the infinite horizon version of the problem presented in section 1.3,
casted in terms of reputation (beliefs about seller types) as well as the type itself as
state variables.
Belief µτ ≡ {µj,τ , µ−j,τ} are a sufficient statistic about the sequence of outcomes up to
τ − 1. Given that the outcomes of sellers are (conditionally) independent, the recursive
formulation of problem for seller j is
V compj (µj, µ−j; θ) = max
eθj
{
R (µj, µ−j, e∗)− c
(
eθj
)
+ (A.30)
+δ
∑
yj
∑
y−j
p
(
yj, y−j|eθj , r−j
)
V compj
(
µ′j, µ
′
−j; θ
)}
s.t. eθj ∈ [0, 1]
where e∗ ≡
{
eg∗j , e
b∗
j , e
g∗
−j, e
b∗
−j
}
and V compj (·) is the continuation value for seller j after
the outcomes of both sellers, {yj, y−j}, which are publicly observable. Recall that, due
to Bayesian learning, µ′j and µ′−j are functions of e∗, µ and yj, y−j . In addition, r−j is a
function of both µ−j and e∗−j . The notation in (A.30) implies that e
∗ are effort decisions
as perceived by other sellers and buyers, which will be confirmed in an equilibrium:
since all players have rational expectations, each one can solve the problem of the other
and therefore "guess" an effort choice.
No Reputation and Perfect Reputation as Absorbing States
It is important to note that, due to the assumption about sellers / buyers being Bayesian
learners, the Markov process has two absorbing states: µ = 0 and µ = 1. That is,
µj,t ≡ P (θj = g|µj,t−1 = 0, yj,t−1) = 0 ∀ t, yj,t−1, µ−j,t (A.31)
and
µj,t ≡ P (θj = g|µj,t−1 = 1, yj,t−1) = 1 ∀ t, yj,t−1, µ−j,t (A.32)
Note that expressions (A.31) and (A.32) hold for any effort level of both sellers.
Given the properties of the cost function, the optimal effort under such states is the
minimum effort e. It is then straightforward, given that c (e) = 0, to compute the value
for a seller at these states:
Proposition 6 The continuation values at each absorbing state satisfy
V compj (1, 0; ·) > V compj (1, 1; ·) > V compj (0, 0; ·) > V compj (0, 1; ·) (A.33)
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Proof. Each term in the relation (A.33) represents the value of selling under competi-
tion when the type-beliefs of both sellers have converged to either 0 or 1. Such beliefs
need not coincide with the true type of sellers; indeed, the value at an absorbing state
/ belief for seller j is independent of her true type. Then, we have
V compj (0, 0; θj) =
E
(
b
(2)
j
∣∣∣µj = 0, µ−j = 0)
1− δ =
rj(0, 0)E
(
v
(2)
j
∣∣∣µj = 0, µ−j = 0)
1− δ (A.34)
V compj (0, 1; θj) =
E
(
b
(2)
j
∣∣∣µj = 0, µ−j = 1)
1− δ =
rj(0, 1)E
(
v
(2)
j
∣∣∣µj = 0, µ−j = 1)
1− δ (A.35)
V compj (1, 0; θj) =
E
(
b
(2)
j
∣∣∣µj = 1, µ−j = 0)
1− δ =
rj(1, 0)E
(
v
(2)
j
∣∣∣µj = 1, µ−j = 0)
1− δ (A.36)
V compj (1, 1; θj) =
E
(
b
(2)
j
∣∣∣µj = 1, µ−j = 1)
1− δ =
rj(1, 1)E
(
v
(2)
j
∣∣∣µj = 1, µ−j = 1)
1− δ (A.37)
where rj(0, 0) = rj(0, 1) = e ∗ b < rj(1, 0) = rj(1, 1) = e ∗ g are the perceived proba-
bilities of successfull delivery. Recall that the properties of the function H2j(µj, µ−j) ≡
E
(
v
(2)
j
∣∣∣µj, µ−j) (the expected 2nd highest valuation in seller j’s auction when type be-
liefs are (µj, µ−j) are such that H2j (µj, µ−j) is increasing in µj , decreasing in µ−j and
H2j(·, ·) = H2−j(·, ·). The result then follows inmediately. 
Relation (A.33) says that, as one would expect, the highest value for seller j of sell-
ing under competition is realized when the belief other market participants have about
her are maximal (i.e. 1) and the beliefs about her competitor are minimal. In such case,
she can enjoy the returns to a perfect reputation even by putting minimum effort, with-
out fearing about her competitor. On the other side of the spectrum, her continuation
value is minimal when her belief is minimal and her competitor enjoys perfect rep-
utation. For the middle cases, the relation V compj (1, 1; ·) > V compj (0, 0; ·) arises since,
although the expected second highest valuation is the same when (µj, µ−j) = (0, 0)
and (µj, µ−j) = (1, 1), a higher perceived probability of successful delivery rj(·, ·) in-
centivizes each buyer to bid higher.
Note that whether relation (A.33) is enough in order for a bad seller to try to dis-
guise himself as a good seller in any state, will depend on the marginal value of effort
at different type beliefs.
A.5. The Value of Reputation in Infinite Horizon 119
Optimal Effort and the Euler Equation
As in the two period case, the effort best response of sellers j = 1, 2 and types θ ∈ g, b
are implicitly characterized by the system of FOCs:
c′
(
eθj
)
= δθ
(
r−j
(
V compj
(
µ′j (S) , µ
′
−j (S) ; θ
)− V compj (µ′j (F ) , µ′−j (S) ; θ) )+
+ (1− r−j)
(
V compj
(
µ′j (S) , µ
′
−j (F ) ; θ
)− V compj (µ′j (F ) , µ′−j (F ) ; θ) )
)
(A.38)
j = 1, 2 ; θ = g, b
where µ′j (y) is the updated reputation after an outcome y in the current transaction.
From the discussion in the previous subsection, it is clear that whenever µj = 0 or
µj = 1, the right hand side of (A.39) is 0, for any µ−j . Therefore, in those cases eθj = e. In
the rest of the state space, the intuition for (A.39) is relatively straightforward. Given
that effort decisions affect directly the probability of a successful outcome, the marginal
benefit of effort is given by the difference in continuation value between a success and
a failure, for all the possible outcomes of the competitor, weighted by the marginal
change in the probability of a success. A seller will be willing to increase her effort
as long as the (discounted) incremental difference in the continuation value, weighted
by the marginal effect of effort on the outcome probabilities θ, is big enough. Seller
j chooses effort strategically taking into account two pieces of information: (i) what
buyers perceive about other types of sellers, which will be part of the updating process
leading to µ′j , and (ii) how the “intensity” of competition (given by the beliefs about her
competitor’s type) will affect her expected revenues, which affects both r−j and µ−j’ in
the RHS of (A.39). In this setting, the expression for the Euler equation for a seller j of
type θ is non-standard. The reason is the following: an effort decision after auction t ,
et, will have a probabilistic effect on the state tomorrow, µ′. Importantly, however, this
change in the distribution of µ′ will affect future states through two channels: future
decisions of effort based on µ′ which will shape the distribution of µ′′, µ′′′, etc, and
through the updating process, which will mean that the effects of et will persist.
In order to save on notation below, lets consider, without loss of generality, the case
in which the outcome y can take a continuum of values. When then can write the FOC
(A.39) for seller j and type θj as
−c′ (eθj)+ δ ∫
y−j
∫
yj
V comp
(
µ′j, µ
′
−j; θ
)∂f (yj|ej, θ)
∂ej
∣∣∣
ej=eθj
f
(
y−j|e∗−j
)
dyjdy−j = 0 (A.39)
where eθ is the optimal effort strategy for a seller of type θ, and f (y|e, θ) is the proba-
bility density for the outcome y conditional on e and θ.
If we repeatedly replace V comp (·) in the expression above, we get
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c′
(
eθ
)
= δ
∫
y
∂f (yj|ej, θ)
∂ej
∣∣∣
ej=eθj
pij
(
µ′, e
′∗; e′
)
dy + (A.40)
+δ2
∫
y
∂f (yj|ej, θ)
∂ej
∣∣∣
ej=eθj
∫
y′
pij
(
µ′′, e
′′∗; e′′
)
f (y′|e′′, θ) dy′dy +
+...
where y ≡ {yj, y−j}, µ ≡ {µj, µ−j}, e ≡ {ej , e−j} and pi (µ, e∗; e) = R (µ, e∗)− c (e)
is the stage-payoff. In a Markov Perfect equilibrium, of course, the effort decisions e
will be a function of current beliefs µ.
Although in this case the derivation of the Euler eq. does not require to work ex-
plicitely with the derivative of V comp with respect to the state µ, each seller does care
about the slope of the value function when deciding an effort level4. Therefore, it is
still useful to have a look at the slope of V comp (µj.µ−j). Assuming differentiability
of V comp (µ; ·), the envelope condition, describing how the maximum value for a seller
changes when the state µ varies, is given by
∂V c (µ; θ)
∂µj
=
∂R
(
µ, e (µ)
)
∂µj
+
+
∂eθj (µ)
∂µj
(
− c′ (eθj (µ))+ δ ∫
y−j
∫
yj
V c (µ′; θ)
∂f (yj|ej, θ)
∂ej
∣∣∣
ej=eθj
f
(
y−j|e∗−j
)
dyjdy−j
)
+δ
∫
y−j
∫
yj
∂V comp (µ′; θ)
∂µ′j
∂µ′j
∂µj
f
(
yj|eθj , θj
)
f
(
y−j|e∗−j
)
dyjdy−j
Note that the term in parenthesis in the second row is equal to 0 at an optimum.
Therefore, we have
∂V comp (µ; θ)
∂µj
=
∂R
(
µ, e (µ)
)
∂µj
+ δE
(
∂V comp (µ′; θ)
∂µ′j
∂µ′j
∂µj
∣∣∣∣∣eθj , θj, e∗−j
)
(A.41)
The second term on the right-hand side of expression (A.41) is "non-standard", and
represents the second channel through which current effort decisions generate future
benefits. One interpretation of this can be the following: in addition to the direct im-
pact on current revenues, a marginal change in the type belief today µ affects the future
learning dynamics. This impact is very particular of a Bayesian learning environment.
Therefore, such change will affect all the future profits for the seller, since all the future
4Technically, the reason is that, although the seller can only affect the density (i.e. weights) with which the
future expected value of reputation is computed, the optimal decision implies shifting probability mass from certain
outcomes (yj) to other outcomes. In other words, the derivative of the density function f (y|e, θ) with respect to e
will be be negative for certain values of yj and positive for others. This implies that seller j will decide the effort
level by "shifting" probability mass such that, marginally, the weighted change in value is the same as the change
in the cost of effort.
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generations of buyers will shape their beliefs (and therefore their selection and bid-
ing strategies) accordingly5. The link with the Euler equation (A.40) is then clear: an
optimal effort strategy (one that maximizes the value for a seller) affects the distribu-
tion of beliefs tomorrow, which triggers a change in expected short-run nrevenues and
a new“learning” path which will affect all future expected profits. The latter impact
appears independently of the effort decision tomorrow.
A.5.2 Existence of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium
We focus on Markov Perfect (Bayesian) Equilibibrium concept, as defined in section
1.3.5. Existence in the dynamic setting is, however, a delicate issue. Given that sell-
ers’ actions are continuous, we follow Adlakha, Johari, and Weintraub, (2010) and Es-
cobar, (2011) to argue the existence of an equilibrium. Their main results imply the
existence of a MPE provided the sets of actions are compact, the set of states is count-
able, the period payoffs are upper semi-continuous in the action profiles and lower
semi-continuous in the competitors’ actions and the transition function depends con-
tinuously on sellers’ actions.
A.5.3 The (Short-Run) Reputation-Elasticity of Revenues
In our dynamic setting, when deciding about effort levels, sellers care about the marginal
effect of reputation on their lifetime income from future transactions. As shown in equa-
tion (A.41), the bayesian learning structure implies that, at an equilibrium,
∂V comp (µ; θ)
∂µj
6=
∂R
(
µ, e (µ)
)
∂µj
(A.42)
The size of the difference between the left-hand side (LHS) and the right-hand side
(RHS) in (A.42) will be determined by the slope of of the learning function w.r.t µ, that
is,
∂µ′j
∂µj
. This determines how much does a change in current reputation affects the value
for a seller due to the impact of the learning structure on future revenues. The second
term in the envelope condition (A.41) is an infinite sum of future revenues, weighted
by such learning slope and the discount factor. On one hand, when the potential types
of sellers are far appart (i.e. g − b ≈ 1) the learning slope will tend to be relatively
big compared to the case when seller types are not very different. On the other hand,
however, when sellers are either very trustworthy or not trustworthy, types will be
revealed quite fast, meaning that soon into the life of a seller, the reputaion µ will be
either 0 or 1 forever.
The equilibrium of the infinite horizon game implies a particular form for the ef-
fort strategies; these are a function of current reputation and "deep" parameters, which
include the discount factor δ, type values g, b , the number of buyers N in each pe-
riod, and cost function parameters C. Therefore, we have that equilibrium (expected)
5Recall that, although buyers are short lived, they observe a summary of past outcomes, represented by µ.
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revenues at the beginning of a period for seller j can be expressed as
Rj
(
µj, µ−j, ej (µ; Ω) , e−j (µ; Ω)
)
= rj
(
µj, ej (µ; Ω)
)
H2j
(
µj, µ−j, ej (µ; Ω) , e−j (µ; Ω)
)
(A.43)
where Ω ≡ {δ, g, b, N,C} , µ ≡ {µj, µ−j}, and ej (µ) ≡
{
egj (µ) , e
b
j (µ)
}
are equilib-
rium effort strategies.
A natural meassure of the impact of reputation is the elasticity of expected revenues
in period t for seller j with respect to her reputation in the same period. In equilibrium,
such elasticity, which we denote ηRjµj , depends on effort strategies and is given by (for
simplicity, the notation abstract from the dependence on deep parameters):
ηRjµj ≡
∂Rj
(
µj, µ−j, ej (µ; Ω) , e−j (µ; Ω)
)
∂µj
× µj
Rj
(
µj, µ−j, ej (µ; Ω) , e−j (µ; Ω)
) (A.44)
= h
(
µj, µ−j; Ω
)
The crucial aspect is that H2j (·) is a function of both sellers effort in equilibrium. This
implies that the reputation-elasticity of revenues is potentially a function of both repu-
tations, and therefore not constant if reputations evolve over time. In addition to the
dependence on the competitor’s reputation, and given the characterization results in
proposition 5, the dependence onn the number of buyers N , is of interest too. As it
has been shown, when the number of buyers in the market increases, their equilibrium
behavior implies that sellers startegic incentives disappear. Therefore, we expect the
nature of the bias that might arise from reduced form estimations of (A.44) to change
with N too.
Reduced Form Estimation of ηRjµj ?
Recall that, conditional on sellers reputations, there are two sources of uncertainty in
the environment we proposed: (i) the valuations that the N buyers have for the good,
which are independently drawn each period from U ∼ [0, 1], and (ii) the selection of
auctions characterized in equilibrium by mixed strategies. We can write realized rev-
enues in equilibrium for seller j at time t as
RRj,t = rj (µj,t, µ−j,t) v
(2)
j (A.45)
where v(2)j is the realized second highest valuation in seller j auction. Importantly,RRj,t
and (µj,t, µ−j,t) are the variables that a researcher can potentially observe.
Given that we assume sellers form rational expectations, and that conditional on
the parameters of the game Ω srategies are a function only of µ, we can think of the
expected revenuesRj,t as a linear projection ofRRj,t on the space of a particular type
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of functions of µt. In other words, we can decomposeRRj,t as
RRj,t = Rj,t + j,t (A.46)
whereRj,t = E
(
RRj,t
∣∣∣µt) and j,t is a forecast error with
E
(
j
∣∣∣µt, e (µt) , µt−1, ...) = E(j∣∣∣µt, e (µt)) = 0 (A.47)
Note that, although the decomposition in (A.46) arises from a linear projection,Rj,t
is potentially a non-linear function of (µj,t, µ−j,t).
All recent empirical studies about the impact of reputation on revenues, such as
Cabral and Hortaçsu, (2010) who uses both cross section as well as panel data for sell-
ers, or Resnick et al., (2006) who use field experiment data in order to generate ex-
ogenous variation in reputation, estimate a specification similar to the following (log)
linear expression forRRj,t in order to try to uncover some information about ηRµ :
logRRj,t = β0 + β1 log µj,t +Xj,tΓ + νj,t (A.48)
where logRRj,t are the log-revenues6 for seller j in period t; log µj,t is the log-public
reputation of seller j in period t; Xj is a set of other control variables potentially in-
cluding seller’s fixed characteristics, and νj,t is an error term.
Would a simple OLS estimate of β1, βˆOLS1 using either panel or experimental data
on revenues and reputation, be enough to consistently estimate ηRµ ? Under general
conditions, the answer is likely to be "no". In order to uncover ηRµ through eq. (A.48),
one needs to make at least two assumptions: (i) the reputation of seller j’s competitors
log µ−j,t does not directly influence seller j’s revenues, and (ii) the way in which log µj,t
affects RRj,t needs to be constant across µj . Under the structure of the simple market
presented here, equilibrium revenues depend on effort strategies, which are not ob-
servable by the econometrician, and they are a function of both sellers reputations. In
other words,
νj,t = g
(
, ej (µ) , e−j (µ) ; j,t
)
(A.49)
In equilibrium, it will probably be the case that Cov
(
log µj,t, νj,t
)
6= 0: not only might
µj,t and µ−j,t be correlated through past and current effort, but the dependence of RR
on µj,t is potentially not constant. The latter implies that even an exogenous source of
variation in µj,t, say from a field experiment as in Resnick et al., (2006), would not be
enough to uncover most of the information about the elasticity.7
6Due to lack of time series data on past prices, Cabral and Hortaçsu, (2010) proxy revenues by the number of
sales. For our purpose, however, they both measure similar aspects of trades.
7Resnick et al., (2006) generate such exogenous variation through an experiment in which a seller with high
reputation creates an additional account under a different name. Under this new account, the auction characteristics
are the same as the ones in the auctions under her original name, but reputation would be clearly different. The
relevant parameter, which in essence is their counterpart of β can be computed as
β˜ = R¯R
original
j − R¯Rnewj
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The next relevant question is then: can a reduced form estimation such as (A.48)
provide some useful information about ηRµ , even when ηRµ cannot be consistently iden-
tified by βˆOLS1 ? Consider the unweighted average of η
Rj
µj across the whole state space
(µj, µ−j)
η¯j =
∫
Mj
∫
M−j
h
(
µj, µ−j; Ω
)
d µ−j d µj (A.50)
A.5.4 Quantitative Experiment
In this section we quantify importance of the endogeneity problem described above,
which can arise when strategic interactions and reputation building behavior are not
taken into account in the reduced form estimation.
We first propose an algorithm to solve the infinite-horizon game, and present the
quantitative properties of the approximated equilibrium (including the true elasticity
of revenues) for different parameter values. We then calibrate a benchmark version
using moments presented in Cabral and Hortaçsu, 2010, and use simulated data to run
different regressions that allow us to analyze quantitatively the importance of omitting
reputation building and strategic behavior from the reduced form model.
Computational Algorithm
In order to solve the dynamic game for a given set of parameter values, we propose an
algorithm in the spirit of Doraszelski and Pakes, (2007) solving for the value functions
of each seller and type, while searching for an equilibrium using the contraction prop-
erties of best responses. Some important aspects that the algorithm needs to take into
account:
There are four key features of the dynamic game that must be taken into account when
solving the problem numerically:
1. Since effort decisions are not observable, they do not affect the type-beliefs di-
rectly, but indirectly through the information (signal) revealed by the outcomes
yj . As described in the previous section, an effort decision ej,t at time t (i.e. condi-
tional on the information set at time t) will have an impact on all the probabilities
of future outcome sequences. This feature prevents us from using a numerical
algorithm that works only through the Euler equations since these would be com-
posed of an infinite sum of terms (i.e. future profits) weighted by the change in
probabilities after an effort decision at time t.
2. Probabilities of outcomes (deliveries) and beliefs are both subjective perceptions of
seller j, function of the best responses (BR) for all players, and these perceptions
.
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must be confirmed in equilibrium. From seller j’s point of view:
P
(
y′j, y
′
−j|θj, BRj
(
e∗−j, s
))
= P
(
y′j|θj, eθj
) · P (y′−j|e∗−j , µ−j) (A.51)
where the equality in (A.51) comes from the independence of conditional out-
comes. Note that P
(
y′−j|e∗−j , µ−j
)
is the reputation of seller −j, which represents
a combination of belief and perceptions held by buyers (and therefore relevant for
other sellers).
3. The dynamic reputation game is characterized by a continuous action space (the
effort chosen by each seller-type is a continuous variable) and a continuous state
space (the beliefs about a seller being of good type are also continuous in [0, 1]).
As it is well known in the game theoretic literature, the existence and unique-
ness of an equilibrium under such features is quite different than under a finite
action space (see for example Athey, (2001)). Therefore, the approximated solu-
tion needs to preserve such continuity in order to avoid one possible convergence
problem. Within each iteration over e∗, a new set of value functions (one for each
seller and type) will be found. We approximate these (unknown) functions by
means of linear approximation schemes, consisting of basis functions and approx-
imation nodes; in other words, we will have Vj (µ;θ) ≈ Vˆj (µ; θ, {c}) where {c} is a
vector of parameters.
The algorithm employed is a slightly modified version of the ideas developed in
Ericson and Pakes, (1995) and Doraszelski and Pakes, (2007). We use a successive ap-
proximation strategy to the value functions of all players and types. Intuitively, we want
to find (one of the possible) equilibrium in which the perceptions about effort, namely
e∗, are indeed optimal strategies by sellers. The algorithm will find a fixed point of a
mapping
e˜θj = F (e
∗, ·) j = 1, 2 ; θ = g, b
where e∗ =
{
eg∗j , e
b∗
j
}
j=1,2
and e˜θj is the optimal effort strategy for seller j and type θ.
The numerical algorithm used can be summarized as follow:
• Step 0: Choose an approximating method, m, and an objective function for the
approximation. Here we use one spectral method (Chebyshev polynomials) and
one finite-elements method (bi linear splines). The grid Gm (method m, with m =
{cheb., spline}) used to approximate eθj will be defined accordingly.
• Step 1: Perceived effort iteration (PEI). Choose an initial value for the perceived
effort strategies, e0∗j,m (µ1, µ2; θ) , j = 1, 2; θ = {g, b} defined at the grid Gm for the
approximating method m. Define a stopping criterion PEI > 0.
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• Step 2: Given e0∗j,m, and all the possible states (beliefs) today (µ1, µ2) compute the
possible values of the beliefs tomorrow, (µ′1, µ′2), which depend only on the real-
izations of the transactions, y1, y2
µ′j = g
(
µj, e
0∗
j,m, yj
)
, j = 1, 2 ; θ ∈ {g, b}
where the law of motion µ′ = g (µ, ·) is derived from a Bayesian learning process.
• Step 3: Value function iteration (VFI). Guess an initial value function V 0j (µ;θ) on
the grid Gm for each seller j and type θ. Define a stopping criterion V FI > 0.
• Step 4: Projection step8. Use such guess and µ′ computed in step 2 in order to
approximate V 0j (µ′; θ) as
Vˆj (µ
′; θ, {cij}) ≡
n1∑
k=0
n2∑
l=0
ckl · Ti1 (µ′1)Tj2 (µ′2)
where the coefficients {ckl} are defined as
{c} = argmin
∫
µ1×µ2
[
V 0j (µ; θ)− Vˆj (µ; θ {c})
]2
dµ1dµ2 (A.52)
• Step 5: Maximization step. Compute V 1j (·) by solving the linear programming
problem
V 1j (µj , µ−j ; θ) = max
eθj
{
R
(
µj , µ−j , e0∗m
)− c (eθj)+
+δ
∑
yj
∑
y−j
p
(
yj , y−j |eθj , e0∗m , µ−j
)
Vˆj
(
µ′j (yj) , µ
′
−j (y−j) ; θ
)}
(A.53)
s.t. eθj ∈ [e, e¯]
• Step 6: If max{|V 1j − V 0j, |}j,θ < V FI , stop and go to step 7. Else, update the guess
by weighted function iteration: V 0j = αV 1j + (1 − α)V 0j , with α ∈ [0, 1] and go to
step 4.
8For the case of Chebyshev polynomials, we need to define the number of basis elements {T}, n1 and n2 (degree
of approximating polynomials for both dimensions). Let Ti1 (h (µ1)) and Tj2 (h (µ2)) be the i-th (j-th) element of
the n1-th (n2-th) degree Cheb. polynomial, where h (·) : [0, 1] → [−1, 1]. Given the properties that characterize the
Chebyshev polynomial family, the coefficients {cij} are relatively easy to compute (this includes the approximation
of the integral in (A.52) using Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature, where we need to define the number of Chebyshev
nodes mµ1 and mµ2, with n1 ≤ mµ1 and n2 < mµ2) .
For the case of bi-linear splines, we choose a set of nodes (in the space of beliefs) {µ1i, µ2j}i,j which together with
the basis {ψ}i,j , they define the tensor approximation as
eˆθj (µ1, µ2; {c}) ≡ eˆ (µ1, µ2, θ; {c}) =
mµ1∑
i=0
mµ2∑
j=0
cij · ψi (µ1)ψj (µ2)
The basis (tent functions) are such that the coefficients take a simple form: cij = V θ (µ1i, µ2j). In addition, for µ1 =
µ1i and µ2 = µ2j we have eˆθ (µ1i, µ2j) = eθ (µ1i, µ2j) Note that, contrary to the strategy folowed for Chebyshev
polynomials, we will have a just-identified system.
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• Step 7: If max{|eˆθj,m − e0∗j,m|}j,θ < PEI , where eˆθj,m = argmaxeθj (A.53), stop. Else,
update the guess by weighted function iteration: e0∗j,m = αeˆθj,m + (1− α)e0∗j,m , with
α ∈ [0, 1] and go to step 2.
Some particularities of our model are worth noting. The fact that the stochastic vec-
tor of outcomes in our model, y, (the outcome of transactions given effort decisions
and types) takes discrete values (success or failure), implies that we don’t need to em-
ploy numerical integration when computing expectations in step 5; this eliminates one
source of numerical approximation error. However, we are still left with the errors
arising from the approximation of Vj (·) in step 4 (fitting step); in addition, we cannot
avoid incurring in errors coming from an optimization or internal root finding algo-
rithm required in step 5.
Given the assumptions regarding the strategies we allow for each seller, the nu-
merical solution provided (time-invariant) effort decision rules.9 Accuracy tests for the
approximated solution and simulation are presented in the appendix.
Parametrization and Calibration
For the exercise to provide some relevant information, we need to impose discipline to
the determination of parameter values.
Note that the dynamic problem for each seller implies that both the possible seller
types as well as the number of buyers in each stage game, are fixed and the type space
is given exogenously. We will then consider them as "parameters" of the game. The
game, therefore, has two set of parameters: (i) parameters characterizing the payoff
function of sellers (discount factor δ, the cost function c(e), and the seller types g, b), (ii)
parameters characterizing market conditions ( number of buyers in the market, N )
Cost Function
The optimal decisions by sellers weight marginal costs of effort against future marginal
increases in revenues, through the change in probabilities of a successful delivery. Al-
though the characterisation (including dynamics) of the equilibrium will as presented
in previous sections requires minimum assumptions on the cost function, the quantita-
tive properties will depend directly on the parametrized cost function. The functional
form chosen for the cost function is
c(e) =
 γ1(γ2−e)2 + γ3 · e+ γ4 if e ≥ e0 if e ≤ e (A.54)
9 To be precise, what we describe here is an "approximate" equilibria. As noted by Kubler2005 such equilibria-
can be far away from the "exact" equilibria. They provide sufficient conditions in order to ensure that such approx-
imated equilibria is close to the exact one. Although such conditions are presented for competitive economies with
heterogeneous agents, we suspect that similar concerns might arise in our dynamic game.
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Such functional form is flexible enough in order to capture the minimum require-
ments. It presents 4 parameters: γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4; these will be calibrated "in equilibrium"
matching 4 moments / conditions, out of which 2 correspond to: c(e) = 0 and c′(e) = 0.
The cost parameters, together with the discount factor β, the seller type values g, b
and the number of buyers in the market N , will shape the effort decisions in equilib-
rium. These efforts e∗ and the assumed market structure will determine the (random)
evolution of reputation and revenues. Although at this point we still don’t have access
to the necessary on-line data in order to carry out a proper calibration / estimation,
below we describe the main moments in the data analyzed in Cabral and Hortaçsu,
(2010) as a reference.
Given our objective, namely quantifying the bias in the estimated elasticity of rev-
enues η when a reduced form estimation is used, we will carry out two type of ro-
bustness checks: (i) different distances of seller types g − b and (ii) different number of
buyers in the market, N . Given the results of the characterization of the equilibrium in
the 2-period game, changes in the values of these parameters have a significant impact
on the properties of the equilibrium, and therefore might affect the size of the bias that
arises in the estimation of η.
Cabral and Hortaçsu, 2010 analyzes a sample of 819 sellers of three different goods10
and follow them at monthly intervals between October 24, 2002 and March 16, 2003.
Among other features, they make emphasis on two moments observed in the dynamics
of sales and feedback data11:
1. Conditional mean impact of the first negative feedback on sales growth rates.
2. Conditional mean impact of the second and third negative feedbacks on sales growth
rates.
3. Mean number of transactions (time) until the first negative feedback.
4. Mean number of transactions (time) between the first and the second negative
feedback.
The benchmark calibration is presented in table A.1.
10 IBM ThinkPad T23, collectible coins and 1998 Holidays Teddy Beanie Babies.
11 There is a fifth dimension of sellers behavior and strategies that is analyzed by Cabral20120, but which we do
not consider here: the possibility for a seller to exit (change 0ne’s identity or leave eBay). Although we do think
that having the possibility to exit might change the importance of the reputation mechanism, the current version of
our model does not include such possibility.
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TABLE A.1: Parameter Values. Benchmark Model
Parameter Value
Common discount factor δ .9
Large gap in types, g − b g = .9 b = .1
Small gap in types, g − b g = .9 b = .4
Number of buyers, N N = 5, N = 10 and N = 50
γ1 1.2
γ2 0.1
γ3 0.058
γ4 0.087
e 0.5
Figures A.3 and A.4 present effort strategies (policy functions) and value functions
respectively, in equilibrium, as a function of current seller reputations {µj, µ−j}. The
plotted solution corresponds to the case where the number of buyers in the market
is N = 10 (an intermediate value), the possible types of sellers are either far appart
(g = 0.9 and b = 0.1) or closer together (g = 0.9 and b = 0.4).12 These graphs should
be read in the same way as in the 2-periods case. Each curve in the left panels of figure
A.3 plots a good-type seller (seller 1 in this case) optimal effort decisions as a function
of her own’s reputation, for different (fixed) values of her competitor’s reputation. The
impact of an increase in the competitors reputation has a similar effect to the 2 period
case. However, the pattern of optimal decisions differs signifficantly between the case
when types are far apart (g = 0.9 and b = 0.1, top row) and the case when types are
closer together (g = 0.9 and b = 0.4, bottom row). The former case is particularly
different from the 2 periods case: note that now the optimal effort decision for a seller
with high "ability" peaks at a reputation close to 0 and then becomes monotonically
decreasing in her reputation; the optimal decision for a seller with low "ability" behaves
in the opposite way, peaking very close to maximal reputation.
The reason for these behaviors can be hinted from the shape of the value functions
for each type of seller, presented in figure A.4. A g-type seller knows that it is crucial
to avoid getting close to zero reputation; once this reputation zone is avoided, chances
are that she will be recognized by buyers and her competitors as a g-type seller in the
long run. Due to this reason, the difference in net present value (NPV) between zero
and near zero reputation is huge, and therefore the steepness of the value function in
that region. On the other hand, and still considering the case (g = 0.9 and b = 0.1), a
b-type sellers NPV around the lowest reputation does not change much. She is aware
that it will be very tough for her to convince buyers in the long run that she is of
g-type. The behavior of her NPV changes significantly as her reputation increases,
12 We present effort and value functions for the other parameter values in the appendix.
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since it becomes more likely that buyers end up believing she is a good seller. As her
reputation increase, her NPV approaches at an even faster rate the NPV of a g-type,
and therefore it becomes more profitable to invest in building the reputation.13 Note
that as we proved in proposition 6, the NPV (i.e. value functions) of both types of
sellers are equal when their reputation is either 0 or 1.
FIGURE A.3: Equilibrium effort strategies for N = 10: g = 0.9, b = 0.1 top row;
g = 0.9, b = 0.4 bottom row
13Note that, although the value function of a bad seller near maximal reputation has a similar behavior as the
value function of a good seller near minimal reputation, the effort of the bad seller is significantly smaller than the
effort of the good seller. The reason is that in the optimality conditions, the benefit in an increase in reputation needs
to be weighted by the change in the probability of a successful delivery, given by θ.
A.5. The Value of Reputation in Infinite Horizon 131
FIGURE A.4: Equilibrium Value Functions for N = 10: g = 0.9, b = 0.1 top row;
g = 0.9, b = 0.4 bottom row
Figure A.5 presents the "true" reputation-elasticity of revenues generated in equi-
librium. This is computed according to equation (A.44), using the approximated equi-
librium solution to the game.14
14The accuracy of the approximation is discussed in appendix X.
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FIGURE A.5: Reputation-Elasticity of Revenues with g = 0.9, b = 0.1 and N = 10
(left figure) and N = 50(right)
Short-Run Value of Reputation: Are reduced-form estimates Biased?
We now answer the main question posed at the beginning of this section: are the es-
timates of the impact of reputation arising from reduced form econometric models
still unbiased when strategic competition and reputation-building behavior are not
accounted for? In other words, what information can a reduced form econometric es-
timation provide about the elasticity of revenues, as presented in figure A.5?
We proceed in the following way:
1. The numerical algorithm described above provides a solution to the infinite hori-
zon game, characterized by optimal effort strategies e∗θj (µ) for θ ∈ {g, b}, j = 1, 2
a set of four value functions {Vj (·; θ)}, j = 1, 2; θ ∈ {g, b} and buyer’s optimal
selection and bidding strategies {si (µ) , bi (µ)}.
2. We then simulate M independent "panels" of (2) sellers competing for short lived
buyers. These simulations will provide us with, among other variables, histories
of seller revenues and reputations. More concretely, for a given set of parameter
values (including the values of {g, b}), we simulate pairs of sellers under three
different combinations of sellers types: (i) both sellers are of g-type; (ii) one seller
is of g-type and one seller is of b-type; (iii) both sellers are of b-type. Obviously,
the type realization of a seller is not known by buyers or the competitor. Then,
starting from a set of initial beliefs {µ1,0, µ2,0}we let each pair of sellers to compete
during T transactions-periods. In our benchmark simulations, M = 2000 and
T = 200.
3. We finally use such data in order to run reduced form regressions similar to the
ones in Cabral and Hortaçsu, 2010 and Resnik2006 and compare these with a
"correctly specified" estimated regression.
Note that simulations are driven by three sources of randomness in each stage
game, conditional on the current reputation values: first, buyers valuations are freshly
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drawn every period from the support [0, 1] on which they are a priory independently
and uniformly distributed. Secondly, which buyers bid in each auction is determined
by each buyer’s selection strategy s∗i , which is a vector of probabilities determining the
odds of a buyer with an assigned private valuation of choosing each of the open auc-
tions. Finally, after each auction has closed and the seller has decided how much effort
to put into delivering the item e∗θt , the outcome of the transaction (F or S) is determined
randomly according to the technology P (y = S|θ, e∗) = θe∗.
Generated Data: The dynamics of Reputation, Effort and Revenues
Figure A.6 presents a set of typical simulation paths for reputation, effort and (ex-
pected) stage revenues when the possible types of sellers are g = 0.9, b = 0.1. Each
row in the figure presents the case in which two good-type sellers compete and the
one in which a good and a bad seller compete. Figure A.7 presents a similar picture for
the case when the possible types are g = 0.9, b = 0.4.
There are some features worth underlining. First, when the possible types are far
apart, beliefs about the type of the seller converge much faster to the true distribution
of types. Due to the low (high) intrinsic ability to succeed, a bad (good) seller faces a
sequence of failures (successes) with high probability. This drive down (up) the beliefs
and after a couple of transactions, there is convergence. In other words, the separation
of types when sellers are either very professional or fake occurs very fast.
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FIGURE A.6: Typical Simulations of Reputation, Efforts and Instantaneous Rev-
enues Path. Two g-type sellers (left), one g-type and one b-type (right). Parameter
values N = 10; g = 0.9, b = 0.1
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FIGURE A.7: Typical Simulations of Reputation, Efforts and Instantaneous Rev-
enues Path. Two g-type sellers (left), one g-type and one b-type (right). Parameter
values N = 10; g = 0.9, b = 0.4
TABLE A.2: Descriptive Statistics from Simulations
Reduced-Form Regressions
The simulation described above, in which M independent pairs of sellers compete
for N short lived buyers during T periods, provide us with histories of reputation
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{{
µmj,t, µ
m
−j,t
}T
t=1,j=1,2
}M
m=1
, effort
{{
emj,t, e
m
−j,t
}T
t=1,j=1,2
}M
m=1
and revenues
{{
RRmj,t,RR
m
−j,t
}T
t=1,j=1,2
}M
m=1
.
The final data used for the estimation, however, is a subset of the full sample: we
discard observations for t ≥ t∗j , where t∗ is the moment in which the reputation of
seller j has converged to 0 or 1. The reason is simple: once the reputation has reached
an absorbing state, then any variability in revenues will be independent of reputation.
Including the observations of periods in which the reputation is maximal or minimal
will therefore make the exercise less transparent.
We use the final dataset to estimate the following four reduced-form econometric
specifications, including a version of equation (A.48) estimated by the mentioned pre-
vious empirical studies:
logRRmj,t = β
1
0 + f
(
β1, log µmj,t
)
+ γ1 log µm−j,t + ν
1
j,t (A.55)
logRRmj,t = β
2
0 + f
(
β2, log µmj,t
)
+ ν2j,t (A.56)
logRRmj,t = β
3
0 + β
3
1 log µ
m
j,t + γ
3 log µm−j,t + ν
3
j,t (A.57)
logRRmj,t = β
4
0 + β
4
1 log µ
m
j,t + ν
4
j,t (A.58)
where f
(
β, log µmj,t
)
is a non-linear function of log µmj,t, though linear in the parameters
β.
Equation (A.55) approximates the "true" (model) expression for the (log) revenues
of seller i in equilibrium, which includes a potentially non-linear dependence on her
own reputation and a linear dependence on the competitors reputation. Equations
(A.56)-(A.58) are the alternative (mis)-specifications considered, where, respectively,
the dependence on the competitors reputation is omitted (eq. (A.56)), f(β, ·) is linear
in reputation (eq. (A.57)) and where both mis-specifications are considered (eq. (A.58)).
The fourth regression considered is the version considered in previous empirical stud-
ies such as Cabral and Hortaçsu, (2010).
Before presenting the results, some comments regarding the regressions and the
simulated data are necessary. First, and as it is hinted from the dynamics of beliefs in
figures A.6 and A.7, when the sellers are either very trustworthy or not trustworthy at
all (i.e. g = .9, b = .1), the reputation of each seller converges to 0 or 1 quite fast. This
implies that we are left with very few observations to estimate the regressions, since, as
described above, we discard observations of the simulated time series for the periods
after the reputation of a seller has reached an absorbing state. With a low number of
observations, the estimated elasticity η(µ) is very imprecise. Second, the assumption
about the distribution of buyer’s valuations implies that when the number of buyers
is small, the second highest valuation in the auction of any seller will be very volatile,
independently of the reputation of the two sellers. With a very long time series, this
wouldnt be a problem for the estimation of the elasticity; however, as mentioned be-
fore, the final simulated data sets are relatively short, which means that the variance of
the estimated coefficients will be quite high. Third, given characteristics of the game
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andthe assumption about the outcome of the transaction tacking only two values (S or
F), the simulated time series of reputation and revenues will be concentrated around a
reduced number of values. This implies that estimating the entire (equilibrium) sched-
ule of the elasticity η(µ) will be very difficult, since we will have few observations for
certain values of the space of reputations.
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B.1 Data sources and definitions
B.1.1 National statistics
The aggregate time-series for the U.K. and the U.S. come from the Office for National
Statistics (ONS) and the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), respectively.
Personal consumption expenditure on non-durable goods and services expenditure,
personal consumption expenditure on durable goods and disposable income are all
seasonally adjusted at the source. The series are divided by total population to ob-
tain per-capita values. The deflator used for the U.K. (U.S.) is the Retail Price Index
excluding mortgage interest payments (Consumer Price Index).
B.1.2 Household survey data
For the U.K., we use the Living Costs and Food Survey (formerly known as Family Ex-
penditure Survey) from 1975 to 2007 (1978 to 2007 when we use educational attainment
for the probit regressions). For the U.S., we use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (in-
terview section) from 1981 to 2007.
Household expenditure. Non-durable goods and services: includes food, alcohol, to-
bacco, fuel, light and power, clothing and footwear, personal goods and services, fares,
leisure services, household services, non-durable household goods, motoring expen-
ditures and leisure goods. Between 1982 and 1987, food at home in the CEX is adjusted
following Aguiar and Bils, 2015. Durable goods: durable household goods, motor ve-
hicles and durable leisure goods. This includes expenditure such as furniture and fur-
nishings, electrical appliances and audio-visual equipment.
Mortgage payments and income. Mortgage payments: includes both interest payments
and capital repayments (not available individually over the whole sample). Net income:
sum of labor- and non-labor household income net of taxes paid.
Restrictions. We exclude households: (i) that do not report income, (ii) that report
negative net income, (iii) that are in either the top or the bottom 1% of either the non-
durable or the durable expenditure distributions of each housing tenure group at any
quarter and (iv) whose head is either below 25 years old or above 74 years old. Fi-
nally, for the CEX, which features a short panel dimension, we only keep households
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that have not changed housing tenure status between interviews. The LCFS comprises
repeated cross-sections and thus each household is observed only once. For compara-
bility across countries and over time, all household variables in the LCFS for the U.K.
(in the CEX for the U.S.) are deflated by the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage in-
terest payments (Consumer Price Index) and divided by the household size to obtain
real values in per-capita terms.
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B.2 Housing tenure and demographics
Distribution of Demographic Characteristics Across Housing Tenure Groups
UK: 1975 - 2007 US: 1981 - 2007
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dle row: share of household heads who completed more than compul-
sory education; bottom row: real per capita income net of taxes. Left:
U.K. (LCFS), 1975q1-2007q4. Right: U.S. (CEX), 1981q1-2007q4.
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TABLE B.1: Mean Quarterly Household Expenditures and Income over the full
sample, in 2007 US$
Panel A: United Kingdom
non-durable durable mortgage after-tax
expenditure expenditure repayments income
Mortgagors 10,202 1,842 1,950 15,555
Outright Owners 10,030 1,625 13,617
Renters 6,807 750 9,310
Panel B: United States
non-durable durables mortgage after-tax
expenditure expenditure repayments income
Mortgagors 14,767 2,470 2,352 20,500
Outright Owners 14,482 2,032 16,495
Renters 11,945 1,542 14,340
Note: Data for the UK comes from the Living Costs and Food Survey
(LCFS) between 1975q1-2007q4; data for the US comes from the CEX
between 1981q1-2007q4. The values in the table are average household
level expenditures and income by cohort. In a given quarter these are
constructed as a weighted average of all households within each co-
hort. Entries refer to sample averages converted into 2007 US dollars.
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Mortgagors Outright owners Renters
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FIGURE B.4: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on
non-durable consumption (ND), durable expenditure (D) and income net of tax
for households below age 65. U.K. data: FES/LCFS (1975-2007). Grey areas are
bootstrapped 90% confidence bands.
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FIGURE B.5: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut
on non-durable consumption (ND), durable expenditure (D) and income net of
tax for households below age 65. U.S. data: CEX (1981-2007). Grey areas are
bootstrapped 90% confidence bands.
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B.3 WHTM by housing tenure
0
.2
.4
.6
H
TM
 S
ha
re
UK
−1
99
5 B
HP
S
US
−1
99
5 S
CF
UK
−2
00
0 B
HP
S
US
−2
00
1 S
CF
UK
−2
00
5 B
HP
S
US
−2
00
4 S
CF
Population Shares of Wealthy Hand−To−Mouth
Mortgagors Outright owners Renters
FIGURE B.6: Shares of Wealthy Hand-To-Mouth (WHTM) households in the pop-
ulation, by housing tenure group. U.K. (U.S.) data: 1995, 2000, 2005 waves of the
British Household Panel Survey (Survey of Consumer Finances). A household is
defined as WHTM if at any given point in time both (i) their net liquid wealth
is less than half of their total monthly household labor income and (ii) their net
illiquid wealth is positive. U.K. (U.S.) data: 1995, 2000, 2005 waves of the BHPS
(SCF).
B.4 Compositional changes and renters
In this Appendix, we report the impulse responses for the shares of mortgagors, out-
right owners and renters as well as on non-durable consumption, durable expenditure
and disposable income for renters in the U.K. and U.S..
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FIGURE B.8: UK results for non-durable, durable and income net of taxes for
“likely” and “unlikely” mortgagors, excluding renters. Groups computed fol-
lowing Attanasio et al (2002) propensity score approach using a fixed probability
threshold. Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands.
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FIGURE B.9: US results for non-durable, durable and income net of taxes for
“likely” and “unlikely” mortgagors, excluding renters. Groups computed fol-
lowing Attanasio et al (2002) propensity score approach using a fixed probability
threshold. Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands.
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B.5 The full model
B.5.1 Households
There are, ex-ante, two types of households: patient households (PH) and impatient house-
holds (IH). These are differentiated by their discount factors βH and βL respectively,
with 0 < βL < βH < 1.1 They all derive utility from the consumption bundle xt,
housing stock and/or services h˜t and dis-utility from labor Lt:
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
(
βi
)t( x1−σt
1− σ + j log h˜t −
Lηt
η
)]
where σ > 0 is a curvature parameter, j is a housing demand parameter, and η > 0 is
related to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The consumption bundle xt is defined
as
xt ≡ Cθt V 1−θt − µCθt−1V 1−θt−1 (B.1)
with Ct and Vt being non-durable consumption and the stock of durables, receptively;
θ ∈ [0, 1] is a share parameter and µ ∈ [0, 1) captures habit persistence. The stock of
durables for a household evolves according to the following law of motion:
Vt+1 =
(
1− Φ
(
Dt
Dt−1
))
Dt + (1− δ)Vt (B.2)
whereDt denotes purchases of new durables, Φ
(
Dt
Dt−1
)
= φd
2
(
Dt
Dt−1
)2
captures the costs
of adjusting durables, and δ is the rate of depreciation of consumer durables. There is
a fixed stock of houses H , which are sold and bought at a price qht .
B.5.2 Assets
Mortgages
Households can borrow/save through a multi-period (long term) instrument, which
we refer to as bond or mortgage. One unit of debt issued at t pays, starting in t+ 1, the
sequence of nominal installments 1, ρ, ρ2, ... , which decay at a rate ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
if Mt units of debt are issued at t, the mortgage installment at t+ j is given by
payt,t+j = ρ
j−1Mt j ≥ 1 (B.3)
1 We assume that impatient (patient) households can trade a complete set of arrow securities with other impatient
(patient) households, but not with the patient (impatient) households. This implies that idiosyncratic risk can
be perfectly shared within households of the same type, but other risks cannot be insured with households of a
different type.
154 Appendix B. Appendix Chapter 2
The total amount of installment payments due at t is then given by
Bt =
t∑
j=1
payt−j,t
= Mt−1 + ρBt−1 (B.4)
Given this notation, the value of the stock of debt at the beginning of each period is
given by
Bstockt+1 =
(
Mt + ρMt−1 + ρ2Mt−2 + ...+ ρtM0
) · St = Bt+1 · St
where St is the time-t price of one unit of debt. The value of the real stock is given by
bstockt+1 ≡
Bstockt+1
Pc,t
= bt+1St =
(
mt + ρ
bt
pic,t
)
St (B.5)
where mt ≡ MtPc,t , bt ≡ BtPc,t and pic,t ≡
Pc,t
Pc,t−1
.
One-period bonds
PH can also save through a nominal one-period bond, traded in zero net supply. One
unit of such bond can be bought at a price of one, and earns a nominal return of Rt.
B.5.3 Production of durables and non-durables
Following Monacelli, 2009, we model two sectors, producing durable investment goods
D and non durable goodsC using labor as the only input. In each sector, there are com-
petitive final good producers and monopolistically competitive producers of interme-
diate varieties, facing the same cost of adjusting prices following Rotemberg, 1982.
In the symmetric equilibrium where intermediate producers use the same amount of
labor, it is possible to obtain an expression for the evolution of prices in each sector
(Phillips curves)
pˆiD,t = β
HEt (pˆiD,t+1) +
(
D − 1
ϑD
)
mˆcD,t (B.6)
pˆic,t = β
HEt (pˆic,t+1) +
(
C − 1
ϑC
)
mˆcC,t (B.7)
where ”ˆ” variables denote deviation form a zero-inflation steady state, and pij,t ≡
Pj,t
Pj,t−1
is the gross inflation rate in sector j.
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Monetary policy
We assume that monetary policy is conducted through the short term (one-period) rate
Rt, following a Taylor rule:
Rt = (Rt−1)
rR
(
pi1+rpit−1
(
Yt−1
Y
)rY
r¯r
)1−rR
R,t
where pit ≡ piαpic,t pi1−αpiD,t is a composite inflation index, Yt = Y αyC,tY 1−αyD,t is a composite
output index and r¯r, Y are steady state real rate and output.
B.5.4 The model with an exogenous credit limit
We first consider, along the lines of Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012, the case where
households face an exogenous2 credit limit of the form
Stbt+1 ≤ Et
(
Ω¯
pit+1
Rt
)
(B.8)
If we define positive values of bt as debt (negative values are savings), then the real
budget constraint (in terms of the non-durable consumption good) for the impatient
household reads
Ct + q
h
t ∆ht + q
d
tDt +
bt
pic,t
= wtLt + Stmt (B.9)
and for the patient household:
C
′
t + q
h
t ∆h
′
t + q
d
tD
′
t −
b
′
t
pic,t
= wtL
′
t − Stm
′
t + ΠC,t + ΠD,c (B.10)
where patient household variables are denoted by “′”.
The problem for the impatient household is to maximize the following expression:
WIH = max{Ct,Dt,Vt+1,ht,Lt,bt+1,mt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
βL
)t
u (xt, ht, Lt)
subject to the budget constraint (B.63), the credit constraint (B.8), and the law of mo-
tion for the durable stock and the outstanding debt, (B.2), (B.4). We also assume a
transversality (No-Ponzi games) condition.
Denote by λt the multiplier on the budget constraint; λtqvt the multiplier on the law
of motion for the durable stock, λM,t the multiplier on the law of motion for mortgage
2One could also think of this as a borrowing limit tied to the steady state value of collateral.
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repayments, and λCC,t the multiplier on the credit constraint. The optimality condi-
tions for Ct, Dt, Vt+1, Lt, ht as well as the Euler equation, can then be written respec-
tively as
λt = θ
(
Ct
Vt
)θ−1 (
x−σt − µβLEt
(
x−σt+1
) )
(B.11)
qdt = q
v
t
(
1− Φ
(
Dt
Dt−1
)
−
∂Φ
(
Dt
Dt−1
)
∂Dt
Dt
)
+
+βLEt
(
λt+1q
v
t+1
λt
∂Φ
(
Dt+1
Dt
)
∂Dt
Dt+1
)
(B.12)
λtq
v
t = β
LEt
(
λt+1
(1− θ
θ
Ct+1
Vt+1
+ (1− δ)qvt+1
))
(B.13)
Lη−1t = λtwt (B.14)
λtq
h
t
(
1 + φh
∆ht
ht−1
)
=
j
h˜t
+ Et
(
βLλt+1q
h
t+1
(
1 + φh
∆ht+1
ht
))
(B.15)
λt = β
LEt
(
λt+1
1 + ρSt+1
Stpit+1
)
+ λCC,tRt (B.16)
Condition (B.11) equates the shadow value of relaxing the budget constraint to the
marginal utility of non-durable consumption, which is a function of habits µ. Con-
ditions (B.12) and (B.13) are standard, and describe the expenditure and stock deci-
sions for durables.3 Equation (B.14) is the usual intratemporal condition equating the
marginal rate of substitution between non-durable consumption and labor to the real
wage. This condition is important to understand how a constrained household ad-
justs hours worked in order to compensate for being borrowing constrained. Equation
(B.15) relates the shadow price of consumption to the marginal service value of hous-
ing in the current period, and its expected resale value in the next period. Note that in
this version of the model, the only difference between D and housing is how they enter
the utility of households. Finally, (B.16) is the modified Euler equation, which involves
the (expected) one-period holding return on the long term mortgage 1+ρSt+1
Stpit+1
.
The problem for the PH is similar, but only facing constraints (B.64) and (B.2), (B.4).
The main difference arises in the Euler equation which, for the patient household, reads
λ
′
t = β
HEt
(
λ
′
t+1
1 + ρSt+1
Stpit+1
)
(B.17)
3 To see things clearly, assume for the moment no adjustment costs, i.e. Φ = Φ
′
= 0. Then these two conditions
can be combined into a standard optimality condition
qdt = β
LEt
(
λt+1
λt
(
UV,t + (1− δ)qdt+1
))
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No-arbitrage pricing
The price St of the mortgage can then be written as
St = E
( ∞∑
j=1
Qt,t+jρ
j−1
)
=
1
Rt
+ ρE (Qt,t+1St+1) (B.18)
where Qt,t+j =
(
βH
)j λt+j
λt
for j ≥ 1 is the stochastic discount factor (SDF) of the patient
household, between t and t + j. This second equality assumes, crucially, that there is
no arbitrage when pricing. This means that a condition needs to be satisfied between
the return of the long term debt and an implicit one-period bond.4
We can define the (Macaulay) duration of this contract as
Dt(ρ) =
∞∑
j=1
(
Qt,t+j · j ρ
j−1
St
)
(B.19)
In a zero inflation steady state, equation (B.17) implies Qt,t+j = 1Rj =
(
βH
)j and
therefore the mortgage price in steady state is
S =
βH
1− βHρ
while the steady state duration is equal to
D(ρ) =
1
1− βHρ (B.20)
Market Clearing
Goods, labour, housing and debt markets need to clear. In other words
YC,t = ωIH (Ct + ξh,t) + ωPH
(
C
′
t + ξ
′
h,t
)
+
ϑC
2
(piC,t − 1)2 YCt (B.21)
YD,t = ωIHDt + ωPHD
′
t +
ϑD
2
(piD,t − 1)2 YDt (B.22)
LC,t + LD,t = ωIHLt + ωPHL
′
t (B.23)
H = ωIHht + ωPHh
′
t (B.24)
0 = ωIHbt + ωPHb
′
t (B.25)
4 Up to a first order approximation, the key no-arbitrage pricing condition can be stated as
Et
( Rt
pit+1
)
= Et
(1 + ρSt+1
Stpit+1
)
Alternatively, we could also have assumed markets for two types of assets: a one-period bond, and a long-term
mortgage, with households being able to use the short term bond only as a saving instrument which pays a gross
nominal interest rate R1t . On the other hand, the mortgage market can be used both for saving and borrowing.
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Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a set of sequences for Ct, C
′
t , Dt, D
′
t, Vt, V
′
t ,
ht, h
′
t, Lt, L
′
t, mt,m
′
t, bt, b
′
t, Lagrange multipliears and prices PC,t, PD,t, wt, qht , qdt , St, Rt
such that:
1. Ct, C
′
t , Dt, D
′
t, Vt, V
′
t , ht, h
′
t, Lt, L
′
t, mt,m
′
t, bt, b
′
t , as well as the corresponding La-
grange multipliers, solve the household problems for given prices and interest
rate Rt.
2. PC,t, PD,t, LC,t, LD,t solve the firms problem for given wt
3. Rt is set according to (B.5.3), and St, Rt satisfy a no arbitrage condition.
4. Prices PC,t, PD,t, wt, qht , qdt , St, Rt are such that all markets clear.
Parameterization
The exogenous credit limit model is parameterized using the values in Table B.2 below.
Most of these are relatively standard and well within the range of estimates available
in the literature. Two parameters, however, deserve further explanation. In the collat-
eral constraint model of the next section, the value of the housing demand shifter, j,
pins down the maximum loan-to-value ratio in the impatient household’s budget con-
straint. To set the latter to the empirically plausible value of 75%, we need j = 0.468.
For the sake of comparability across the two models, we then impose the same value
for j here.
Our framework abstracts from investment, government spending and net exports.
Accordingly, at the aggregate level, income is equal to expenditure and therefore we
need to calibrate the debt to expenditure ratio Ω¯/Y . The household debt to disposable
income ratio (or the private credit to GDP) in the two countries has averaged around
110% while household expenditure tends to represent about 60% of output, implying
a debt to expenditure ratio of about 1.8. Finally, we assume there are equal shares of
constrained and unconstrained households.
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Parameter Description Value
θ/(1− θ) elasticity of substitution between ND and D stock 4
σ elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.5
βL, βH discount factor: mortgagors, outright owners 0.95, 0.99
1/(η − 1) Frisch elasticity of labor supply 2
µ habits parameter 0.5
j housing demand shifter 0.468
δ depreciation rate durables 0.025
εC,D elasticity of varieties 4
ϑC,D cost of adjusting prices 150
rpi, rY , rR Taylor rule: CPI, output, smoothing 1.5,.05,.6
ωIH share constrained households 50%
ωPH share unconstrained households 50%
Ω¯/Y debt to expenditure ratio 1.8
1/(1− βHρ) Benchmark long term debt duration 1 year
TABLE B.2: Calibration of the model.
B.5.5 The model with an endogenous collateral limit
We now assume that the housing stock ht can be used as collateral, following Kiyotaki
and Moore, 1997 and Iacoviello, (2005).5 The credit constraint (B.8) now reads
Stbt+1 ≤ φE
(
qh,t+1ht
pit+1
Rt
)
(B.26)
where φ is the steady state loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, and qh,t+1ht is the real value of the
housing stock at t+1.
There is a rental market through which households can rent (from/to others) hous-
ing services for one period at a rate pt. Households are now also heterogeneous with
respect to the utility they derive from renting.6 Within the impatient households, there
are now two groups of agents. We denote IHm those households who derive relatively
higher utility from owned housing, and IHr those households who derive similar util-
ity from renting or owning. The population shares of IHm, PH and IHr are exogenous
and given by (ωIHm, ωPH , 1− ωIH − ωPH), consistent with the evidence in Section 4.2
that the shares of each housing tenure group do not vary with changes in monetary
policy. But, importantly, the housing tenure choice (how much house to own vs. rent)
will be endogenous.
5Note that we are not allowing the stock of durable goods Vt to be collateralizable. The reason for this is twofold.
First, although there might be some durable goods in the data that are collateralizable, this is not typically the case,
even for large durables such as vehicles. Second, we want to distinguish the role of durable goods from that of the
housing stock.
6This way of modeling renting and owning is a simplification. One could think of this as a reduced form way of
capturing life-cycle considerations which are not present in this class of model.
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Housing utility (services) can be derived from housing owned or rented. Let ht ∈
R+ be the housing stock owned, s−t ∈ R+ the housing rented to others, and s+t ∈ R+ the
housing stock rented from others. Housing services are then given by
h˜t,i = ht,i − s−t,i + γis+t,i i ∈ {PH, IHm, IHr} (B.27)
with γ ∈ [0, 1) capturing different reasons why households might preference to own
rather than to rent.
Crucially, γ is household specific: 0 < γIHm = γPH < γIHr = 1. This means that PH
and IHm derive a higher marginal utility from their housing stock that is not rented
out, ht,i − s−t,i, than from the housing stock that they may rent from others, s+t . For
IHr, on the other hand, the marginal utility is equal whether its owned or rented. All
households face an individual housing feasibility constraint
ht,i − s−t,i ≥ 0 (B.28)
meaning that they cannot rent out more than they currently own, ht,i, and they cannot
sub-let.7
Households also face a quadratic adjustment cost when adjusting the housing stock,
given by
ξh,t = φh
(
∆ht
ht−1
)2
qht ht−1
2
(B.29)
The impatient household (whether borrower or mortgagor/renter in equilibrium)
solves the following optimization problem
WIH = max{Ct,Dt,Vt+1,ht,s+t ,s−t ,Lt,bt+1,mt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
βi
)t
u
(
xt, h˜t, Lt
)
7 Note that restriction (B.28) together with the non-negativity of s−t,i already imply that ht,i ≥ 0.
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subject to (Lagrange multipliers in parenthesis)
Ct + q
d
tDt + q
h
t ∆ht +
bt
pic,t
+ ξh,t = wtLt + Stmt + pt
(
s−t − s+t
)
+ Tt (λt)
Vt+1 =
(
1− Φ
(
Dt
Dt−1
))
Dt + (1− δ)Vt (λtqvt )
h˜t =
ht,i + γs+t,i − s−t,i if i = IHmht,i + s+t,i − s−t,i if i = IHr
(
λ3t
)
ht − s−t ≥ 0
(
λ5t
)
s−t ≥ 0
(
λ6t
)
s+t ≥ 0
(
λ7t
)
bt+1 = mt + ρ
bt
pit
(
λ8t
)
Stbt+1 ≤ φE
(
qh,t+1htpit+1
Rt
)
(λBC,t)
The patient household solves
WPH = max{Ct,Dt,Vt+1,ht,s+t ,s−t ,Lt,bt+1,mt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
βH
)t
u
(
xt, h˜t, Lt
)
subject to (Lagrange multipliers in parenthesis)
Ct + q
d
tDt + q
h
t ∆ht −
bt
pic,t
+ ξh,t = wtLt − Stmt + pt
(
s−t − s+t
)
+ ΠC,t + ΠD,c + Tt (λt)
Vt+1 =
(
1− Φ
(
Dt
Dt−1
))
Dt + (1− δ)Vt (λtqvt )
h˜t = ht,i + γs
+
t,i − s−t,i
(
λ3t
)
ht − s−t ≥ 0
(
λ5t
)
s−t ≥ 0
(
λ6t
)
s+t ≥ 0
(
λ7t
)
bt+1 = mt + ρ
bt
pit
(
λ8t
)
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Market clearing
Denote with ′′ (double tilde) the variables of IHr and with ′ (single tilde) the ones for
PH . Clearing of markets implies
YC,t = ωIH (Ct + ξh,t) + ωPH
(
C
′
t + ξ
′
h,t
)
+ (1− ωIH − ωPH)C ′′t +
ϑC
2
(piC,t − 1)2 YCt
YD,t = ωIHDt + ωPHD
′
t + (1− ωIH − ωPH)D
′′
t +
ϑD
2
(piD,t − 1)2 YDt
LC,t + LD,t = ωIHLt + ωPHL
′
t + (1− ωIH − ωPH)L
′′
t
0 = ωIHmt + ωPHm
′
t + (1− ωIH − ωPH)m
′′
t
H = ωIHht + ωPHh
′
t + (1− ωIH − ωPH)h
′′
t
s+t + s
+′
t + s
+′′
t = s
−
t + s
−′
t + s
−′′
t
Housing tenure in steady state
In the next subsection B.5.9 we show that, for an owning-preference threshold γ¯ such
that γ < γ¯, there exists zero-inflation steady state (SSpi=0) in which:8
1. The PHs own housing stock (h′ > 0) and rent out part of it (s−′ > 0).
2. Impatient renters do not own housing (h′′ = 0) which means they cannot: (i)
borrow (b′′ = 0), or (ii) rent to others (s−′′ = 0). They instead rent housing services
(s+′′ > 0).
3. The IHms own housing (h > 0) but do not participate in the rental market (s− =
s+ = 0).
Parameterization
In Table B.3, we report the values used for the collateral constraint model which are,
in most cases, the same as in Table B.2. The steady state loan-to-value ratio, φ, (which
did not appear in the previous parameterization) is set to 75%, consistent with the
sample averages reported by Besley, Meads, and Surico, 2013. On the other hand, the
shares of mortgagors and outright owners mimic the average values we observe in the
FES/LCSF and CEX.
8 We assume that the conditions above also hold for states “near the SS". This is equivalent to requiring that the
wedge between the rental rate pt and the house price qht not to diverge “too much” from its value in the steady state
SSpi=0. The assumption of no change in housing tenure following a monetary policy shock is, however, consistent
with the results presented in Section 4.2.
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Parameter Description Value
θ/(1− θ) elasticity of substitution between ND and D stock 4
σ elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.5
βL, βH discount factor: mortgagors, outright owners 0.95, 0.99
1/(η − 1) Frisch elasticity of labor supply 2
µ habits parameter 0.5
j housing demand shifter 0.468
δ depreciation rate durables 0.025
εC,D elasticity of varieties 4
ϑC,D cost of adjusting prices 150
rpi, rY , rR Taylor rule: CPI, output, smoothing 1.5,.05,.6
ωIH share of mortgagors 45%
ωPH share outright owners 35%
m max LTV 0.75
Ω¯/Y debt to expenditure ratio 1.8
1/(1− βHρ) Benchmark long term debt duration 1 year
TABLE B.3: Calibration of the model.
Renters
Figure B.11 presents the impulse response functions for a 25bp cut in interest rates for
non-durable consumption, durable expenditure and income of renters in the collateral
constraint model. These responses are the analogue of the ones presented in Figure
2.10. Two interesting features are worth discussing. First, the renters’ responses are
relatively large, being only slightly smaller than those of mortgagors but larger than
those of outright owners. The fact that renters’ consumption responds significantly is
intuitive given that these households are constrained and wealth-poor in our model.
Second, the renters’ responses for non-durable consumption and for durable ex-
penditure vary with the duration of mortgage contracts. While this may seem less
intuitive, it can be understood by looking at the response of labor income. To the ex-
tent that different values for ρ produce different aggregate demand effects, these will
also affect the renters’ income.
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FIGURE B.11: Response of non-durable consumption, durable expenditure and
income in a model with a collateral constraint: results for renters. Duration refers
to the effective duration of fixed-rate mortgage contracts in the aggregate econ-
omy which, on average, is about one year for the U.K. and around 7 years for the
U.S.
B.5.6 Log-Linearized Conditions: Exogenous Credit Limit
In this subsection, we present all the equilibrium conditions (budget constraints, opti-
mality conditions and market clearing) log-linearized around a 0-inflation (in both sec-
tors) SS. We want the AC for durables, Φ(·), to have the following properties: Φ(SS) =
Φ
′
(SS) = 0 and Φ′′(SS) > 0.
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Aggregate Demand
YC
Y
YˆC,t = ωIH
C
Y
Cˆt + ωPH
C
′
Y
Cˆ
′
t (B.30)
YD
Y
YˆD,t = ωIH
D
Y
Dˆt + ωPH
D
′
Y
Dˆ
′
t (B.31)
LC
Y
LˆC,t +
LD
Y
LˆD,t = ωIH
L
Y
Lˆt + ωPH
L
′
Y
Lˆ
′
t (B.32)
0 = bˆt + bˆ
′
t (B.33)
λˆt = (1− θ)
(
Vˆt − Cˆt
)
+
σ
1− βLµEt
(
µβLxˆt+1 − xˆt
)
(B.34)
λˆ
′
t = (1− θ)
(
Vˆ
′
t − Cˆ
′
t
)
+
σ
1− βHµEt
(
µβH xˆ
′
t+1 − xˆ
′
t
)
(B.35)
xˆt =
θ
1− µ
(
Cˆt − µCˆt−1
)
+
1− θ
1− µ
(
Vˆt − µVˆt−1
)
(B.36)
xˆ
′
t =
θ
1− µ
(
Cˆ
′
t − µCˆ
′
t−1
)
+
1− θ
1− µ
(
Vˆ
′
t − µVˆ
′
t−1
)
(B.37)
Vˆt+1 = δDˆt + (1− δ)Vˆt (B.38)
Vˆ
′
t+1 = δDˆ
′
t + (1− δ)Vˆ
′
t (B.39)
λˆt + qˆ
v
t =
(
1− βL(1− δ))Et (Cˆt+1 − Vˆt+1)+ (1− δ)βLEt (qˆvt+1)+ Et (λˆt+1)(B.40)
λˆ
′
t + qˆ
v
t =
(
1− βH(1− δ))Et (Cˆ ′t+1 − Vˆ ′t+1)+ (1− δ)βHEt (qˆvt+1)+ Et (λˆ′t+1)(B.41)
qˆdt
Φ′′
=
qˆvt
Φ′′
+ Dˆt−1 + βLEt
(
Dˆt+1
)
− (1 + βL)Dˆt (B.42)
qˆdt
Φ′′
=
qˆvt
Φ′′
+ Dˆ
′
t−1 + β
LEt
(
Dˆ
′
t+1
)
− (1 + βL)Dˆ′t (B.43)
λˆt =
βL
βH
Et
(
λˆt+1 + β
LρSˆt+1 − Sˆt − pˆiC,t+1
)
+
(
1− β
L
βH
)(
λˆCC,t + Rˆt
)
(B.44)
λˆ
′
t = Et
(
λˆ
′
t+1 + β
′
ρSˆt+1 − Sˆt − pˆiC,t+1
)
(B.45)
Housing and Renting Markets
λˆt + qˆ
h
t + φh∆hˆt =
j
λqhh
(
jˆt − hˆt
)
+ Et
(
βL
(
λˆt+1 + qˆ
h
t+1 + φh∆hˆt+1
)
+ (B.46)
λˆ
′
t + qˆ
h
t + φh∆hˆ
′
t =
j
λqhh′
(
jˆt − hˆ′t
)
+ Et
(
βH
(
λˆ
′
t+1 + qˆ
h
t+1 + φh∆hˆ
′
t+1
))
(B.47)
0 = ωIH
qhh
Y
hˆt + ωPH
qhh
′
Y
hˆ
′
t (B.48)
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Borrowing constraint and Evolution of Debt
Sˆt + bˆt = −
(
Rˆt − Et (pˆic,t+1)
)
(B.49)
bˆt = (1− ρ)mˆt + ρ
(
bˆt−1 − pˆic,t
)
(B.50)
Aggregate Supply
YˆC,t = LˆC,t (B.51)
YˆD,t = LˆD,t (B.52)
ΠC
Y
ΠˆC,t =
LC
Y
LˆC,t − LC
Y
(
wˆt + LˆC,t
)
(B.53)
ΠD
Y
ΠˆD,t = q
dLD
Y
(
qˆdt + LˆD,t
)
− wLD
Y
(
wˆt + LˆD,t
)
(B.54)
(η − 1)Lˆt = λˆt + wˆt (B.55)
(η
′ − 1)Lˆ′t = λˆ
′
t + wˆt (B.56)
pˆiC,t = β
′
Et (pˆiC,t+1) +
εC − 1
ϑC
mˆcC,t (B.57)
pˆiD,t = β
′
Et (pˆiD,t+1) +
εD − 1
ϑD
mˆcD,t (B.58)
ˆmcC,t = wˆt (B.59)
mˆcD,t =
εD − 1
εD
(
wˆt − qˆdt
)
(B.60)
Evolution of Variables and Budget Constraints
Vˆt+1 = δDˆt + (1− δ)Vˆt (B.61)
Vˆ
′
t+1 = δDˆ
′
t + (1− δ)Vˆ
′
t (B.62)
S(1− ρ)b
Y
(
Sˆt + mˆt
)
=
C
Y
Cˆt +
qdD
Y
(
Dˆt + qˆ
d
t
)
+
qhh
Y
∆hˆt +
b
Y
(
bˆt−1 − pˆiC,t
)
−
−wL
Y
(
wˆt + Lˆt
)
(B.63)
b
′
Y
(
bˆ
′
t−1 − pˆiC,t
)
=
C
′
Y
Cˆ
′
t +
qdD
′
Y
(
Dˆ
′
t + qˆ
d
t
)
+
qhh
′
Y
∆hˆ
′
t +
S(1− ρ)b′
Y
(
Sˆt + mˆ
′
t
)
−
−wL
′
Y
(
wˆt + Lˆ
′
t
)
− ΠC
Y
ΠˆC,t − ΠD
Y
ΠˆD,t (B.64)
Monetary Policy
Rˆt = (1− rR) (1 + rpi) pˆit−1 + rY (1− rR) Yˆt−1 + rRRˆt−1 + ˆR,t + ρˆR,t−1 (B.65)
Yˆt = αY YˆC,t + (1− αY ) YˆD,t (B.66)
pˆit = αpipˆiC,t + (1− αpi) pˆiD,t (B.67)
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B.5.7 Log-Linearized Conditions: Collateral Constraint Model
In what follows, we linearize the main equilibrium conditions around a 0-inflation (in
both sectors) steady state (SSpi=0) in which:
1. PH own housing stock (h′ > 0) and rents out part of it (s−′ > 0)
2. Impatient renters do not own housing (h′′ = 0) which means they cannot: (i)
borrow (b′′ = 0), and (ii) rent to others (s−′′ = 0). They instead rent housing
services from others (s+′′ > 0)
3. IHm own housing (h > 0) but do not participate in the renting market (s− = s+ =
0)
In such a SS, therefore, the following must hold:
1. λ5′ = λ6′ = 0; λ7′ ≥ 0
2. λ5′′ ≥ 0; λ6′′ ≥ 0; λ7′′ = 0
3. λ5 = 0; λ6 ≥ 0; λ7 ≥ 0
In the next section, we show that such SS exists for an owning-preference γ < γ¯.
We assume that the conditions above also hold for states "near the SS". This is not a
trivial assumption. In escence, this assumption requires the wedge between the rental
rate pt and the house price qht not to diverge “too much” from its value in the steady
state SSpi=0 described above. As shown below, the wedge in such steady state,
p =
(
1− β ′
)
qh
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Aggregate Demand
YC
Y
YˆC,t = ωIH
C
Y
Cˆt + ωPH
C
′
Y
Cˆ
′
t + (1− ωIH − ωPH)
C
′′
Y
Cˆ
′′
t (B.68)
YD
Y
YˆD,t = ωIH
D
Y
Dˆt + ωPH
D
′
Y
Dˆ
′
t + (1− ωIH − ωPH)
D
′′
Y
Dˆ
′′
t (B.69)
LC
Y
LˆC,t +
LD
Y
LˆD,t = ωIH
L
Y
Lˆt + ωPH
L
′
Y
Lˆ
′
t + (1− ωIH − ωPH)
L
′′
Y
Lˆ
′′
t (B.70)
0 = bˆt + bˆ
′
t (B.71)
λˆt = (1− θ)
(
Vˆt − Cˆt
)
+
σ
1− βLµEt
(
µβLxˆt+1 − xˆt
)
(B.72)
λˆ
′
t = (1− θ)
(
Vˆ
′
t − Cˆ
′
t
)
+
σ
1− βHµEt
(
µβH xˆ
′
t+1 − xˆ
′
t
)
(B.73)
λˆ
′′
t = (1− θ)
(
Vˆ
′′
t − Cˆ
′′
t
)
+
σ
1− βLµEt
(
µβLxˆ
′′
t+1 − xˆ
′′
t
)
(B.74)
xˆt =
θ
1− µ
(
Cˆt − µCˆt−1
)
+
1− θ
1− µ
(
Vˆt − µVˆt−1
)
(B.75)
xˆ
′
t =
θ
1− µ
(
Cˆ
′
t − µCˆ
′
t−1
)
+
1− θ
1− µ
(
Vˆ
′
t − µVˆ
′
t−1
)
(B.76)
xˆ
′′
t =
θ
1− µ
(
Cˆ
′′
t − µCˆ
′′
t−1
)
+
1− θ
1− µ
(
Vˆ
′′
t − µVˆ
′′
t−1
)
(B.77)
Vˆt+1 = δDˆt + (1− δ)Vˆt (B.78)
Vˆ
′
t+1 = δDˆ
′
t + (1− δ)Vˆ
′
t (B.79)
Vˆ
′′
t+1 = δDˆ
′′
t + (1− δ)Vˆ
′′
t (B.80)
λˆt + qˆ
v
t =
(
1− βL(1− δ))Et (Cˆt+1 − Vˆt+1)+ (1− δ)βLEt (qˆvt+1)+ Et (λˆt+1)(B.81)
λˆ
′
t + qˆ
v
t =
(
1− βH(1− δ))Et (Cˆ ′t+1 − Vˆ ′t+1)+ (1− δ)βHEt (qˆvt+1)+ Et (λˆ′t+1)(B.82)
λˆ
′′
t + qˆ
v
t =
(
1− βL(1− δ))Et (Cˆ ′′t+1 − Vˆ ′′t+1)+ (1− δ)βLEt (qˆvt+1)+ Et (λˆ′′t+1)(B.83)
qˆdt
Φ′′
=
qˆvt
Φ′′
+ Dˆt−1 + βLEt
(
Dˆt+1
)
− (1 + βL)Dˆt (B.84)
qˆdt
Φ′′
=
qˆvt
Φ′′
+ Dˆ
′
t−1 + β
HEt
(
Dˆ
′
t+1
)
− (1 + βH)Dˆ′t (B.85)
qˆdt
Φ′′
=
qˆvt
Φ′′
+ Dˆ
′′
t−1 + β
LEt
(
Dˆ
′′
t+1
)
− (1 + βL)Dˆ′′t (B.86)
λˆt =
βL
βH
Et
(
λˆt+1 + β
HρSˆt+1 − Sˆt − pˆiC,t+1
)
+
(
1− β
L
βH
)(
λˆCC,t + Rˆt
)
(B.87)
λˆ
′
t = Et
(
λˆ
′
t+1 + β
HρSˆt+1 − Sˆt − pˆiC,t+1
)
(B.88)
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Housing and Renting Markets
λˆt + qˆ
h
t + φh∆hˆt =
j
λqhh
(
jˆt − hˆt
)
+ Et
(
βL
(
λˆt+1 + qˆ
h
t+1 + φh∆hˆt+1
)
+ (B.89)
+
(
βH − βL)φ(λˆCC,t + qˆht+1 + pˆiC,t+1)
)
λˆ
′′
t + qˆ
h
t =
j
λ′′qhs+′′
(
jˆt − sˆ+′′t
)
+ Et
(
βL
(
λˆ
′′
t+1 + qˆ
h
t+1
)
+ (B.90)
+
(
βH − βL)φ(λˆ′′CC,t + qˆht+1 + pˆiC,t+1)
)
+
+
((
1− βL − (βH − βL)φ)− j
λ′′qhs+′′
)
λ˜5
′′
λˆ
′
t + qˆ
h
t + φh∆hˆ
′
t =
j
λqh(h′ − s−′)
(
jˆt − hˆ′t + sˆ−
′
t
)
+ Et
(
βH
(
λˆ
′
t+1 + qˆ
h
t+1 + φh∆hˆ
′
t+1
))
(B.91)
pˆt + λˆt =
jγ
(1− βH)λqhh
(
jˆt − hˆt
)
+
(
1− jγ
(1− βH)λqhh
)
λˆ7t (B.92)
pˆt + λˆt =
j
(1− βH)λqhh
(
jˆt − hˆt
)
−
(
1− j
(1− βH)λqhh
)
λˆ6t (B.93)
pˆt + λˆ
′′
t =
j
(1− βH)λ′′qhs+′′
(
jˆt − sˆ+′′t
)
(B.94)
pˆt + λˆ
′
t =
jγ
(1− βH)λ′qh(h′ − s−′)
(
jˆt − hˆ′t + sˆ−
′
t
)
+ (B.95)
+
(
1− jγ
(1− βH)λ′qh(h′ − s−′)
)
λˆ7
′
t
pˆt + λˆ
′
t =
j
(1− βH)λ′qh(h′ − s−′)
(
jˆt − hˆ′t + sˆ−
′
t
)
(B.96)
0 = ωIH
qhh
Y
hˆt + ωPH
qhh
′
Y
hˆ
′
t (B.97)
sˆ+
′′
t = sˆ
−′
t (B.98)
Borrowing constraint and Evolution of Debt
Sˆt + bˆt+1 = Et
(
qˆht+1
)
+ hˆt − rˆrt (B.99)
rˆrt = Rˆt − Et (pˆiC,t+1) (B.100)
bˆt+1 = (1− ρ)mˆt + ρ
(
bˆt − pˆic,t
)
(B.101)
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Aggregate Supply
YˆC,t = LˆC,t (B.102)
YˆD,t = LˆD,t (B.103)
ΠC
Y
ΠˆC,t =
LC
Y
LˆC,t − LC
Y
(
wˆt + LˆC,t
)
(B.104)
ΠD
Y
ΠˆD,t = q
dLD
Y
(
qˆdt + LˆD,t
)
− wLD
Y
(
wˆt + LˆD,t
)
(B.105)
(η − 1)Lˆt = λˆt + wˆt (B.106)
(η
′ − 1)Lˆ′t = λˆ
′
t + wˆt (B.107)
(η
′′ − 1)Lˆ′′t = λˆ
′′
t + wˆt (B.108)
pˆiC,t = β
HEt (pˆiC,t+1) +
εC − 1
ϑC
mˆcC,t (B.109)
pˆiD,t = β
HEt (pˆiD,t+1) +
εD − 1
ϑD
mˆcD,t (B.110)
ˆmcC,t = wˆt (B.111)
mˆcD,t =
εD − 1
εD
(
wˆt − qˆdt
)
(B.112)
Evolution of Variables and Budget Constraints
Vˆt+1 = δDˆt + (1− δ)Vˆt (B.113)
Vˆ
′
t+1 = δDˆ
′
t + (1− δ)Vˆ
′
t (B.114)
Vˆ
′′
t+1 = δDˆ
′′
t + (1− δ)Vˆ
′′
t (B.115)
S(1− ρ)b
Y
(
Sˆt + lˆt
)
=
C
Y
Cˆt +
qdD
Y
(
Dˆt + qˆ
d
t
)
+
qhh
Y
∆hˆt +
b
Y
(
bˆt−1 − pˆiC,t
)
− wL
Y
(
wˆt + Lˆt
)
(B.116)
b
′
Y
(
bˆ
′
t−1 − pˆiC,t
)
=
C
′
Y
Cˆ
′
t +
qdD
′
Y
(
Dˆ
′
t + qˆ
d
t
)
+
qhh
′
Y
∆hˆ
′
t +
S(1− ρ)b′
Y
(
Sˆt + lˆ
′
t
)
− (B.117)
−wL
′
Y
(
wˆt + Lˆ
′
t
)
− (1− β
′
)qhs−
′
Y
(
pˆt + sˆ
−′
t
)
− ΠC
Y
ΠˆC,t − ΠD
Y
ΠˆD,t
0 =
C
′′
Y
Cˆ
′′
+
qdD
′′
Y
(
Dˆ
′′
t + qˆ
d
t
)
+
(1− β ′)qhs+′′
Y
(
pˆt + sˆ
+′′
t
)
− wL
′′
Y
(
wˆt + Lˆ
′′
t
)
(B.118)
Monetary Policy
Rˆt = (1− rR) (1 + rpi) pˆit−1 + rY (1− rR) Yˆt−1 + rRRˆt−1 + ˆR,t + ρˆR,t−1 (B.119)
Yˆt = αY YˆC,t + (1− αY ) YˆD,t (B.120)
pˆit = αpipˆiC,t + (1− αpi) pˆiD,t (B.121)
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B.5.8 Relevant Steady State Ratios
Assuming zero inflation in both sectors, we can characterize some of the steady state
(SS) ratios, quantities and relative prices.
Relative (household) consumption CD
From the first order condition for durable stock of household i ∈ {IH, PH, Renter}
we have that
λiqv = βiλi
(
1− θ
θ
C
V
+ (1− δ)qv
)
(B.122)
In addition, we can compute the durable investment in steady state from the law of
movement for the durable stock:
V =
D
δ
⇔ V δ = D
Finally, using the FOC for durable investemtn in steady state, we have
qv = qd =
εD − 1
εD
εC
εC − 1
where the second equality holds in a zero inflation, flexible-prices SS. We can then
write the retlative consumption of durables as
C
D
=
θ
1− θ
εC
εD
(εD − 1)
(εC − 1)
(1− βi(1− δ))
βiδ
(B.123)
Note that (B.123) is independent of credit frictions. This is true because we are assum-
ing that durables cannot be used as collateral for borrowing. Given that preferences are
homothetic, C
D
is also independent of income.
Hours worked L
From the labor-consumption decision in SS
λi
εC − 1
εC
= Lη
i−1 (B.124)
while from the optimality condition for non durable consumption we have that
λi = θ(1− βiµ)
(
C
D
δ
)θ−1
x−σ (B.125)
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Combining (B.123), (B.124) and (B.125), and for given values of εC , εD, θ, µ, δ, βi, σ
we can back up the SS hours worked as a function of the elasticity ηi and the consump-
tion basket x:
L =
(
εC − 1
εC
θ(1− βiµ)
(
C
D
δ
)θ−1
x−σ
) 1
ηi−1
(B.126)
Housing value: qvh
For the impatient household (IH), from the housing-consumption optimality condition
and given that ∂ξh
∂h
|SS = 0 , we have
λqh =
j
h
+ β
(
λqh +mλqh(β
′ − β)
)
which implies
qhh =
j
λ (1− β(1 +m(β ′ − β))) (B.127)
For patient hpuseholds (PH) we have
λqh =
j
h′
+ β
′
(
λ
′
qh
)
and therefore
qhh
′
=
j
λ′ (1− β ′) (B.128)
Debt: b
Given that the borrowing constraint binds in a steady state equilibrium,we have
b = mβ
′
qhh
= mβ
′ j
λ (1− β(1 +m(β ′ − β))) (B.129)
Durable Investment over Output: DY
From the durable intertemporal condition of each household i ∈ {IH, PH, Renters} ,
and using the fact that in SS qd = qv, we have
λiqd = βi
(
λi
1− θ
θ
Ci
Di
δ + (1− δ)qd
)
from where we can derive
qdDi
Y
=
Ci
Y
(
βδ(1− θ)λi
θ (λi − β(1− δ))
)
(B.130)
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Consumption to Output share: CY
For the impatient household, the budget in SS reads
C
Y
+
qdD
Y
+
(1− β ′
β ′
) b
Y
=
wL
Y
(B.131)
and, similarly, for the renters we have
C
′′
Y
+
qdD
′′
Y
=
wL
′′
Y
(B.132)
from which we can solve for C
Y
C
′′
Y
.
For the patient hoseholds we have
C
Y
+
qdD
Y
+
(1− β ′
β ′
) b
Y
=
wL
Y
+
ΠC
Y
+
ΠD
Y
(B.133)
whcih means we also need to solve fo ΠC
Y
and ΠD
Y
. In SS,
ΠC
Y
=
LC
Y
(1− w) (B.134)
ΠD
Y
=
LD
Y
(
qd − w) (B.135)
=
(
1− LC
Y
) (
qd − w)
Since we know how to solve for C
Y
and C
′′
Y
, we can write
LC
Y
= ωIH
C
Y
+ ωPH
C
′
Y
+ (1− ωIH − ωPH) C
′′
Y
(B.136)
which means that both (B.134) and (B.135) can be written as a function of C
′
Y
and deep
parameters. From the budget constraint (B.133) we can then solve for C
′
Y
.
Output Shares: YCY and
YD
Y
Once we have solved for C
Y
, C
′
Y
and C
′
Y
we can use eq. (B.136) to find LC
Y
and
LD
Y
= 1− LC
Y
B.5.9 Proof of "Separation" In Steady State
Here we show that there is a steady state (SS) in which:
1. PH own housing stock (h′ > 0) and rents out part of it (s−′ > 0)
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2. Impatient renters do not own housing (h′′ = 0) which means they cannot: (i)
borrow (b′′ = 0), and (ii) rent to others (s−′′ = 0). They instead rent housing
services from others (s+′′ > 0)
3. IHm own housing (h > 0) but do not participate in the renting market (s− = s+ =
0)
Intuition of the Proof:
At the SS interest rate R = 1
β′ , both IHm and IHr households want to borrow in
order to shift consumption from the future to the current period. To do so, due to
frictions in credit markets, they need to own housing stock to use as collateral. A
crucial element is the LTV being <1, or the “haircut” on the value of the collateral
being >0. This will imply that an increase in the amount of collateralizable asset (in
this case housing stock) they own, translates into a less than proportional increase in
the resources available to borrow. The SS relative rental rate p
qh
= 1 − β ′ (determined
such that assets have the same returns) implies that, given the perfect substituability
between renting and owning in terms of utility, a positive downpayment (m<1) will
make it suboptimal for the IHr to own (i.e. invest) in any amount housing stock. For the
IHm, however, a sufficiently high “bias for owning”, reflected in a sufficiently low γ,
implies they can overcome the relatively high q
h
p
by buying a house “smaller” than the
one they would otherwise rent, and using it to get a collateralized loan (a mortgage).
What the above means is that the collateral value of a house per se is not enough in-
centive for the impatient households to invest / buy a house. This is true more in gen-
eral in this kind of set-ups where the assets are priced by the patient (unconstrained)
guys, including Iacoviello (2005). What we are adding in our set-up is the assumption
that, for some households, the services provided by a rented house are less valuable in
terms of utility than the services provided by an own house.
The arguments above make use of the fact that owning a house and renting are
substitutes in terms of the utility generated. This implies that an increase of ∆ units
of housing stock h generates the same increase in utility as an increase of 1
γ
∆ units of
rented housing s+ (with γ = 1 in the case of IHr households):
u
(
h+ ∆ + γs+ − s−) = u(h+ γ (s+ + 1
γ
∆
)
− s−
)
(B.137)
The idea of the proof is to show that, in a SS equilibrium with active mortgage
markets, the relative rental rate needs to be
p = qh
(
1− β’)
in which case the PH will be indifferent between lending and buy-to-rent, and under
which IHm will want to own for a sufficiently low γ. For p > qh
(
1− β ′), the PH would
prefere not to lend funds through the mortgage martket, but to buy-to-let as much as
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possible. For such relative prices, we will see that the return of a buy-to-let strategy
is such that Rbuy−to−let > R . This would imply a collapse of the mortgage market
and unbounded consumption growth, unless it bring the housing price up and back to
p = qh
(
1− β ′). For p < qh (1− β ′), it will be the case that neither PH nor IHm will be
willing to engage in buy-to-let, and therefore no household will be willing to rent to
IHr.
Patient Households’ Problem
Recall the relevant optimality conditions of the PH for the housing and renting vari-
ables, asuming for the time being that there are no adjustment cost to changing housin
λ
′
tq
h
t =
jt
h˜
′
t
+ β
′
Et
(
λ
′
t+1q
h
t+1
)
+ λ5
′
t
ptλ
′
t =
jtγ
h˜
′
t
+ λ7
′
t
ptλ
′
t =
jt
h˜
′
t
+ λ5
′
t − λ6
′
t
In SS these conditions imply
λ
′
q
(
1− β ′
)
=
j
h˜′
+ λ5
′
(B.138)
λ
′
p =
jγ
h˜′
+ λ7
′
(B.139)
λ
′
p =
j
h˜′
+ λ5
′ − λ6′ (B.140)
I will now consider different cases regarding the choice of (h, s+, s−) in SS, and analyze
their pricing and market clearing implications.
• Case I: Assume s+′ = 0
This implies that, due to Inada conditions, h′−s−′ > 0 and therefore λ5′ = 0, λ7′ ≥
0 from the KT conditions. Now, we have two possibilities:
– λ6′ = 0: From equations (B.138) and (B.140) we then have that
p = qh
(
1− β ′
)
(B.141)
while the KT conditions require s−′ ≥ 0. Is the relative rental rate (B.141)
consistent with s+′ = 0 as assume above? To check this, assume that, while
in SS, the household switches, once and for all, from 1 unit of rented housing
to γ units of owned housing that are not rented out to other households, so
that housing utility u
(
h˜
′
)
remains the same. The resource cost at t is simply
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γqh while the resource benefit at t and in the future are the rents not payed,
qh
(
1− β ′). The net present value (NPV), or net resource gain is
NPV = qh
(
1− β ′
)
− γqh + β ′
∞∑
τ=0
β
′
qh
(
1− β ′
)
= qh (1− γ)
which is >0 for any value of γ.
What are the choices of IHr and IHm households given the relative prices
in (B.141)? Consider the case of the IHm (the case of IHr is similar but with
γ = 1). As above, sssume that the household switches, once and for all, from
1 unit of rented housing to γ units of owned housing that are not rented out
to other households, so that housing utility u
(
h˜
′
)
remains the same. The
resource cost at t is γqh while the resource benefit at t is the rent not payed,
qh
(
1− β ′) plus the extra amount the household can (and will, given the bind-
ing borrowing constraint) borrow, ∆b = β ′mγqh . The net resource gain in
the current period is then
∆Wt = q
h
(
1− β ′
)
+ β
′
mγqh − γqh (B.142)
From t+1 onwards, assuming nothing else changes, the household rolls over
the debt and avoids paying rents. Therefore, the discounted value of all fu-
ture gains starting in t+ 1 is
∆Wτ>0 = β
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
(
qh
(
1− β ′
)
− 1− β
′
β ′
β
′
mγqh
)
=
β
1− β q
h
(
1− β ′
)
(1−mγ) (B.143)
Note that ∆W > 0 for γ < 1,m < 1. The net resouce change at t is positive if
γ¯t ≡ 1− β
′
1− β ′m > γ
while the net (present value) of resource change is positive if
NPV ≡ ∆Wt + ∆Wτ>0 > 0
⇔
γ¯ ≡ 1− β
′
(1− β ′m) (1− β) +mβ (1− β ′) > γ
In other words, for γ < γ¯, IHm households prefere to buy houses with a
mortgage, while it is optimal for IHr households to rent, since for them, γ =
1.
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At the relative price q
h
p
implied by (B.141), a PH household is indifferent be-
tween buying an extra unit of housing stock to rent out to other other house-
holds, and not doing so (or lending it through the mortgage market). To see
this, consider the following investment strategy: at t, buy one unit of hous-
ing at price qh, and then rent it out. At t + 1, sell that unit at price qh. Given
that the PH is not constrained in her borrowing capacity, she will not use this
extra unit of housing as collateral to borrow. The net present value of this
strategy in SS (recall again that the stochastic discount factor in SS is 1)
NPV = qh
(
1− β ′
)
− qh + β ′qh (B.144)
= 0
This is consistent with the condition λ6′ = 0 and s−′ ≥ 0.
Is this investmet strategy optimal for a constrained IHm? Since the IHm
household uses the housing stock as collateral for borrowing more today, the
NPV of a buy-to-let strategy would be
NPVinvest = q
h
(
1− β ′
)
− qh + β ′mq + β
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
(
qh
(
1− β ′
)
−mqh
(
1− β ′
))
= qh (1−m) β − β
′
1− β < 0 (B.145)
since β < β ′ . Therefore, if p = qh
(
1− β ′), IHm households will not engage
in buy-to-let, and IHr can only rent from patient households. We have one
possible SS:{
h > 0, s− = s+ = 0
}
;
{
h
′
> 0, s−
′
> 0, s+
′
= 0
}
;
{
h
′′
= s−
′′
= 0, s+
′′
> 0
}
; p = qh
(
1− β ′
)
– λ6′ > 0: From the KT conditions, this implies s−′ = 0, and from eqs. (B.138)
and (B.140), we have that
p < qh
(
1− β ′
)
(B.146)
With this relative prices, IHr have even more incentives to rent. However,
since s−′ = 0, they can only rent from IHm households. The individual
feasibility condition (B.28) rules out sub-leting; therefore, if an IHm house-
hold rents to an IHr household, it has to do so from their stock of housing.
However, since a buy-to-let strategy, which keeps the utility from housing
constant, has a negative NPVinvest when p = qh
(
1− β ′) as shown in (B.145)
above, it will be more negative for p < qh
(
1− β ′). Therefore, this can not be
an equilibrium in SS.
• Case II: Assume s+′ > 0
This implies λ7′ = 0 from the KT conditions. Linearity within the housing utility
implies it cannot be optimal for a household to rent and buy at the same time.
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Therefore it must be either that: (i) h′ = s−′ > 0, in which case the PH buys-to-let,
or (ii) h′ = s−′ = 0. Lets consider these cases separately.
– h′ = s−′ > 0 : In this case we have λ6′ = 0. From equations (B.138) and
(B.139) it follows that
p = qh
(
1− β ′
)
(B.147)
Someone has to rent to the PH. However, as shown above in eq (B.145), when
p = qh
(
1− β ′) it is not optimal for an IH household to buy-to-let. This cannot
be an equilibrium.
– h′ = s−′ = 0: This means that the PH does not own houses, and rents from
other households. In this case we have λ5′ ≥ 0, λ6′ ≥ 0 and therefore
p ≤ γqh
(
1− β ′
)
(B.148)
Note, however, that the relative price q
h
p
implied by (B.148) is even bigger
than the one implied by (B.147). Therefore, we can conclude that it wont be
optimal for either IH household to rent to the PH households. This cannot
then be an equilibrium.
Impatient Households’ Problem
Equation (B.144) above showed that, when p = qh
(
1− β ′), a buy-to-let strategy for
the PH has NPV = 0. Note that the NVP of lemding 1 consumption unit through the
mortgage market is also 0 in SS:
NPV mortgage = −1 + β ′R
= −1 + β
′
β ′
= 0
This implies that for p > qh
(
1− β ′), a patient household in SS will prefer to invest all
resources in a buy-to-let strategy, since in that case we would have
Rbuy−to−let > R =
1
β ′
and we are assuming no uncertainty. This would imply that the mortgage market
would collaps unless house prices increase, since the PH would prefer to invest by a
buy-to-let strategy rather than by mortgage lending. Moreover, since Rbuy−to−letβ ′ > 1,
consumption would grow unboundedly. This cannot be a SS equilibrium that satisfies
a transversality condition.
We now proceed from the IHm households optimal conditions in order to check
whether there is an alternative SS.
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Without adjustment cost, the optimality conditions are
λtq
h
t =
jt
h˜t
+ βEt
(
λt+1q
h
t+1
)
+ Et
(
mλBC,tq
h
t+1pit+1
)
+ λ5t
ptλt =
jtγ
h˜t
+ λ7t
ptλt =
jt
h˜t
+ λ5t − λ6t
which in SS imply
λqh
(
1− β −m(β ′ − β)
)
=
j
h˜
+ λ5
λp =
jγ
h˜
+ λ7
λp =
j
h˜
+ λ5 − λ6
• Case I: Assume s+ = 0
This implies λ7 ≥ 0, and due to the inada conditions on u
(
h˜
)
, it must be that
h− s− > 0, implying λ5 = 0. Now we can consider two cases:
– s− > 0: then we have λ6 = 0 which implies
p = qh
(
1− β −m(β ′ − β)
)
(B.149)
It is easy to check that, for such relative rental rate, switching from one rental
unit to γ units of housing stock has a positive net resource gain for the IHm
for any value of γ < 1 , confirming indeed that it is optimal for the IHm to
have s+ = 0. For the IHr, the net resource gain (or NPV) of switching is
NPV = qh
(
1− β −m(β ′ − β)
)
− qh + β ′mqh
+
β
1− β
(
qh
(
1− β −m(β ′ − β)
)
− (1− β ′)mqh
)
= 0
implying they are indifferent between renting and buying.
As aargued above, however, the relaive prices in (B.149) imply that the PH
would prefere oto engage in buy-to-let rather than lend through the mort-
gage market, and her consumption would grow unboundedly since the re-
turn of such strategy would satisfy Rbuy−to−letβ ′ > 1. This cannot be a SS
equilibrium, since it would violate a transversality condition.
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– s− = 0: We then have s− = s+ = 0 and λ5 = 0, λ6, λ7 ≥ 0. From the FOCs in
SS, we have that this is an optimal choice if
p = qh
(
1− β −m(β ′ − β)
)
− λ
6
λ
≤ qh
(
1− β −m(β ′ − β)
)
and
p = γqh
(
1− β −m(β ′ − β)
)
+
λ7
λ
≥ γqh
(
1− β −m(β ′ − β)
)
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House Prices Home Equity Withdrawal
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FIGURE B.14: IRF for aggregate real house prices (first column) and home equity
withdrawal as a share of net housing wealth (second column). Grey areas are
bootstrapped 90% confidence bands. Top row: U.K. (1975-2007). Bottom row:
U.S. (1981-2007).
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C.1 Piecewise-linear Solution - Sketch of the Algorithm
The algorithm proposed in Guerrieri and Iacoviello, (2015b) builds on a non-linear
approximation to the equilibrium decision functions of the model in section 3.4. Define
and collect all the endogenous variables of the model in the vector Xt:
Xt ≡
({
Cit , D
i
t, V
i
t , h
i
t, b
i
t, L
i
t
}
i=IH,PH
, qht , q
d
t , wt, Rt, St
)
and the only shock, the monetary shock R,t in the vector ut ≡ R,t. Given the inequality
constraint (3.5), one can define two “regimes” in the model economy: one where the
constraint binds (the “reference” regime), and the other where it is slack. For each of
these regimes, the economy is linearized around the same point, namely the 0-sectorial
inflation steady state, in which the constraint binds. The linearized system in each case
can be written as
A1Et (Xt+1) + A0Xt + A−1Xt−1 +But = 0 (C.1)
if (3.5) binds, and
A∗1Et (Xt+1) + A
∗
0Xt + A
∗
−1Xt−1 +B
∗ut + C∗ = 0 (C.2)
if it is slack, where A1, A∗1, A0, A∗0, A−1, A∗−1, B,B∗, C∗ are conformable matrices (vec-
tors) and Et (·) is the mathematical conditional expectation operator. When there is no
shock, the economy is characterized by (C.1) and the solution can be written as1
Xt = PXt−1 +Qut (C.3)
with P,Q matrices of reduced form parameters. Then, starting from an initial state X0
where (3.5) binds, and given a shock u1 in t = 1 (no other shocks are expected to hit
the economy after t = 1 ), the algorithom uses a guess-and-verify strategy:
1. Guess the period T when the economy goes back to the reference regime , i.e. the
constraint (3.5) binds again permanently after the shock of size u1. Then for t ≥ T ,
Xt = PXt−1 from (C.3).
1Using any standard solution method for linear rational expectation systems.
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2. At T−1, the constraint is assumed slack, and therefore the solution can be written
by combining (C.2) and (C.3):
XT−1 = − (A∗1P + A∗0)−1 (XT−2 + C∗) (C.4)
3. One can iterate backwards up to t = 0, starting from (C.4) and using in each step
either (C.1) or (C.2) depending on the guess for the regime holding in each period.
The result is a time-varying decision rule.
4. Using the solution obtained in steps 1-3, compute a path forX , and check whether
the initial guess for the regimes holding in each period is verifyed. If it does, stop.
Otherwise, go back to step 1.
185
Bibliography
[1] Sachin Adlakha, Ramesh Johari, and Gabriel Y Weintraub. “Equilibria of Dynamic Games
with Many Players: Existence, Approximation, and Market Structure”. In: Management
Science April (2010), p. 71.
[2] Mark Aguiar and Mark Bils. “Has Consumption Inequality Mirrored Income Inequal-
ity?” In: American Economic Review 105.9 (2015), pp. 2725–2756.
[3] George A Akerlof. “The Market for ’Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism”. In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84.3 (1970), pp. 488–500.
[4] Aditya Aladangady. “Homeowner Balance Sheets and Monetary Policy”. In: FEDS work-
ing paper No. 2014-98, Board of Governors (2014).
[5] Susan Athey. “Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria
in Games of Incomplete Information”. In: Econometrica 69.4 (2001), pp. 861–89.
[6] O. Attanasio, J. Banks, and S. Tanner. “Asset holding and consumption volatility”. In:
Journal of Political Economy 110 (2002), pp. 771–792.
[7] Orazio P. Attanasio, Erich Battistin, and Andrew Leicester. From Micro to Macro, From Poor
to Rich: Consumption and Income in the UK and the US. Tech. rep. University of Michigan.
2006.
[8] Adrien Auclert. “Monetary Policy and the Redistribution Channel”. In: MIT mimeo (2015).
[9] Adrien Auclert. “Monetary Policy and the Redistribution Channel”. MIT. 2015.
[10] Ravi Bapna, Chrysanthos Dellarocas, and Sarah Rice. “Vertically Differentiated Simul-
taneous Vickrey Auctions: Theory and Experimental Evidence”. In: Management Science
58.7 (2010).
[11] Robert Barsky, Christopher House, and Miles Kimball. “Sticky-Price Models and Durable
Goods”. In: American Economic Review 97(3) (2007), pp. 984–998.
[12] Christian Bayer et al. “Precautionary Savings, Illiquid Assets, and the Aggregate Conse-
quences of Shocks to Household Income Risk”. In: Manuscript, University of Bonn (2015).
[13] David Berger et al. House Prices and Consumer Spending. Working Paper 21667. National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2015.
[14] Timothy Besley, Neil Meads, and Paolo Suirco. “Risk Heterogeneity and Credit Supply:
Evidence from the Mortgage Market”. In: NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Volume 27 (2012).
[15] Timothy Besley, Neil Meads, and Paolo Surico. “Risk Heterogeneity and Credit Sup-
ply: Evidence from the Mortgage Market”. In: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 27 (2013),
pp. 375–419.
186 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[16] Michael C. Best et al. Interest Rates, debt and Intertemporal Allocation: Evidence from Notched
Mortgage Contracts in the United Kingdom. Tech. rep. Bank of England Staff Working Paper
No. 543, 2015.
[17] Mike Brewer and Cormac O’Dea. Measuring living standards with income and consumption:
evidence from the UK. Tech. rep. 2012.
[18] M. Browning, A. Deaton, and M. Irish. “A profitable approach to labour supply and
commodity demands over the life-cycle”. In: Econometrica 53(3) (1985), pp. 503–44.
[19] Luis Cabral and Ali Hortaçsu. “The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Evidence from eBay”.
In: The Journal of Industrial Economics 58.1 (2010), pp. 54–78.
[20] Alessandro Calza, Tommaso Monacelli, and Livio Stracca. “Housing Finance and Mone-
tary Policy”. In: Journal of the European Economic Association 11 (2013), pp. 101–122.
[21] John. Campbell and Joao Cocco. “A Model of Mortgage Default”. In: The Journal of Finance
70.4 (2015), pp. 1495–1554.
[22] John Y. Campbell. “Mortgage Market Design”. In: Review of Finance 17.1 (2013), pp. 1–33.
eprint: http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/1/1.full.pdf+html.
[23] Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. “When Is the Government
Spending Multiplier Large?” In: Journal of Political Economy 119.1 (2011), pp. 78 –121.
[24] Lawrence J Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans. “The Effects of Monetary
Policy Shocks: Evidence from the Flow of Funds”. In: The Review of Economics and Statistics
78.1 (1996), pp. 16–34.
[25] Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans. “Monetary policy
shocks: What have we learned and to what end?” In: Handbook of Macroeconomics. Ed. by
J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford. Vol. 1A. North-Holland, 1999. Chap. 2, pp. 65–148.
[26] Lawrence J. Christiano, Mathias Trabandt, and Karl Walentin. “DSGE Models for Mon-
etary Policy Analysis”. In: Handbook of Monetary Economics. Ed. by Benjamin M. Fried-
man and Michael Woodford. Vol. 3. Handbook of Monetary Economics. Elsevier, 2010.
Chap. 7, pp. 285–367.
[27] James Cloyne, Clodomiro Ferreira, and Paolo Surico. Monetary Policy When HHousehold
Have Debt: New Evidence on the Transmission Mechanism. Working Paper 589. Bank of Eng-
land, 2016.
[28] James Cloyne and Patrick Huertgen. “The macroeconomic effects of monetary policy: a
new measure for the United Kingdom”. In: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
forthcoming (2015).
[29] James Cloyne and Paolo Surico. “Household Debt and the Dynamic Effects of Income
Tax Changes”. In: Review of Economic Studies forthcoming (2015).
[30] Olivier Coibion. “Are the Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks Big or Small?” In: American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4(2) (2012).
[31] Olivier Coibion et al. “Innocent Bystanders? Monetary Policy and Inequality in the U.S.”
In: NBER Working Papers 1817 (2012).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 187
[32] Martin W. Cripps, George J. Mailath, and Larry Samuelson. “Imperfect Monitoring and
Impermanent Reputations”. In: Econometrica 72.2 (2004), pp. 407–432.
[33] Thomas Crossley, Hamish Low, and Cornac O’Dea. Household Consumption Through Re-
cent Recessions. Tech. rep. 2012.
[34] Marco Di Maggio, Amir Kermani, and Rodney Ramcharan. “Monetary Policy Pass-Through:
Household Consumption and Voluntary Deleveraging”. In: Mimeo, Columbia University,
Berkeley University and Boards of Governors (2015).
[35] Matthias Doepke and Martin Schneider. “Inflation and the Redistribution of Nominal
Wealth”. In: Journal of Political Economy 114(6) (2006).
[36] Ulrich Doraszelski and Ariel Pakes. “A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in
IO”. In: ed. by Mark Armstrong and Robert Porter. Vol. 3. Handbook of Industrial Orga-
nization. Elsevier, 2007. Chap. 30, pp. 1887–1966.
[37] Gauti Eggertsson and Paul Krugman. “Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A
Fisher-Minsky-Koo Approach”. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (2012), pp. 1469–
513.
[38] Richard Ericson and Ariel Pakes. “Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for
Empirical Work”. English. In: The Review of Economic Studies 62.1 (1995), pp. 53–82.
[39] Juan F. Escobar. “Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition”.
In: Working paper. University of Chile (2011).
[40] Carlos Garriga, Finn Kydland, and Roman Sustek. “Mortgages and Monetary Policy”. In:
Centre for Macroeconomics Discussion Paper DP2013-6 (2013).
[41] Mark Gertler and Peter Karadi. “Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and Economic
Activity”. In: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7(1) (2015), pp. 44–76.
[42] Nils Gornemann et al. “Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents”. In: mimeo FRB
Philadelphia and University of Bonn (2012).
[43] Luca Guerrieri and Matteo Iacoviello. “Collateral constraints and macroeconomic asym-
metries”. In: International Finance Discussion Papers 1082, Board of Governors (2014).
[44] Luca Guerrieri and Matteo Iacoviello. Collateral constraints and macroeconomic asymmetries.
International Finance Discussion Papers 1082. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (U.S.), 2015.
[45] Luca Guerrieri and Matteo Iacoviello. “OccBin: A toolkit for solving dynamic models
with occasionally binding constraints easily”. In: Journal of Monetary Economics 70.C (2015),
pp. 22–38.
[46] B. Holmstrom. “Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective”. In: The Review
of Economic Studies 66.1 (1999), pp. 169–182.
[47] Johannes Horner. “Reputation and Competition”. In: American Economic Review 92.3 (2002),
pp. 644–663.
188 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[48] Matteo Iacoviello. “House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the
Business Cycle”. In: American Economic Review vol. 95(3) (2005).
[49] Oscar Jorda, Moritz Schularick, and Alan Taylor. “Betting the House”. In: Mimeo (2014).
[50] Bruno Jullien and In-Uck Park. Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication. The
Centre for Market and Public Organisation 11/272. Department of Economics, University
of Bristol, UK, Mar. 2011.
[51] Alejandro Justiniano, Giorgio Primiceri, and Andrea Tambalotti. “Credit Supply and the
Housing Boom”. In: mimeo, Northwestern University and FRBs Chicago and New York (2014).
[52] Alejandro Justiniano, Giorgio E. Primiceri, and Andrea Tambalotti. “Household Lever-
aging and deleveraging”. In: Review of Economic Dynamics 18(1) (2015), pp. 3–20.
[53] Greg Kaplan, Benjamin Moll, and Giovanni Luca Violante. “Monetary policy according
to HANK”. In: mimeo Princeton University and New York University (2015).
[54] Greg Kaplan and Giovanni Luca Violante. “A Model of the Consumption Response to
Fiscal Stimulus Payments”. In: Econometrica 82(4) (2014), 1199–1239.
[55] Greg Kaplan, Giovanni Luca Violante, and Justin Weidner. “The Wealthy Hand-to-Mouth”.
In: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 48(Spring) (2014), pp. 77–153.
[56] Ben Keys et al. “Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy”. In:
Manuscript Columbia University (2015).
[57] Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore. “Credit Cycles”. In: Journal of Political Economy 105(2)
(1997).
[58] D. Kreps and R. Wilson. “Reputation and Imperfect Information”. In: Journal of Economic
Theory 27.2 (Aug. 1982), pp. 253–279.
[59] George J Mailath and Larry Samuelson. “Who Wants a Good Reputation?” In: Review of
Economic Studies 68.2 (2001), pp. 415–41.
[60] N. Gregory Mankiw. “The Savers-Spenders Theory of Fiscal Policy”. In: American Eco-
nomic Review 90.2 (2000), pp. 120–125.
[61] Robin Mason and Ákos Valentinyi. The existence and uniqueness of monotone pure strategy
equilibrium in Bayesian games. Discussion Paper. 2007.
[62] Karel Mertens and Morten. O. Ravn. “Understanding the Aggregate Effects of Antici-
pated and Unanticipated Tax Policy Shocks”. In: Review of Economic Dynamics 14(1) (2011),
pp. 27–54.
[63] Atif Mian, Kamalesh Rao, and Amir Sufi. “Household Balance Sheets, Consumption, and
the Economic Slump*”. In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128.4 (2013), pp. 1687–1726.
[64] Atif Mian et al. “Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy”. In: Journal of Finance
forthcoming (2015).
[65] David Miles. “Incentives Information and Efficiency in the UK Mortgage Market*”. In:
The Economic Journal 115.502 (2005), pp. C82–C98.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 189
[66] Tommaso Monacelli. “New Keynesian models, durable goods and collateral constraints”.
In: Journal of Monetary Economics 56 (2009), pp. 242–254.
[67] Xavier Ragot. “The case for a financial approach to money demand”. In: Journal of Mone-
tary Economics 62.0 (2014), pp. 94 –107.
[68] Paul Resnick et al. “The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment”. In:
Experimental Economics 9 (2006), pp. 79–101.
[69] Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer. “A New Measure of Monetary Shocks: Deriva-
tion and Implications”. In: American Economic Review 94(4) (2004), pp. 1055–84.
[70] Julio Rotemberg. “Sticky Prices in the United States”. In: Journal of Political Economy 90
(1982), pp. 1187–1211.
[71] Vincent Sterk and Silvana Tenreyro. “The Transmission of Monetary Policy Operations
through Redistributions and Durable Purchases”. In: CEPR DP10785 (2015).
[72] Steven Tadelis. “The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism”. In: Journal of
Political Economy 110.4 (2002), pp. 854–882.
[73] Bernardita Vial. “Walrasian Equilibrium and Reputation under Imperfect Public Moni-
toring”. In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 10.1 (2010), p. 23.
[74] Bernardita Vial and Felipe Zurita. “Competing Reputations under Free Entry”. Universi-
dad de Chile Working Paper. 2012.
[75] Arlene Wong. “Population Aging and the Aggregate Effects of Monetary Policy”. In:
mimeo Northwestern University (2015).
[76] Arlene Wong. Population Aging and the Transmission of Monetary Policy to Consumption. Job
Market Paper. Northwestern University, 2015.
[77] Michael Woodford. Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability. NBER Working Papers 8072. Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, Jan. 2001.
